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President:	Mr. Cárdenas	(Argentina)
Members:	Botswana	Mr. Legwaila
	China	Mr. Wang Xuexian
	Czech Republic	Mr. Kovanda
	France	Mr. Mérimée
	Germany	Mr. Henze
	Honduras	Mr. Martínez Blanco
	Indonesia	Mr. Wisnumurti
	Italy	Mr. Fulci
	Nigeria	Mr. Gambari
	Oman	Mr. Al-Khussaiby
	Russian Federation	Mr. Lavrov
	Rwanda	Mr. Ubalijoro
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir David Hannay
	United States of America	Mrs. Albright

Agenda

An Agenda for Peace

Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations (S/1995/1)

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The meeting resumed at 3.40 p.m.

Mr. Fulci (Italy): The tragic earthquake that has just struck Japan prompts me to open my remarks by joining you, Mr. President, and other speakers in expressing our profound solidarity with and sincere condolences to our Japanese colleague, Ambassador Owada. These are the sentiments not only of the Italian Mission here in New York but also of the Government and the people of Italy as a whole.

Let me begin by expressing Italy's agreement with the statement that will be made shortly by the Permanent Representative of France, Ambassador Mérimée, on behalf of the European Union, to which we fully subscribe. Our national comments are meant only to underline particular aspects or criteria that we deem of special importance.

The "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace", prepared by the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, is a much-appreciated essay that summarizes the challenges facing the United Nations in the aftermath of the cold war, in the light of the experience of the United Nations since the Agenda for Peace was first presented by Mr. Boutros-Ghali. The Secretary-General's reading of international reality largely corresponds to the views of my authorities. Some of these views were expressed in this Chamber only last week by the Italian Foreign Minister.

The proliferation of forces claiming an autonomous role on the international scene multiplies the risks of regional conflicts. Thus, there is a greater need to get to the root of the problems and to adapt the *modus operandi* of the United Nations in this field. Furthermore, in our opinion, peace-keeping operations must not overshadow the other essential tasks established by the Charter: to promote economic development, to protect human rights and to affirm democratic principles. If, as everyone seems to agree, there can be no peace and security without development, then we need a global vision of security.

Allow me to deal with methods before discussing the Secretary-General's suggestions on preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, regional cooperation, sanctions and disarmament.

Concerning methods, the debate over an Agenda for Peace, part II, has taken on a public dimension. For some time now the General Assembly has been discussing the complex issues it raises in the Committee of 34. In last year's Presidential Statements of 3 May, 27 July and 4 November, the Security Council focused on the problems of peace-keeping, stand-by forces and the mechanisms for consultation with troop-contributing countries. Hopefully, like the General Assembly, the Council will continue systematically to study the individual points in the Supplement in order to foster homogeneous and coherent responses to these interdependent issues.

With respect to preventive diplomacy, the crises facing the international community have changed radically and show a tendency to be less reactive to the instruments of classical diplomacy. Thus we must drastically expand the United Nations capacity for early warning, negotiating influence and crisis management. The role of the Secretary-General's Special Envoys in recent success stories, such as Cambodia and Mozambique, cannot be overemphasized.

Therefore, considering also the efforts already made to downsize the Secretariat, the proposal to expand the contingent of high-level personalities, utilizing the indications provided by Member States, seems to us quite pertinent. Rightly, the Secretary-General has remarked on the increased cost that this would entail, especially for long-term support missions. But perhaps support for Special Envoys could also be provided by their own countries, through their embassies.

Peace-keeping operations face numerous sub-problems that cannot be addressed in a single meeting. We remain convinced — as is the Secretary-General — that the United Nations must take a fundamentally different approach to operations under Chapters VI and VII of the Charter. The difference must be in resources and structures, both quantitatively and qualitatively; conditions, where the consensus of the parties is the primary condition; impartiality; the use of force, which should always be the very last resort, as our colleague from Honduras said this morning; and the mandate.

Frankly, we are growing increasingly sceptical about "dual-use operations". When peace-keeping operations are created for interposition or monitoring, or to support humanitarian action, they simply cannot be amplified later on; instead, they should be completely redesigned to fit Chapter VII of the Charter. Furthermore, the transition from one phase to another must correspond to an increased involvement of troop-contributing countries in the decision-making process. We had a very bad experience with this in Somalia, and we will never tire of repeating it again and again.

A second order of problems concerns the United Nations growing difficulty in promptly obtaining suitable forces on a case-by-case basis. We continue to believe in the formula of stand-by forces, even if we share the Secretary-General's perplexity, given the huge gap between availability in theory and availability in practice. But we do not believe that the hypothesis of a rapid reaction force contradicts the model of stand-by forces. One could even project the creation of a rapid reaction force to be deployed only after the consent of the participating nations, as the final outcome of a process that started with stand-by forces.

Those considerations are intertwined with the issues of regional organizations and their role, or of groups of States that may take autonomous initiatives to implement Council decisions. The Secretary-General stresses that this type of operation entails greater responsibility, because it is tied to the use of force — for example, the Gulf War, Somalia and Haiti.

We are convinced that there is growing recognition of the need for more regional cooperation, as demonstrated by the decisions taken at the Budapest Summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) — the former Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Western European Union (WEU) document of Bonn-Petersberg, the Atlantic Summit in Brussels, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Conference in Cairo. The availability of "dedicated" forces for rapid deployment with specific duties, including those of a humanitarian nature, has been discussed and, to certain extent, decided on by the WEU. The OSCE, for its part, has done initial planning for a peace-keeping operation in Nagorny Karabakh.

On another subject, we believe it is important to reflect seriously on the sanctions system. In discussing the extension of the implementation of resolution 943 (1994) a few days ago, the Italian Foreign Minister said:

> "Let us not forget that sanctions hurt people more than they do Governments. By creating the perception of an international conspiracy against the country, sanctions often tend to rally the people around the Government rather than mobilize them against it" (*S/PV.3487, p. 13*)

as sanctions are often meant to do.

Not everyone may agree with the proposals formulated by the Secretary-General for new procedures in the Council's monitoring and assessment of the impact of sanctions. Yet there can be no doubt that in deciding on sanctions the Council must be very selective. Sanctions are an instrument that must be used parsimoniously, and only when there are irrefutable reasons.

The Secretary-General also recalled the commitment expressed at the 1992 Summit meeting to strengthen United Nations capacity in the fields of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. We all share the view that 1995 is an important year in this effort.

De-mining is a key issue in countries that have severe development problems and are dealing with the aftermath of conflicts. This is the direction taken in initiatives of the European Union as well as in the Secretary-General's establishment of a trust fund. Equally noteworthy is the recent creation of a data bank on de-mining at the Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Having already implemented a self-imposed moratorium on land-mines, Italy intends to continue to do its part, and urges further steps towards a true system of international control.

Mr. Gambari (Nigeria): On behalf of the Nigerian Government and people, I wish to convey condolences to the Government and people of Japan for the enormous losses they have suffered as a result of the recent earthquake in that country.

It is appropriate that the Security Council should devote a special session to an open debate on the "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations", and my delegation is grateful to the Secretary-General for this important document. Nigeria fully supports the views expressed by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). However, as a country that is a major troop contributor to both regional and United Nations peace-keeping operations, we would like to make the following additional comments.

The end of the cold war has not, unfortunately, brought about the safer and more peaceful world which was generally hoped for. In his "An Agenda for Peace", released about two and a half years ago, the Secretary-General drew Member States' attention to certain hard decisions which had to be taken to meet the challenges of the post-cold-war era in the areas of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. Quite rightly, the Secretary-General, on his own initiative, also

touched on the related concepts of post-conflict peace-building and peace enforcement.

The document now before us takes stock of the performance of the United Nations in the complex and challenging fields of conflict management and conflict resolution against the background of extant difficulties, and it suggests options for overcoming some of the contradictions immanent in those instruments available to the international community for the maintenance of international peace and security. One cannot but sympathize with the Organization's managers, who, within the short span of two years, have had to cope with a phenomenal increase in the number and volume of crises, as highlighted in the Secretary-General's Supplement. Furthermore, these crises have, in a broader sense, been predominantly intra-State rather that inter-State, sometimes with no clear-cut battle lines and almost always with devastating consequences for non-combatants — in particular, women and children. Clearly, this underlines the dire need for rethinking many aspects of how to cope with such crises and conflicts. It calls for new tools, new concepts and new responses, as well as a greater political commitment and increased resources from Member States of our Organization.

With respect to preventive diplomacy and peace-making, there can be no denying the continued relevance of early warning mechanisms and other preventive means for nipping in the bud or defusing situations of tension before they develop into full-blown conflicts. My Government believes that in order to achieve the desired results of early preventive measures the Secretariat should cast its net far and wide in recruiting personnel with the requisite experience and knowledge of local situations to undertake conflict-prevention missions on behalf of the Secretary-General. Nigeria is ready to make available to the Secretary-General individuals with the necessary skills, background and relevant experience.

My delegation welcomes the flexible manner in which the United Nations has responded so far to the evolving process and challenges of peace-keeping. The lessons learned as a result of this flexible approach need to be further developed. Meanwhile, we can all be justifiably proud of the high degree of professionalism, skill and dedication of our "Blue Helmets" involved in the complex and challenging tasks in the field and on the ground. We salute the entire Secretariat, especially the Department of Peace-keeping Operations and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, for the creativity and dynamism with which they have adapted to the changed and changing circumstances of peace-keeping and conflict management.

However, certain aspects of peace-keeping deserve serious reconsideration. Here I would like to pose a few questions. For example, how do we ensure that mandate periods given to peace-keeping operations are realistically determined, taking into account the complexity of the particular situation, while refraining from using them as instruments to coerce parties in conflict in order to achieve short-term rather than long-term objectives in finding durable solutions to the conflicts in the various areas of the world? Secondly, how can United Nations operations be sustained in the face of unexpected but unavoidable setbacks which tend to erode and undermine the credibility and authority of the United Nations by making the United Nations look as if it wanted to cut and run in conflict situations? I believe it is inappropriate for a peace-making Organization such as ours to cut and run whenever unforeseen difficulties arise in peace-keeping operations. Thirdly, how does the United Nations standardize the procedures and criteria for establishing and terminating peace-keeping operations in order to avoid the perception — or is it the reality? — of double standards?

Nigeria is acutely aware of the difficulties posed to peace-keeping operations by the shortage of troops and equipment. It is important, therefore, that continuing efforts be made by the Secretary-General in respect of stand-by arrangements and that Member States provide the necessary support to translate the proposal into reality — in particular, the support of those who are in a position to provide such badly needed logistic, equipment and training facilities to the proposed force.

The objective, in our opinion, is how to reduce the time-lag between the time the Security Council decides to authorize a peace-keeping operation and the actual full deployment of such an operation on the ground. We would prefer this approach to the idea of a rapid reaction force proposed by the Secretary-General, because we strongly believe that such a rapid reaction force presents many problems.

My delegation ascribes due importance to the Secretary-General's prescription on post-conflict peace-building — an issue which in our view remains pivotal to the establishment of a durable and comprehensive peace in societies that have just undergone crises in which the United Nations has been involved. The scope of assistance which the United Nations could provide

includes the retraining of militia organizations, institutional reforms and the execution of development projects. In this respect, my Government shares the Secretary-General's justifiable concern at the reluctance which Member States have often shown with regard to rendering assistance which is necessary in order to secure the peace that has been gained through peace-keeping operations. There are several examples from our continent, Africa, to illustrate this unfortunate trend. We cannot but hope that Member States will become more forthcoming in supporting peace-building activities, even when such exercises involve additional costs, cognizant of the fact that these efforts may be the best way of assuring that the major efforts already invested in helping to end conflicts are not undermined in the post-conflict period.

The Secretary-General puts his finger right on the contradictions that arise from the employment of sanctions in efforts to maintain or restore international peace and security. Therefore, several questions again need to be addressed. First, how do we, for example, ensure that it is properly targeted to affect the relevant segment of a country's population — that is, usually, the leadership or the senior members of a Government? Secondly, how do we make adequate provisions to protect innocent civilians? Finally, how do we compensate the neighbouring States that often bear the brunt of enforcement, at great expense to their own economies and to their own domestic stability?

My delegation does not underestimate the fact that in certain circumstances, short of the use of military force, sanctions remain one of the most potent instruments available to the international community for achieving compliance from parties unamenable to peaceful negotiations. Indeed, experience has shown that, given the political commitment of all Members to enforce the measures, sanctions could indeed within a short time frame have the desired effects. However, we must not forget that prolonged imposition of sanctions could have the opposite effect of producing greater intransigence and defiance from the people and Government, who may suddenly find common ground by pleading that sanctions are an international conspiracy by the international community to unduly punish them.

An unhealthy development in the area of sanctions is the unilateral imposition of measures by some countries on other States in an attempt to influence the domestic politics of the targeted country. Such unilateral actions give sanctions a very negative connotation and may very well undermine their moral force.

Enforcement action - another issue raised by the Secretary-General - could be part of peacemaking and peace-keeping. It is the view of my delegation that there may not be a dividing line between peacemaking and peace enforcement. We are of course aware that in the present circumstances the United Nations lacks the necessary political backing and resource support from Member States to undertake directly enforcement as envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter.

The past few examples of the collective use of enforcement action have been undertaken by a group of Member States with the blessing of the United Nations. My delegation believes that this may not always be the ideal situation, and present difficulties being faced by the Organization should not be an excuse to contract out to a group of powerful States what would normally be a United Nations responsibility. With the necessary political will and commitment to the ideals of collective security enshrined in the Charter, it is the view of my delegation that multinational forces for peace enforcement could be placed at the disposal of the United Nations and might well operate under the command of the Secretary-General and his staff. This is one of the hard decisions that needs to be taken by Member States.

Effective coordination between the United Nations and other players in conflict situations has been rightly identified by the Secretary-General as crucial to the successful and effective management and resolution of conflicts. It remains critically important that all other agencies, especially Governments, which authorize and finance United Nations activities, continue to lend their full support to the Secretary-General in the discharge of his onerous duties. Especially crucial is the role of regional organizations and the inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations, whose functions must be seen as complementary to the work of the United Nations itself. We share the view of the Secretary-General that the authority and supremacy of the United Nations are vital in these relationships if interregional or institutional rivalries are not to mar the prospects of achieving collective goals and objectives. No less important for the regional organizations, especially for those of developing countries, is adequate assistance from the United Nations through logistic and financial support to enable such regional organizations to execute their mandate in the maintenance of regional peace and security, a mandate which, after all, they exercise for and on behalf of the United Nations. The relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations in the area of peace-keeping is, in the view of my delegation, one of

the most underdeveloped aspects of the Agenda for Peace, which has been under consideration by the international community since 1991.

The conclusions reached by the Secretary-General in his position paper are imaginative and far-reaching, and on the whole very constructive. They underscore in our view a basic need for the United Nations to be responsive to the demands of a changing international political landscape whose form and content are yet to be fully assessed and fully determined so that the continuing legitimacy of the United Nations can be assured.

In this regard, the Secretary-General's "An Agenda for Peace", the "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace" and "An Agenda for Development", should, taken together, form a composite whole from which the United Nations can realistically meet the aspirations of the international community in the collective search for peace, in the collective search for development and the collective pursuit of the well-being of all of our peoples.

Mr. Al-Khussaiby (Oman): May I, on behalf of the Sultanate of Oman, join you, Mr. President, in extending heartfelt condolences to the people and Government of Japan and to the bereaved families of those who died as a result of the severe earthquake.

I should like to begin my statement by conveying my delegation's sincere thanks and appreciation to the Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, for his lucid report on the work of this Organization, entitled "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations".

My delegation associates itself in particular with the position of the Non-Aligned Movement on the Secretary-General's Supplement, as reflected in the statement delivered this morning by the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations on behalf of the countries of that Movement.

The issues addressed in the Secretary-General's report are of crucial significance, prompting all of us to take effective and collective measures to achieve positive developments in line with the fundamental purposes and principles of the Charter on which the creation of this Organization was based.

In recent years the role of the United Nations in the field of the maintenance of international peace and security has been augmented and has evolved by diverse means and as a result of complex situations that have brought to the fore both its potentials and its shortcomings. None the less, the achievements of the United Nations in this field are commendable. In the light of the experience gained in this regard, my delegation is of the opinion that it is high time for the United Nations to undertake a careful review and to approve some clear guidelines for the adoption of urgent and serious approaches that will eventually lead to the establishment of permanent mechanisms to deal with this matter. Therefore, my delegation welcomes the Security Council's timely discussion of this report.

While concurring with the statement of the Ambassador of Indonesia, my delegation would like to highlight additional points that could be taken into consideration with regard to the question of enhancing the United Nations peace-keeping operations and, more so, the means of doing so.

The United Nations can be proud of the achievements of its peace-keeping operations, of which there were 17 at the end of 1994, and of the successes of most of them. Inevitably, in the last few years, we have witnessed the emergence of other, new multidimensional peace-keeping operations. In this context, my delegation would like to recall the three principles highlighted by the Secretary-General in paragraph 33 of his report: the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence and under clearly defined mandates.

We should like to emphasize that it is up to the conflicting parties themselves to assume the responsibility of resolving their conflicts and that the peace-keeping forces should play a complementary role. If it becomes necessary to establish peace-keeping forces, it is obviously better for the United Nations to work closely with the regional organizations or regional groups and the concerned parties, in proportion to the readiness of the latter to cooperate with the mandate of these troops, than to work unilaterally and without the categorical consent of the conflicting parties and even the participation of the regional group.

The regional arrangements world-wide do not in any way undermine the role of the Security Council as the principal body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security; rather, these arrangements must assist in alleviating the Council's workload and in instilling the spirit of sharing and caring

in international affairs. Lessons must be learned from the mistakes of the past so that these lessons may be prevented from recurring.

My delegation would like to reiterate what the Ambassador of Indonesia said with respect to the maintenance of the assessments of Member States agreed upon in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3101 (XXVIII). My delegation also recognizes the necessity for a broad-based discussion by the General Assembly on the report's proposals concerning the fulfilment of the additional financial obligations.

My delegation strongly believes that today's open debate is most opportune and timely. Once again, we are very grateful to the Secretary-General for the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace — his position paper on the historic occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations. This is a very thought-provoking document. We hope that our deliberations today and the informal consultations of the members of the Council will lead to realization of the need for a proper study of objectives and appropriate actions in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

Finally, we hereby recognize and commend the international community's earnest and prompt contributions in respect of the many difficult issues — whether preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, post-conflict peace-building, sanctions or disarmament.

Mr. Kovanda (Czech Republic): Some three months ago, Mr. Josef Zieleniec, my Foreign Minister, highlighted in his statement to the General Assembly some success factors of those peace-keeping operations that have worked, and he contrasted them with some of the struggling ones. He said:

> "We must ... draw the necessary lessons." *(Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, Plenary Meetings, 15th meeting, p. 15)*

This is exactly what the Secretary-General and his collaborators have done by summarizing and assessing the experiences that have transpired in our efforts to maintain international peace and security over the past few years.

Why such a synthesis was called for is clear from the Secretary-General's statistics on the upsurge of these activities since 1988 — a period during which the number of peace-keeping operations has increased from 5 to 17. These statistics imply that during this period the number of military personnel deployed in the average peace-keeping operation has just about doubled, and the annual cost of the average peace-keeping operation has increased by a factor of almost five. It would seem that the average peace-keeping operation is much more resource-intensive today than six or seven years ago.

The question is, of course, whether "average peace-keeping operation" is a useful concept. Are the foregoing inferences, while they are correct, relevant? Some insights might be garnered from disaggregating extant peace-keeping operations by size.

Today, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) is in a class by itself. Disregarding the rapidly diminishing United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), UNPROFOR, with its almost 40,000 people, is by an entire order of magnitude larger than the next group of operations. This next group includes the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, and until recently it included United Nations Operation in Mozambique — each with some 5,000 people. The United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force and the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission have about 1,000 people each, and the remaining nine operations each feature a few dozen to a few hundred people.

Now, when we exclude UNPROFOR and UNOSOM II from the total sample the analysis of the changing size of peace-keeping operations looks quite different. Outside these two operations, we are fielding only some 20,000 people in peace-keeping operations, and the average size of each has actually decreased — from around 2,000 personnel in 1988 to fewer than 1,400 today.

The Secretary-General disaggregates peace-keeping operations qualitatively, as he analyses the changes in the nature of conflicts that they deal with. One important change is the shift from purely international conflicts, which were the predominant concern of the Security Council in earlier years, to conflicts that either are domestic ones outright or follow on the heels of the disintegration of a larger State.

This type of conflict entails different characteristics. Adversaries do not include only well-defined armies facing each other along a well-defined line. Rather, ill-defined and uncoordinated armed groups often operate throughout the territory, not only fighting their armed

adversaries but also preying on or outright attacking civilian populations.

This situation calls for a different, far more complex, response of peace-keepers, and, by implication, a different mandate. The Secretary-General makes the very interesting distinction between classical peace-keeping operations and multifunctional ones. In multifunctional operations, peace-keepers have much more to do: in addition to their traditional task of monitoring buffer zones and cease-fires, they provide humanitarian relief, protect humanitarian operations of other agencies and non-governmental organizations and, even more important perhaps, their political role is heightened: they nurture in myriad ways the implementation in the field of a settlement reached at a conference table. The list of specific tasks — and the report does contain one — is indeed long.

Two big examples of multifunctional operations are provided: Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Somalia. We note that the success of the first of these operations has been rather limited — limited so far largely to preventing the expansion and dousing the intensity of the fighting — while the second operation has been, in political terms at least, largely unsuccessful. This lack of success may well have been caused by burdening the mandates of these operations with tasks that implicitly require the use of force, mandates that were thus based on the logic of peace-enforcement rather than of peace-keeping. The Secretary-General suggests that such tasks included protecting humanitarian operations during continued warfare, protecting civilian populations in safe areas, and pressing for reconciliation rather faster than the parties could handle.

Those are very serious points, and since it is the Security Council that draws up the mandates of peace-keeping operations, albeit on the recommendation of the Secretariat, they deserve our serious reflection. For it is probably not a coincidence that precisely the two largest peace-keeping operations, which together skew the overall statistics, are, on the one hand, the most typical multifunctional ones and, on the other, among the less successful ones. In studying the lessons they offer we will be touching on the limits of the possible in peace-keeping operations. One immediate lesson is that simply continuing to increase the size of a peace-keeping operation leads to diminishing returns. What I mean is that even the largest peace-keeping operation cannot enforce peace, whilst enforcement may be a task beyond our capacities altogether. It may indeed be that when enforcement is needed we well-nigh have to look to the mechanism of farming out the task, such as to groups of States, as outlined in the sub-chapter on enforcement action.

Nevertheless, of the several instruments at our disposal for safeguarding peace and security, peace-keeping is still one of the principal ones, the one employed most often and the one with which we have the greatest experience.

And to what ends? Once we treat UNPROFOR and UNOSOM as special cases, we end up with a mixed bag of results. We have the "classics," the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), in place for 15, 20, 30, even 45 years or more, in situations where the United Nations has well-nigh run out of steam, ideas, often even initiative, and where any further change is most likely going to depend on events beyond the control of this Organization. We are in a holding pattern. The Secretary-General might as well remind us that international problems cannot be solved quickly or within a limited time. We should not lose sight of the fact that a peace-keeping operation is not an end in itself but rather a means toward the political settlement of a conflict. And if the settlement is nowhere on the horizon, does the time never come when we pack up and go?

Of the more recent operations, some are clearly successful, and the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) is an outstanding example of these — and let me stress that it was also a multifunctional operation par excellence; others are grinding away towards a resolution more or less fuzzily outlined on the horizon. Reflecting upon them indicates very clearly one important point: they are all different, every one of them is sui generis. None of these peace-keeping operations is even four years old, and fully half of them are less than two years old. But even within this group, being able to chalk up accomplishments in El Salvador, Namibia and Cambodia, in addition to Mozambique, is in and of itself a source of encouragement and pride.

Allow me merely to touch on some of the different instruments for strengthening peace and security mentioned in the report.

We agree with the Secretary-General — and, indeed, who would not? — that preventive diplomacy is preferable to resolving a conflict that has turned violent. The domestic nature of most conflicts is of course a difficulty here. We share the opinion that States should be automatically willing to accept the good offices of the United Nations, however far we may still be from this doctrine. Resorting to Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter is one way of legally buttressing these United Nations efforts. We would, however, hope that flagrant violations of human rights might in and of themselves constitute a good enough reason for the United Nations to step in. We draw attention to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which has agreed that the principle of non-interference does not apply to situations affecting human rights protection.

For preventive diplomacy one needs, so to speak, "preventive diplomats," of which there is a dearth. It is perhaps of interest that the OSCE is developing a database of qualified, capable personalities. This is an idea the United Nations might wish to adopt, and it might perhaps even cooperate with the OSCE in utilizing its resources.

A number of important issues are discussed in the sub-chapter on peace-keeping. We are often frustrated by the lack of information, even as we do acknowledge the value of information the Secretariat provides us at just about every informal consultation of the Council. Still, we will continue to be bewildered every time we hear from other sources, for example from the press, of developments which clearly affect the situation on the ground, and which the Secretariat is not in a position to confirm or deny. The need for full substantiation of statements is clear; nevertheless, one wonders whether the omission, albeit unwitting, of important facts, does not sometimes have the same effect as the commission of informational blunders.

Unity of command is a principle we wholeheartedly support. Everyone else does too. So where is the problem? We would appreciate an evaluation of why the principle has been breached in some instances. Was it a manifestation of a Government's fickleness? Was it a result of excessive sensitivity to domestic public opinion — and who but the local politician can be the arbiter of that? Or was it perhaps a manifestation of lack of trust in the existing command? And, if so, are we doing all we can to appoint only the highest-calibre, universally respected soldiers to commanding posts?

We have taken note of the Secretary-General's disapproving remarks in this sub-chapter concerning the Security Council's alleged increased propensity for micro-management. Other critical remarks addressed to the Council occur elsewhere in the document, and we reserve the right to discuss these important issues on some other occasion.

The sub-chapter on disarmament contains very important points on what the Secretary-General has privately described as "macro-disarmament": dealing with weapons of mass destruction. My Government is very keen on being a part of these efforts, but we feel other opportunities might be even more suitable for their in-depth discussion. For the record, though, let me stress the importance we attach to the forthcoming conference of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and to the early entering into force of the chemical weapons Convention.

As for micro-disarmament, my country supports efforts to limit the arms trade. The position and policies of my country since 1990 are well known. Suffice it to say that micro-disarmament as an issue cannot be separated from the world arms trade, with all the complexities that that entails. We contribute information to the United Nations Register of Conventional Weapons, and we also support efforts to reduce civilian casualties from land-mines and have taken important national steps to this end.

As for sanctions, setting clear-cut criteria for imposing and lifting them would perhaps be desirable. We see a difference here between the political role of setting such criteria in every individual case and the technical role of determining whether the criteria have been met. We really ought to avoid giving the impression that the Security Council is, so to speak, moving the goal posts while the game is on, even if developments in the target country do not follow our original expectations.

Sanctions are indeed a double-edged sword. Let us clearly state that well-targeted sanctions do have an important role to play. On the other hand, though, we know that they often stimulate the mobilization of domestic resources; in the short run, at least, they often strengthen rather than weaken the intended political target; they may inspire the population's mistrust in the international community. Gaps in a sanctions regime have a multiplier detrimental effect on their overall effectiveness and can exacerbate their counterproductive aspects, giving rise to ingenious ways of further obviating their intended role.

The effect of sanctions on third countries is the unfairest side effect. No argument can be found for justifying the suffering of a third country that arises strictly from the accident of its geographical proximity. Quite frankly, though, we know of no simple solution and are grateful to the Secretary-General for his efforts, though they have so far been fruitless, in exploring some novel avenues.

Despite certain doubts we all have about the effectiveness of sanctions and their impact on vulnerable segments of the civilian population, they are nevertheless one of the very few instruments we have at our disposal. We do, however, by and large support the Secretary-General's recommendations contained in paragraph 75 of his report.

In a separate chapter, the Secretary-General discusses cooperation with regional organizations. Two of the forms such cooperation can take is co-deployment and joint operations. My delegation is particularly taken by the four principles he stresses for such cooperation, namely, establishing an agreed mechanism for consultations; respecting the primacy of the United Nations; clearly defining the division of tasks; and maintaining consistency, for instance of standards for peace-keeping operations.

Elsewhere in the document, the Secretary-General discusses in a fresh way enforcement action by groups of States. Recalling the war in Korea usefully reminds us that this concept was not invented recently, even though it is only recently that it has been employed with any frequency. What we would recommend is some reflection as to whether the same or similar principles that apply to peace-keeping cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations should not also explicitly apply between the United Nations and the ad hoc groups of States entrusted with enforcement.

In this regard, we would like to see an additional principle emphasized — the principle of transparency. Two elements should be considered here. First, there is a need for regular information to be provided by United Nations sources on the performance of the regional organization or of the group of States, information that would pay particular attention to the enforcer's impartiality. The second element is the need for up-to-date information provided by the regional organization or group of States itself to the Security Council. These principles are, by and large, being observed today, but we would like to see them become a truly integral and routine part of our decision-making.

In conclusion, let me thank the Secretary-General and his team for the extraordinary document they have presented. My not touching on every one of its aspect suggests how rich it is, rather than a lack of interest on our part. The Security Council, dealing as it does day in and day out with the world's fires, seldom has the time or opportunity to sit back and contemplate the broader picture. The urgent usually pushes the important off our agenda. The document we are discussing today provides us precisely with the important, with the broader picture, and we will draw on it for a long time to come, I am sure.

Let me at this point also pay homage to the thousands of men and women whose dedicated work has allowed the Secretary-General to observe that

> "More progress has been made in the past few years towards using the United Nations as it was designed to be used than many could ever have predicted" (*S/1995/1, para. 105*).

and especially to salute those who in this effort have laid down their lives.

Mr. Ubalijoro (Rwanda): My delegation would like to pay a tribute to the Secretary-General for his useful, stimulating and encouraging "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace". We should also like to express our solidarity with and convey our condolences to the people of Japan for the suffering they are enduring as a result of the disaster created by the earthquake in their country.

After the end of the cold war, many African countries had hoped that the new era of political détente would open new horizons for them. As the new geopolitical order was forming, we realized that we had fallen into another vain illusion. It is fitting to note that some countries have even been victimized by this new political scenario.

After the genocide it experienced, our country is facing a challenge unprecedented in its history. We fully concur with and support the Secretary-General's idea on the concept of peace-building, because it is very relevant to our status quo. Currently, we are facing huge problems regarding reconstruction, rehabilitation and socio-economic development. Our greatest preoccupation is the reconciliation of the Rwandese people. The international community should realize that if it is to promote peace, stability and prosperity in developing countries, its efforts should be aimed at strengthening and

reinforcing the pillars of such factors as unity, justice and social well being in developing countries. Our Government is more than determined to take the reins of its destiny and lead its people to the brightest, most peaceful and prosperous future that its current limited economic, infrastructural and organizational capacities can provide.

Our country wishes to convey its appreciation to all the troop-contributing countries, especially those that are presently based on our territory. Given that our country is a beneficiary of such aid, we believe that it would be constructive to make a fundamental suggestion to all troop-contributing countries. We should like to express our concern at the lack of dialogue between troop-contributing countries and parties that are concerned with peace-keeping activities. As the Secretary-General points out, it is more than necessary to overcome the reluctance of countries that are a part of a conflict in which the United Nations desires to intervene. Therefore, dialogue should be encouraged between all parties concerned, either directly or indirectly, in order to harmonize the activities of peace-keeping.

Our delegation feels that, after the traumatizing genocide experience in our country, the United Nations should treasure one of the most important and valuable lessons it has learned in its 50 years of activity. We are sorry to have to continuously reiterate our allegations as we recall for the umpteenth time the Security Council's resolution of April last year to decrease the United Nations troops at the most crucial, dramatic, needy, indeed helpless, moment in our country's history. It is pitiful to have to note this contradiction: that one month later the same Security Council that had decided to pull out the United Nations peace-keeping troops reviewed its position by proposing to redeploy its troops in Rwanda. Unfortunately, the time-table was no longer on the side of the United Nations. The United Nations was not able to intervene in a rapid, correct and efficient manner as thousands of human lives were being extinguished.

In conclusion, we would like to recall the Secretary-General's view on the subject of "micro-disarmament". Even though our country adheres to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, our concerns and preoccupations on this issue are oriented in a different manner. We are appalled by the volume of trade in light weapons, which are a major threat to the security of most developing African countries. We do not wish to speak rhetorically on this matter, but our assessment — made with extreme caution and realism — is that we judge such weapons can create a disaster that can compare to the dangerous effects of a nuclear explosion. In our country, such weapons have created genocide, causing more than a million deaths in only three months — a world record for the intensity of massacres.

The President *(interpretation from Spanish):* I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of the Argentine Republic.

My delegation thanks the Secretary-General for preparing and submitting the position paper in document S/1995/1, entitled "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace".

This document is as opportune as it is well thought out. It is as stimulating as it is thought-provoking. It is just the kind of document that we need during this transitional period, when it is wise for us to stop — despite the urgency — and think about results and experiences, and thereby affirm or correct our course.

As is clear from today's meeting, the Security Council is beginning a task of discussion and analysis which will take some time, following the procedures of the Council in this respect, and which we hope will result in the necessary definitions and adjustments.

Nevertheless, my delegation attributes special importance to this meeting, because we believe that the opportunity to hear the opinion of Member States, especially those that are now members of the Security Council, is an exercise that will be of benefit to all.

On this occasion we should like to express our preliminary views on some of the many questions referred to by the Secretary-General. We do not intend to make an exhaustive analysis or to deal with all the subjects referred to in the report. Throughout this exercise that is beginning today we shall have ample time and opportunity to do that. We should, however, like to refer to some questions that we feel lend themselves particularly to some comments now.

It is true that, as the Secretary-General says, we are in a time of transition. This is aptly described in chapter II of his report, relating to the quantitative and qualitative changes that have taken place since the end of the cold war. But we would point that there is a difference between a disorderly transition and a the well-thought-out transition that is advocated. It is the same kind of difference that there is between lightning and a lamp: both shed light, but the former is ephemeral, dangerous and not very trustworthy, whereas the latter is constant,

safe, and definitely predictable. That is why the message sent us by the Secretary-General is so opportune. That is also why there is a need for this debate that is now beginning, on his initiative.

It is also quite true that we must adopt decisions — some of them perhaps difficult; but that is usually the way it is. Otherwise, there might be some doubt about the maturity of the commitment of Member States to the Organization. We shall revert to this matter later.

We are concerned at the Secretary-General's reference, in regard to the new types of intra-State conflicts with which our Organization has to deal, as firmly as is required, to the fact that

> "Civilians are the main victims and often the main targets". *(S/1995/1, para. 12)*

This is a clarion call. It cannot be ignored, because what is involved is the direct defence of the human being and his dignity. The international community cannot remain indifferent to the magnitude of the problem set out by the Secretary-General, which is at the very centre of humanitarian law. But we have the sad feeling that, despite that categorical and accurate affirmation, we have strayed from the path to civilization. We must immediately undertake the effort to redress this situation.

We are particularly pleased with chapter III of the Secretary-General's paper, on the instruments for the promotion of peace and security.

With regard to preventive diplomacy, we would point to the efforts and progress during the past few years.

The restructuring of the Department of Political Affairs has been quite wise. It is now possible to follow up more closely and thoroughly the tensions that could lead to regional or international crises. It is always wiser to prevent or stop conflicts before they break out. But, generally speaking, this is also the best way to make use of the meagre resources available.

Sometimes, regrettably, egotism, distrust or petty or transitory interests make people reluctant today to request or accept the helpful collaboration of our Organization. Nevertheless, without the assent of the contending parties, there is very little, strictly speaking, that the United Nations can do to prevent conflicts. That is why we would encourage the Secretary-General to persevere on the path initiated by this chapter, despite the difficulties or obstacles he may face.

In this connection, we would like to refer to the financial solutions that have been proposed, in particular those for small field missions — small in size but with a usefulness that would be far from small.

As a preliminary view, we are inclined to choose the option of using for preventive diplomacy existing credits for unforeseen and extraordinary activities. We believe that at a later stage it might be appropriate to have a specific heading in the budget for activities related to preventive diplomacy. But, of course, we do not want in that way to reduce funds that are allocated today to social activities or activities related to the promotion of development.

With regard to the maintenance of peace, the categorical restatement of the traditional philosophy in the matter is of transcendental importance. The logic of peace has a price. It is clear today that to forget or overlook this not only places us on the wrong path, but is also dangerous.

Consent of the parties, impartiality, non-use of force: these are the three central pillars of this traditional philosophy. But if there is not strict and sacred adherence to them, we shall lose from sight the minimum flexibility that is indispensable to saving or protecting lives, particularly of civilians or of those who generously expose themselves to danger so that our Organization can accomplish its mission or so that humanitarian assistance can be given to those who are suffering the consequences of war. We must express all our appreciation and gratitude for the work that has been done and the efforts that have been exerted.

We agree that during these critical times we cannot, generally speaking, impose peace-keeping operations. These are technical alternatives, measures of last resort, after all other efforts have failed.

We believe that the mechanism for consultation between the Security Council and the Secretariat is flexible. But improvements can always be made. In particular, horizontal sharing of information with all delegations, in time, is indispensable, in respect of political decision-making by the Security Council.

Here I should like to point out that the Security Council is not discharging all its responsibilities in the

decisions to start or conclude peace-keeping operations. We must not fall into the habit of becoming involved in details. We must be properly and constantly informed about the development of peace-keeping operations, specifically those that, because of their scope and complexity, are mutifaceted or require the participation of large contingents of personnel, exposed to changing circumstances and, frequently, danger.

The Charter of the United Nations, in Article 41, confers primary responsibility — I repeat: primary responsibility — on the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. It makes it clear that the action expected from this body must be rapid and effective. This is stated expressly. The very nature of the Council's delicate mission requires this, but there can be no rapidity or effectiveness if there is no coordination. That is why the constant, ongoing flow of information is, I repeat, indispensable for the collegial efforts of the Security Council.

We would also emphasize the systematic implementation of consultations between the Security Council, the troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat - which, indeed, is already part of the routine of our Organization.

Governments of countries that, with the nobility that this requires, are contributing troops to the United Nations, have the right and the responsibility to be heard and to be informed, on a regular basis, of the military and political developments relating to the operation in which they are taking part. They must be able at all times to report to their people on the progress of their respective operations.

Unity in the chain of command is undoubtedly another fundamental principle in ensuring the success of these peace-keeping undertakings. The importance of this question increases in direct proportion to the dangers or the risks posed by the tasks being undertaken.

As regards reserve or stand-by forces, the Argentine Republic was one of the first countries to receive the Secretary-General's Mission charged with dealing with this question, and we were also one of the first 35 Member States explicitly to commit resources and units to this end.

As to the proposal to create a rapid reaction force, which would be a kind of strategic reserve for the Security Council, we believe that this is an interesting initiative and one that deserves careful study in all its aspects, without ruling out components of a policing nature that could be incorporated into it.

Let us now turn to the chapter on post-conflict peace-building. It must be understood that after every conflict there are socio-economic and humanitarian questions that must be tackled or resolved if there is to be a lasting peace. The medium- and long- term consolidation of ongoing military efforts will depend on successful reconstruction or rehabilitation. We must be able to count on having the necessary resources and be sure that maximum use can be made of them. One example is the central role played by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the Haitian crisis, when, on President Aristide's return, it was able to resume its activities in that country. It is now in charge of the coordination and promotion of all multilateral technical assistance and of most bilateral assistance in this new stage of the restoration of democracy.

Depending on circumstances, this could involve assigning technical, economic and financial assistance tasks at various levels: development of the institutions indispensable to the functioning of democracy; respect for human rights; and tasks related to health, education, the environment and justice, when related to peace-building.

In this connection, at the initiative of our country, the Executive Board of UNDP raised the indicative planning figure for Haiti to the level it was at before the recent budgetary cut of 30 per cent which affected all Member States. This is just one example, in our view, of how economic and political decisions complement each other. This is an example of the consistency needed within the framework of a strategy for sustainable human development in the post-conflict stage.

At the same time, we would like to refer to the potential of the General Assembly's recent resolution 49/139 B, regarding the participation of "White Helmets", volunteers in United Nations activities in the area of humanitarian assistance. This is on the understanding that this initiative will make it possible to channel into peace-keeping efforts all the energy that can be mobilized in the private sector. We are anxiously awaiting proposals that have been requested of the Secretary-General regarding the implementation of this mechanism.

Finally, we would like to mention the excellent experience accumulated over the past few years regarding assistance in electoral processes. This has allowed

conflicts that otherwise might have dragged on to be resolved harmoniously. In the post-conflict period much valuable experience has been acquired recently, experience upon which much can be built.

As regards cooperation and coordination between the United Nations and regional organizations, since the Agenda for Peace was first circulated there have been a number of instances of tasks being divided between our Organization and regional organizations of various levels and types. Although it is not a matter now of drawing up a balance sheet, we would say that on the whole the results have been positive, and we should encourage the continuation and strengthening of these experiences. We do not want to lay down strict guidelines for the modalities of such cooperation, although — just as an indication — we regard as relevant the principles set forth by the Secretary-General in paragraph 86 of his Supplement. We are convinced that these principles must be evaluated and applied on a case-by-case basis, since the subjects of this cooperation may be extremely diverse, depending on circumstances, as we have seen.

If a conflict is subject to direct action by the Council, it is evident that the most important part of the management of the conflict rests with the Council itself, and that the assignment of tasks and the division and coordination of work and responsibilities all fall within the scope of Security Council decisions. We must bear in mind the — at times — scant similarity between the procedures of the political bodies of different international organizations, and attempt to make them compatible. The same applies to the ability of regional bodies to react; the resources and information available to them; and the duration of the crisis, depending on the sphere it occurs in.

As regards disarmament, my delegation would like to make a few brief comments. Argentina believes that since the Summit meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992 significant progress has been made in the area of non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control. It is time to reaffirm that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a threat to international peace and security, which falls under the jurisdiction of this Council. The Government of Argentina attaches special importance to the 1995 Conference on the review and extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Congress of the nation approved the Treaty in law 24.448, and the ratification instruments are now being deposited.

My delegation fully agrees with the general guidelines laid down by the Secretary-General regarding "micro-disarmament". This can play a central role in the prevention of many conflicts. We are convinced that the proliferation of light weapons throughout the world and the illegal traffic in them are a complex challenge that must be faced immediately by the international community.

Regarding the proliferation of anti-personnel mines, we would like to repeat that my country, sharing the growing concern of the international community, has declared a five-year moratorium on their export, sale and transfer. We therefore support the establishment of a permanent regime to eliminate these weapons.

I shall now refer briefly to economic sanctions, an instrument almost as old as international relations themselves, since Pericles himself, in 432 B.C., first used them, in his memorable Megaria decree. The main thing to remember is that they are specifically to be found in Article 41 of the Charter as an instrument available to the Security Council. They have sometimes been used successfully, as in the case of the former Southern Rhodesia and later with regard to South Africa. However, since 1990 economic sanctions have been imposed repeatedly by the Security Council in various forms, and recent experience has shown, as the Secretary-General suggests in his report, that there must be an in-depth re-examination of the way in which the sanctions have been applied.

The case of Haiti, *inter alia*, is an example. On the one hand, sanctions were improved step by step, in so far as that was possible without losing their effectiveness, in order to try to focus them on those responsible in the de facto Government. At the same time, effective measures were planned to control the impact on the humanitarian situation and assure the supply of food and medicine.

The Argentine Republic believes that sanctions should be resorted to in exceptional cases and should be interpreted narrowly, for they are an instrument of deterrence or coercion, not a penalty.

It is time to review the procedures of the Sanctions Committees and the processes involved in renewing sanctions. We should consider periodically reviewing the various sanctions regimes in order to bring them into line with the conflicts that initiated them.

At the same time, these are a useful instrument available to the international community. Sanctions, even if because of their stigmatizing, can prevent or postpone

the use of a more serious measure: military force, which we should turn to only as a last resort. Therefore, economic sanctions must be used as a flexible instrument that is adapted to a particular situation and that can be adjusted when the political objectives established by the Council are attained.

The management of sanctions always requires a difficult combination of prudence, reasonableness and firmness. To be effective they must be rigorously precise and meticulously customized so as to reduce the possibility of causing unnecessary damage and of building up the resistance of those on whom they are imposed. They must be applied by the entire international community, and without exception, and with the same criteria. Furthermore, during the shortest possible period of time in which they can begin to take effect, we must be able to evaluate their results and their efficacy.

It should be pointed out that the utilization of sanctions has not yet been combined with the alternative of resorting simultaneously to incentives, so that reward and punishment are intertwined in coherent policy plans intended to influence or modify behaviour that threatens international peace and security. This alternative holds great possibilities and opens up a wide field for thinking about enriching the instruments at the disposal of the international community to make its work more effective and, perhaps, its policies less onerous.

Providing the United Nations with the necessary resources to deal with its responsibilities as the central institution in the conduct of international relations is the responsibility of all. The attainment of this objective will contribute significantly to the consolidation of peace in the world and will also enhance the Organization's credibility.

Obvious though it may be, it must be repeated — because of the considerable sums of money still owed to the United Nations — that there can be no effective operation without Member States' proper fulfilment of their financial responsibilities, in accordance with their clear obligations under the Charter.

With respect to the financial crisis affecting us, I wish to say that we should not shirk our responsibilities. We shall continue to work tirelessly in the framework of the General Assembly to respond to the Secretary-General's timely initiative and to try to provide permanent and suitable solutions. As long as some Member States are still very much in arrears in their contributions, the great potential of the United Nations for peace and development will never materialize. What is worse, the international community will continue to send a negative signal *vis-à-vis* the United Nations, that of a lack of genuine commitment to the ideals and principles that inspired its creation half a century ago.

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

Mr. Mérimée (France) (*interpretation from French*): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union.

I should like first to thank the Secretary-General for his excellent report entitled "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations". This important document provides timely help for the Council and the General Assembly to ponder in depth all facets of the objectives and means of maintaining international peace and security. It rounds out the important contribution of "An Agenda for Peace", which remains a useful basis for reflection by Member States.

The report of the Secretary-General quite rightly stresses the importance of preventive diplomacy and post-conflict peace-building. It emphasizes that the concept of peace-keeping, especially in the form of peace-keeping operations, is an irreplaceable instrument and that there is a need to improve the capacity for rapid deployment of United Nations troops. It takes into consideration various aspects of the resort to enforcement measures, military and non-military alike, and calls for caution in this regard. In all these areas the Secretary-General underlines the importance of cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations.

Recourse to the methods of preventive diplomacy and peacemaking is the best means of preventing the outbreak or exacerbation of conflicts and of avoiding situations in which the Security Council must decide to launch a peace-keeping operation. Conflict prevention includes assistance to countries that are making progress towards democracy and the monitoring of elections. The establishment of and respect for human rights and the rights of individuals belonging to minorities, as well as measures to promote economic and social stability, are other basic elements of prevention.

We attach particular importance to preventive diplomacy. We support the intensification and improved

integration of efforts between the United Nations system and regional organizations in order to better identify situations that may give rise to conflicts.

We also support the initiatives of a number of countries, including European countries, that have provided the Secretary-General with a list of personalities, experts and resources likely to help the Secretariat to carry out fact-finding, mediation or good-offices missions in parts of the world where disputes may surface or be exacerbated. We support the Secretary-General's suggestion that the personalities so designated should also be available for long-term missions. We also support the efforts to ensure regular financing for preventive-diplomacy and peacemaking missions. By strengthening personnel and material resources available for United Nations preventive-diplomacy activities, we would be bolstering the confidence of the international community in the Organization's capacity in this field and helping make better use of the resources available to the United Nations as a whole.

I should like to take this opportunity to recall the European Union's support for the preventive deployment of troops, including stationing them on only one side of a border, in order to help stabilize a tense situation, where the consent of all the Governments concerned is lacking. Preventive deployment, such as that carried out in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, should be used in other cases as well, whenever it seems useful and possible to do so.

In cases where a peace-keeping operation has been necessary, we believe it is legitimate and useful for the United Nations to maintain a presence on the ground after the end of the operation in order to ensure that its action is followed up in such a way as to contribute to a lasting restoration of peace through measures for coordinated consolidation in the economic, social, institutional, electoral, humanitarian and human rights fields. This method has already been proven on many occasions, particularly in Namibia and Cambodia. It deserves to be continued, as is intended in El Salvador and Mozambique. Indeed, it would be difficult to understand if, after having put so much effort into an operation that was probably burdensome, complex and costly, the United Nations were to withdraw without taking measures designed to secure the results. Peace-building activities can also be useful, without the deployment of a peace-keeping operation, to prevent conflict or remedy its consequences.

These measures could be planned from the outset in the mandates or the political agreements between the parties before the launching or in the course of an operation. In any case, the transfer to the competent bodies of the peace-building functions assumed within the framework of a peace-keeping operation should be planned and organized. We believe it is necessary to have a transitional phase between an operation under the aegis of the Security Council and actions that are the responsibility of other parts of the United Nations system, so as to preserve a political logic in the implementation of consolidation measures.

The question of rapid deployment of peace-keeping operations remains crucial. Speed of deployment depends largely on the capacity of Member States themselves to meet manpower and material needs. In this regard, we favour the idea of studying the stockpiling of reserves of the United Nations to use material left over from already completed operations already completed for the start-up phase of new operations. We also believe it to be necessary to improve — as has been shown by the time taken in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda — arrangements for contacts between Governments which are contributing troops to the United Nations and those that are providing equipment. In this respect, we support the concept proposed by the Secretariat of calling upon Member States to equip and train battalions provided by other States in the form of an overall allocation within a given time-frame.

Arrangements relating to stand-by forces, the principle of which was endorsed in the Presidential statement on 27 July 1994, should make it possible to anticipate the planning phase of operations and to reduce the time between the adoption of a resolution and the deployment of a force. In principle, this system does not guarantee that contingents will be provided for a given operation, since States which agreed to participate are under no obligation to respond automatically. However, we think that if enough States commit themselves to it the system of stand-by force modules is an appropriate response to the question of rapid deployment. The European Union hopes that the Secretariat will continue to develop this concept and to attract support from other Member States. The European Union feels that particular attention should be given to the greatest possible capacity for interaction between contingents and that the system of stand-by forces should be supplemented by a similar exercise with regard to command structures and civilian components.

Other measures to improve the capacity for rapid deployment can be considered within a regional framework.

All the members of the Union are also members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Furthermore, the member countries of the European Union are either fully-fledged members or observers in the Western European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In these bodies, procedures have been worked out to support peace-keeping operations and to contribute to them.

Particular attention should also be given to the improvement of peace-keeping capacity in Africa. The African countries, through the Organization of African Unity in particular, should also improve their internal cooperation as well as their cooperation with other organizations or Member States. This cooperation concerns the training of troops, stockpiling equipment and necessary logistical planning in order to mobilize urgently personnel and contingents for preventive diplomacy missions, humanitarian actions and peace-keeping operations under the United Nations. Members of the European Union are now considering arrangements for cooperation with African States within this context.

Furthermore, the European Union has noted with interest the Secretary-General's proposal to create a United Nations rapid reaction capacity. This proposal, however, should be examined most carefully in the light of its practical implications and its political and financial consequences.

It should also be recalled that an essential condition for the rapid deployment of peace-keeping forces is the availability of financial resources, particularly for the start-up phase. That is why the European Union stresses that it is imperative, for Member States, pursuant to their obligations under the Charter, to pay their assessments for the financing of activities they have approved.

Rapid deployment and, more generally, the success of peace-keeping operations, depend on the political will of States to shoulder their responsibilities for peace-keeping. This will should be strengthened by improving arrangements for consultation and exchange of information with countries providing contingents, as mentioned in the Presidential statement of 4 November 1994.

The Secretary-General in his report touches on the delicate question of enforcement measures, whether it be the imposition and effects of sanctions and the effects of them or military measures involving the use of force.

The European Union has supported the sanctions regimes against certain States or entities. These measures are indeed the only enforcement instrument, apart from the use of force. We consider that sanctions against States or entities which have contravened international law are not designed to punish their populations, but are an exceptional but necessary measure, when it comes to exerting pressure on a Government to bring about a change of attitude on its part where diplomatic means alone have proved inadequate to achieve this goal. Sanctions must have a precise goal. The acts of a State or entity which will make it possible to ease or lift sanctions must be defined when they are adopted. Sanctions should also be regularly examined. As to their effects, we believe that requests for exemption in connection with humanitarian activities must be examined rapidly by the relevant Committees in such a way as to prevent unnecessary suffering on the part of the civilian populations. Furthermore, we should continue to study, in particular having resort to the expertise of the Bretton Woods institutions, means of helping Member States which have suffered indirect damage because of the application of sanctions in the interests of international peace and security.

With regard to the use of force and military enforcement measures, a number of comments can be made. It is true that a peace-keeping operation is more likely to succeed if it is undertaken with the consent of the parties and without the use of force. It is always preferable, as the Secretary-General quite rightly points out, for the prestige and resources of the United Nations — and, indeed, those of Member States — not to be committed in an attempt to prevent a crisis or put an end to one, except within the framework of a process which enjoys the consent of the parties.

The fact remains that the use of force entails dangers for an operation if it does not possess the necessary military resources to face its consequences and if the conditions with regard to the definition of the mandate in the command structure and the conduct of operations have not been met.

The unfortunately fluctuating nature of crises faced by the international community should mean that we never reject the possibility — in the absence of the consent of the parties, and even against their will in certain exceptional circumstances, if the situation so

requires — of our Organization's deciding to have recourse to the enforcement measures provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter. Otherwise, we would collectively be sending a very negative signal about the Organization's will to ensure respect for international law.

The European Union wholeheartedly supports the intention of the Secretary-General to develop coordination and cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations by means of consultation, diplomatic support, mutual operational support, co-deployment and joint operations in compliance with a number of principles: primacy of the United Nations in accordance with the Charter; clear-cut division of labour; and consistency, particularly with regard to the norms for peace-keeping. Furthermore, the European Union considers that the United Nations can, on a case-by- case basis, benefit from the delegation by the Security Council of certain operational tasks to regional organizations and arrangements.

We would hope in this regard that relations between the United Nations and regional arrangements and organs which, under Chapter VIII of the Charter, could help the work of preventive diplomacy and peace-keeping could be formalized even further in such a way as to be consistent with the objectives, field of activity and the capacities of each of these organizations.

The Security Council, to which any Member State may bring any dispute which poses a threat to international peace and security, should be kept informed of action taken or contemplated in this area by regional arrangements and organs. It should also be recalled that only the Security Council can mandate enforcement action in the case of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.

I should like to end with two points.

The Secretary-General rightly stresses that civilian populations are the principal victims of current conflicts. In this regard, we, like him, are concerned at the proliferation of small-calibre weapons and anti-personnel mines. It is in this context that the European Union has proposed that consideration be given to a code of conduct for the transfer of conventional weapons. The commitment of the European Union has contributed a great deal to the progress made, within the framework of the Convention on the banning or limitation of the use of certain conventional weapons, to limit the export of anti-personnel mines. We should also like to recall the initiative taken by the European Union in the realm of mine-clearance assistance. We should also seek means of stemming the flow of small-calibre arms, which are helping to trigger and fuel conflicts.

Too often the work of the United Nations in the field of peace-keeping is misunderstood by public opinion. People seem to think either that this is the very essence of the Organization's work or that the failure of certain operations masks the success recorded elsewhere. We think that the tasks, the difficulties and the achievements of the United Nations should be part of a public relations policy that would make possible a proper appreciation of the efforts of the Organization. The European Union will support any action to this end.

It is also important for populations within the zones of United Nations operations to be informed as to the objectives and progress of the operations. The European Union will continue to support all efforts to this end.

In conclusion, the European Union, whose members have made a considerable contribution in support of the activities of the United Nations in the realm of the maintenance of international peace and security, considers that the Organization has a creditable record to date, despite all the setbacks that have occurred in certain cases.

The President *(interpretation from Spanish)*: Out of consideration for my colleagues, particularly for Ambassadors and delegations whose countries are not members of the Security Council, I should like to share my plan of work.

I propose that we should not go beyond 7 o'clock this evening and that we should then resume the meeting at 10 a.m. tomorrow. In other words, we would plan to begin — actually begin — at 10.15 or 10.20 and, God willing, end about noon or perhaps even a little earlier. Thus we should be spared the need to meet in the afternoon.

The next speaker is the representative of India. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Sreenivasan (India): My delegation is pleased, Sir, that this important debate is taking place under your sagacious presidency. We are particularly appreciative of your personal contribution to transparency in the functioning of the Security Council through your regular

briefing of the general membership on the formal and informal proceedings of the Council.

We have undertaken a preliminary analysis and assessment of the "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace", which has been thoughtfully prepared and presented by the Secretary-General as we enter the fiftieth anniversary year of the United Nations. We have taken note of the fact that the Secretary-General has presented his Supplement as a document of the fiftieth session of the General Assembly. As the issues addressed have direct and long-term implications for the work of the United Nations in fulfilling the objectives of the Charter, it is the expectation of my delegation that this debate of the Security Council is just the beginning of a series of wide-ranging discussions on the issues raised by the Secretary-General — a process that will necessarily continue in greater detail during the fiftieth session of the General Assembly. By then we shall have gained more experience in different areas and shall also have received the central documents on the Agenda for Peace and the Agenda for Development to which the Secretary-General referred in his press conference of 5 January 1995.

The focus of the "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace" is understandably on peace-keeping operations. This not only highlights the principal focus of United Nations activities in the recent past, but also underlines the need to restore the balance between peace-keeping operations and the vital activities of the United Nations in the economic and social sectors.

We are gratified to note that the clear lesson drawn in the Supplement from recent experience of peace-keeping operations is that respect for certain basic principles of peace-keeping is essential to success. These are consent, impartiality and the non-use of force except in cases of self-defence. We are equally gratified that the Secretary-General has highlighted the point that the logic of peace-keeping flows from political and military premises quite distinct from those of enforcement, and that the dynamics of the latter are incompatible with the political process that peace-keeping is intended to facilitate. We trust that the Security Council will bear these lessons of recent history in mind as it proceeds to deal with the challenging situations that lie ahead.

We agree with the Secretary-General that conflicts that the United Nations is asked to resolve usually have deep roots and have defied the peacemaking efforts of others, and that their resolution requires patience, diplomacy and the establishment of a political process that will lead to a mutually acceptable political settlement. We also agree that it is necessary to resist the temptation to use military power to speed up the process of resolution of conflicts. Peace-keeping and peace enforcement are indeed, clearly, alternative techniques.

In the section on sanctions, the Secretary-General has highlighted certain issues that should engage the serious attention of the international community in the light of recent experience. The issues raised by the Secretary-General are both philosophical and practical, and they are revealing and thought-provoking. As we address the overall question of sanctions, we trust that these issues will also be appropriately addressed. It is important to ensure that the means are as justifiable as the ends.

We have noted the Security Council's suggestion concerning the establishment of a mechanism to implement Article 50 of the Charter. We have long called for such a mechanism to be established. In our view, the mechanism should be established by the Security Council, and it must contain the element of automaticity of application. The Security Council could consider establishing a fund for this purpose financed from assessed contributions, as peace-keeping operations are, at the very time the Council imposes sanctions.

The Secretary-General has made in his Supplement some new proposals and also resuscitated some old yet significant ones made in "An Agenda for Peace". We have not had the time for a detailed examination of some of these proposals, yet it would be inappropriate for us not to convey our preliminary reaction to some of them, even at this stage.

The Secretary-General acknowledges in paragraph 6 of the Supplement that some of the ideas contained in "An Agenda for Peace" have not proved themselves. The unprecedented growth of peace-keeping operations has imposed a strain on Member States, resulting in a dearth of personnel and funding, even for mandated operations. The delay in the reimbursement of troop costs makes it difficult for developing countries to participate in the operations. In certain countries public opinion is agitated over the loss of peace-keepers' lives and the existing anomalies in death and disability benefits.

A pragmatic and realistic approach is clearly called for. It is obvious that the United Nations would be well advised to return to the traditional format of peace-keeping and to the customary caution with which

these operations were established. Barring peace-enforcement, and in exceptional cases where consent is a matter of practical and realistic impossibility, consent must be a prerequisite for United Nations activity. At the same time, my delegation is not at all sure that the United Nations should have an independent capacity for peace enforcement. Similarly, while India has agreed to contribute to stand-by forces as presently constituted, we doubt the validity of the concept of a standing force for the United Nations.

The suggestion that there is need to create a climate of opinion or ethos within the international community in which the norm would be for Member States to accept the offer of United Nations good offices is well taken. However, this needs to be thought through. Good offices are efforts under Chapter VI and are predicated on the consent of the parties concerned. The creation of norms, automatically applicable, would lead to dilution of the principle of consent and, on application, the confusion between peace-keeping and peace-enforcement, which the Secretary-General has clearly presented as mutually exclusive, would return. Similarly, we feel it necessary to urge caution with respect to the proposal for establishing small field missions. These, unless closely monitored and approved only after inter-governmental scrutiny, could easily lead to long-term and expensive entanglements.

The Secretary-General has, in his Supplement, rightly pointed out that the discussions initiated in 1994 for the elaboration of an "Agenda for Development" have also served to advance international consensus on the crucial importance of economic and social development as the most secure basis for lasting peace. It is also his understanding that his Supplement to the Agenda for Peace is just for reflection and discussion, while the focus for discussions during the next six months should be on the Agenda for Development. We fully share the Secretary-General's belief that the focus during 1995 must be on the Agenda for Development. As I have already indicated, it is imperative that the balance between the United Nations activities on the maintenance of international peace and security on the one hand and economic and social activities on the other be urgently restored. For this purpose, the present momentum in the discussions on an Agenda for Development must be maintained.

Earlier in the debate the Permanent Representative of Indonesia, in his capacity as the Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, addressed the Council. My delegation would like to associate itself with his statement.

Before I conclude, may I take this opportunity to reiterate my Government's continuing commitment to the objectives of the United Nations. Further, India will continue, as in the past, to effectively participate in United Nations peace-keeping operations, as part of its consistent and principled contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of India for his kind words addressed to me and to my delegation.

The next speaker is the representative of Malaysia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Razali (Malaysia): Mr. President, you and your colleagues have begun the year on a promising note by initiating steps towards greater transparency in the work of the Council. The Malaysian delegation would like to commend you for these initiatives, which we hope will be institutionalized as part of the efforts to make the Council truly representative as well as being well placed to address the needs of the Member States.

I would also like to record my deep appreciation to your predecessor, the Permanent Representative of Rwanda, for having steered the Council last month.

We recall that the precursor to this report — namely, the Agenda for Peace — was in itself prepared in response to a request by the Council. The debate on the issues raised within the Agenda for Peace evoked, and in fact continues to evoke, mixed reactions within and outside the United Nations, developing into a continuing debate as the issues raised deal with questions of international peace and security, with substantial focus on the United Nations peacekeeping activities.

In the General Assembly itself the debate culminated in resolutions 47/120 A and B, entitled "An Agenda for Peace." Yet reading the current report as contained in document A/50/60, entitled "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace", we are not sure that it is meant for the consideration of the General Assembly, particularly when it is noted that this report makes no specific reference to the General Assembly resolutions 47/120 A and B.

We hope, too, that the introduction of this report at this point, during the work of the United Nations will not deflect attention from the urgent need to adopt an Agenda for Development. Indeed, resolution 47/120 A, among

others, recognized — in its seventh preambular paragraph — that "An Agenda for Peace" would need to be complemented with "An Agenda for Development",

> "to strengthen the socio-economic development of Member States as one of the means of enhancing international peace and security."

As we are all aware, the progress on an Agenda for Development has been limited and slow.

This morning and for part of this afternoon we non-Council members, belonging to the general membership, have had the benefit of listening to the positions of Council members. Some of the statements made, I regret to say, reflect entrenched national positions, surely not fully taking into account the positive and negative experiences at the United Nations on issues dealing with peace and security and the mechanism of peace-keeping and peace-making. I also regret to say that from their entrenched positions the few will try to continue to dictate the discourse on, and examination in the Council of, this multifaceted issue. My delegation believes that the Agenda for Peace and all attendant issues are better served by discussion in the General Assembly.

I would like to make a few comments on the Secretary-General's paper: First, the members of the United Nations will no doubt be relieved that, unlike the first report, the current report underlines the importance of the principle of consent, a principle strongly advocated by developing countries. Secondly, the current report also addresses in a forthright manner the issue of sanctions. The call to take appropriate measures to address the impact of sanctions on third parties enjoys widespread support within the membership of the United Nations. While the sanctions regime has often been vigorously enforced in the context of specific instances and some countries, the need to address on an urgent and priority basis the needs of those adversely affected by sanctions has not been resolved. Similarly, sanctions serving the specific political agenda of a few Council members should not be condoned. Sanctions of the United Nations cannot be seen as a political vendetta in promotion of special interests. If the Council's action is to represent a genuine process of collective opprobrium, its implications, proportionality and reasons for continued enforcement must bear the result of a continuing collective examination. In this regard, the recommendation contained in paragraph 75 of the report of the Secretary-General deserves the full support of all Member States.

The report of the Secretary-General is excessively centred on the Security Council and has limited comments involving the important role of the General Assembly, a point highlighted in resolution 47/120 B. Taking into account the fact that all these conflicts continue to take place in areas of the developing world, the role of the General Assembly should not be marginalized. After all, the first United Nations peace-keeping operation was set up by the General Assembly, which has the power to establish peace-keeping operations as well. Accordingly, the report should spell out specific measures in which the General Assembly could be involved, not only in peace-keeping but also in the larger question of international peace and security.

On the observation by the Secretary-General, contained in paragraph 39, that the Security Council increasingly tends to micro-manage peace-keeping operations, Malaysia holds the view that this is a reflection of the dysfunctional relationship between the Council and the Secretariat. This situation has arisen primarily as a result of the preponderant influence of some powerful members of the Council as well as the excessive reliance on the financial contributions of some of these members. Lessons should be learned from this situation. As for the Secretariat itself, we have high regard for the competence and professionalism of the senior officials dealing with peace-keeping. At the same time, with an annual budget of more than $3 billion the Secretary-General must put his house in order, just as the Council must discharge its responsibilities consistently without resort to double standards and selectivity. At the end of the day, it is important that leadership be provided in partnership from the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Secretariat.

On the issue of consultations between troop-contributing countries and the Council, the report should spell out further means to enhance the consultations as well as to implement Article 44 of the Charter. This is an issue on which advance work has been done and we hope that the process of consultations between the troop-contributing countries and the Council will be institutionalized.

On disarmament, the Secretary-General admits that he has chosen to "concentrate on what might be called 'micro-disarmament'" (*S/1995/1, para 60*). Although he has endeavoured to elaborate on "micro-disarmament", generally a euphemism for light weapons, he has not highlighted the important role of the key producers and exporters of these so-called light weapons. The

Permanent Five, which enjoy special powers in this very Council on issues of international peace and security, are also the world's leading arms traders. They have it within their power to promote genuine and complete disarmament — nuclear and weapons of mass destruction. A recent issue of the Harvard International Review has catalogued the various issues relating to the arms bazaar, which constitutes a major threat to international peace and security. It has also further catalogued the role of the major Powers in this context. Overall, the impression is created that the Secretary-General has, on this issue, shied away from his own stated desire for hard decisions.

On the issue of a rapid reaction force, referred to in paragraph 44, we would like to seek clarification, considering that a number of countries have agreed to have stand-by arrangements for peace-keeping. In fact, I wish to take this opportunity to announce the decision of the Malaysian Government to participate in the stand-by arrangements.

Finally, the request, as reflected in paragraph 32, for a certain amount of discretion in the use of a proposed contingency provision of $25 million per biennium would seem to indicate a desire to act independently. This proposal has come at a time when audit reports have revealed instances of serious financial mismanagement in the various United Nations peace-keeping operations. Hence, Member States may find it difficult to allow for this discretionary flexibility, given the poor management record.

These observations are not exhaustive. My delegation would be ready to examine further, in the Council or General Assembly, the issues raised in this report, in an effort to bring about collective responsibility on this important issue.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): The next speaker is the representative of Ukraine. I call on him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Zlenko (Ukraine): I should like to join you, Mr. President, in conveying my Government's sorrow and condolences to the people of Japan, including the families who lost loved ones during the horrible earthquake there.

(*spoke in Spanish*)

Allow me at the outset to join in the congratulations that have been extended to you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council. Directing the work of one of the most important bodies of the United Nations entails shouldering great responsibilities and making decisions that affect the future. It is a great honour for a diplomat and politician. In recent days, we have had occasion to witness your diplomatic skills, your tact and your ability to relate to colleagues. All of this has contributed to the constructive decisions that have been adopted in connection with certain complicated international problems.

I also wish to express my appreciation to the Ambassador of Rwanda for his successful work as President of the Council in December.

At the beginning of this, my first statement before the Security Council this year, I wish to extend a warm welcome to the new non-permanent members of the Council. The States Members of the United Nations have placed great confidence in them. I express my appreciation to the five members of the Council that have carried out with dignity the difficult mission entrusted to them by the international community.

(*spoke in Russian*)

The dramatic changes that have occurred throughout the world in recent times are, to varying degrees connected with the end of the cold war. Not all of these changes have justified the hopes of the peoples of the world for peaceful, safe and stable development. This is primarily because the positive processes around the world have not been pursued, while the negative trends and phenomena have not been identified or prevented in good time. As a result, old threats have been exaggerated while the international community has minimized new, more destructive threats.

In this context, the position paper of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace", is in our view an attempt to assess and respond to the many current challenges connected primarily with the emergence of a new generation of conflicts. The poison of ethnic and religious intolerance has increasingly afflicted States and even entire regions, giving rise to a dangerous corrosion of the emergent post-confrontational system of international relations.

How can we not be concerned at the fact that such conflicts are so often accompanied by unprecedented violations of human rights and are marked by considerable casualties among peaceful civilians? This is a challenge to the very basis of their rights - that is, the

right to life. The defence of human rights in contemporary circumstances can no longer be considered as the exclusively domestic affair of a given State.

In this regard, promoting the observance of human rights and cooperating with the United Nations in this sphere - including the dispatch of fact-finding verification missions - should be a moral injunction, incumbent upon all States without exception. Such missions will, in our view, promote the creation of a climate of freedom from fear, which, as Dag Hammarskjöld said, is the quintessence of the whole philosophy of human rights.

In our view, the part of the position paper in which the Secretary-General sets forth his view of the role and place of individual instruments for ensuring peace and security within the peacemaking activities of the United Nations are worthy of our particular attention. In this connection, I should like to draw the Council's attention to a truth which is as old as the world itself but which, unfortunately, is often disregarded: an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. That is why placing stress on active preventive diplomacy that would make it possible to avert new conflicts should become the hallmark of the work of the United Nations in the area of maintaining international peace and security.

The delegation of Ukraine believes that the United Nations must make active use, both bilaterally and multilaterally, of its potential for persuasion *vis-à-vis* the parties to a conflict. It is important constantly to expand and bring into active play a whole arsenal of methods of persuasion, so as to prevail upon the leadership of those parties to make use of the Organization's peacemaking services. And insistence on this should not be viewed by States as an attempt to interfere in their domestic affairs. This role, in our view, could be entrusted to the standing institution of international mediators being set up in the Office of the Secretary-General. It could include the most authoritative and eminent politicians and statesmen, representing all continents. At the same time, they could be entrusted with certain functions of other instruments for ensuring peace and security — in particular, post-conflict peace-building, an important element of which is monitoring of elections.

Another important aspect of preventive diplomacy is that of seeking individual approaches to emerging conflicts. In our view, this is a task that could be successfully performed only by professional conflict specialists who had been formally trained and would be represented within the structure of the United Nations Secretariat — for example, within the Department of Peace-keeping Operations.

An analysis of recent successes and failures in peace-keeping operations shows that an imperative in producing the mandate for operations and in laying down their fundamental principles is clear-cut observance of universally accepted norms of international law, in particular respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers.

Many practical difficulties in the sphere of the command and management of peace-keeping operations could, in our view, be performed by revitalizing provisions of the Charter of the United Nations that, in our view, have been forgotten — and wrongly so. I refer in particular to Article 47, which defines the role and functions of the Military Staff Committee. According to paragraph 4 of that Article, that Committee,

> "with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees".

The delegation of Ukraine believes it would be appropriate to consider the question of expanding this practice and also the possibility of including in the membership of these regional sub-committees representatives of appropriate countries that are contributing troops to peace-keeping operations deployed in a given region.

In the final analysis, the success of peace-keeping operations depends to a large extent on swift deployment of national contingents provided by States to the United Nations. In this regard, Ukraine has supported the idea of the creating of, and has given its assent to participation in, what is known as a United Nations reserve force. At the same time, experience has shown that the existence of a reserve force does not in itself lead to bringing it swiftly into play. In these circumstances, the Secretary-General's proposal for the creation of a rapid reaction force is in our view worthy of our attention. This would be a strategic reserve for the Security Council, prepared for deployment in case of an urgent need for the dispatch of a peace-keeping force. We believe that the availability to the United Nations of such units would in itself exercise a restraining effect on the actions of potential parties to a conflict.

In our view, the need also arises for further study of such elements of this idea as command of the force and criteria for representatives of national contingents in a peace-keeping force. Here, criteria should take into account historical, political and geographical factors.

The active application of sanctions raises a multitude of questions, which the Secretary-General has attempted to answer in his position paper. While paying a tribute to the efforts of the Secretary-General to this end, I should like to share with the Council our own views on this score.

A fundamental contradiction in the practice of sanctions is that when they are introduced the main foundation is the interest of the international community, but when they are lifted the dominant factor is national interests - sometimes not even genuine ones - on the part of individual States. Furthermore, a particularly glaring contradiction lies in the interpretation of the degree to which the goals of sanctions have been attained, an interpretation based on a subjective appreciation by States of their end results. In recent years, in connection with the active use by the Security Council of economic enforcement measures as an important instrument of international efforts to resolve regional conflicts, the problem of the negative consequences of sanctions in general and their effect on outside countries in particular has taken on an entirely new resonance.

The Security Council imposes sanctions on behalf of the whole international community. Therefore, all its members should bear the responsibility for their implementation and their consequences. The urgent need to help countries that have encountered difficulties, as a result of the application of sanctions, in solving their special economic problems is recognized by practically everyone today. This is also recognized in the position paper of the Secretary-General. But this, in our view, is clearly inadequate. What we need are bold and concrete proposals, appropriate practical steps, both on the part of the international community as a whole and on the part of its individual members.

In this regard, we believe it appropriate to return once again to the question of creating a special compensatory mechanism that would include a compensation fund. What requires further study as one of the possible elements of this mechanism is the question of reducing the contribution for the financing of peace-keeping operations by the total losses which would have been calculated by United Nations methodology. Here, the functions of appreciation of the economic losses already sustained by States, study of the economic, political and social consequences of the application of sanctions, coordination of efforts to minimize their consequences for the most vulnerable groups of the population and also for outside countries, and monitoring of their implementation could be entrusted to a standing committee of the Security Council on sanctions.

The inability of the world community to provide a swift and effective answer to the problems arising from the application of sanctions may undermine trust in the very institution of sanctions and call into question the very principle of collective activity in the implementation of enforcement measures by the United Nations.

Our analysis of the position paper presented by the Secretary-General is by no means exhausted by the points I have already made. Regarding the report as a point of departure for a thoroughgoing discussion of ways and means of enhancing the capacity of the world community to react effectively to the challenges of the day, the Ukrainian delegation intends to take an active part in the work on a comprehensive concept of peacemaking activity on the part of the United Nations in the twenty-first century.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Ukraine for the kind words he addressed to my delegation in Spanish.

The next speaker is the representative of Pakistan. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Marker (Pakistan): Permit me, Mr. President, to associate my delegation with your remarks and to express our sincerest condolences to the Government and people of Japan and to our colleague, Ambassador Owada, on the tragedy and loss of life that has resulted from the devastating earthquake in that beautiful country.

My delegation is grateful to the Secretary-General for the most valuable and thought-provoking supplement to his report of June 1992 entitled "An Agenda for Peace". We have read the Supplement with great interest. Indeed, the "position paper", as the Secretary-General describes the document, makes some very pertinent points and contains some far-reaching suggestions. Since the position paper is now being carefully examined by my Government, the comments that I wish to offer today are necessarily preliminary in nature.

Let me express our hope that in due course this supplementary report will be discussed in the General Assembly also and that, in view of other pressing matters that engage the attention of the general membership, sufficient time will be allowed before any decisions or decisions are made. As a major troop-contributor to United Nations peace-keeping, Pakistan will maintain a close and positive interest in this issue.

The Secretary-General has rightly pointed out that the end of the cold war led to a period of hope and change and rising expectations from the United Nations. In fact, what has happened is that a world marred by super-Power rivalry has been replaced by one riven by numerous inter-State and intra-State conflicts. While the United Nations has scored notable successes in some trouble spots, such as Cambodia, South Africa and Mozambique, in others the results have been disappointing.

The position paper graphically presents the rapid increase in United Nations activities related to peace and security over the last six years. Today, peace-keeping is a major United Nations activity involving contingents from dozens of countries. The number of military personnel deployed on peace-keeping duties has increased sixfold since 1988, while the financial outlay required to meet the peace-keeping demands on the United Nations has gone up more than 15 times. In the light of these developments as well as those mentioned in the Secretary-General's report, the importance that he has placed on the subject of peace and security is fully understandable. My delegation would wish to pay a particular tribute to the Department of Peace-keeping Operations for the initiatives and the innovative approach that have characterized the work of this Department in dealing with the difficult circumstances that have prevailed in the recent past.

We endorse the Secretary-General's view that it is far better to prevent conflicts than to undertake major politico-military efforts to resolve them after they have broken out. It is unfortunate that States, while continuing to announce their commitment to resolving disputes peacefully, balk at proposals for United Nations help. The Secretary-General has rightly called for the creation of a climate of opinion, or international ethos, in which the norm would be for Member States to accept an offer of United Nations good offices.

The Secretary-General has also correctly identified some of the practical problems confronted in the sphere of peace-keeping. Unity of command is, in our view, an important principle, especially when a peace-keeping mission is operating in a dangerous or hostile environment. The experience of the United Nations operation in Somalia, where more than 100 United Nations peace-keepers lost their lives, provided a dramatic and poignant emphasis to this point. Another important aspect of peace-keeping operations is to keep the troop-contributing Governments fully informed and abreast of the situation where their troops are deployed, as well as to consult them before taking decisions having a bearing on the mandate as well as the welfare of their contingents.

We have noted with interest the idea of a rapid-reaction force to act as the Security Council's strategic reserve for deployment. The idea would need to be further developed before it could be seriously considered by the general membership of the United Nations. The idea of establishing a reserve stock of standard peace-keeping equipment also needs to be examined with care.

The importance of disarming the sides involved in a civil war or an internal conflict is well established. United Nations efforts in this regard met with success in Mozambique. However, in Somalia the consequences were quite disastrous. The obvious conclusion is that "micro-disarmament" works when there is a prior agreement between the parties involved and there is also the political will on their part to honour their commitments. As for arms trafficking, we agree with the Secretary-General that this problem can be effectively tackled on a regional basis.

The Secretary-General has raised some very pertinent issues as regards the subject of sanctions. The increasing use of the instrument of sanctions by the Security Council has led to many difficulties for countries that are neither involved in the crisis situation nor consulted on the Council's decision that led to the imposition of sanctions. We accept that the decisions of the Security Council are binding for the entire United Nations membership. However, at the same time we strongly believe that the problems created for third countries as a result of Council decisions ought to be effectively addressed. In this context we welcome the suggestion of the Secretary-General to establish a mechanism to, *inter alia*, explore ways of assisting Member States that are suffering collateral damage due to Security Council sanctions and to evaluate claims of such States under Article 50. This could prove to be an important step towards institutionalizing a system whereby the burdens placed on third countries as a result

of Security Council-imposed sanctions are equitably shared by all United Nations Member States.

The authority of the United Nations to take enforcement action against those responsible for threatening or breaching the peace is enshrined in the Charter. But once aggression has taken place and been recognized by the Security Council and a decision has been taken by it, then the United Nations — or, more specifically, the Security Council — is compelled to rely on the Member States to implement the terms of that decision. Despite the precedents of the Security Council's authorizing a group of Member States to take enforcement action against a delinquent State, the need for the Council to exercise the utmost discretion and care in this regard cannot be overemphasized. In authorizing enforcement action, the Security Council should in all instances clearly establish the act of aggression and ensure that its action has the support of the general membership of the United Nations.

In conclusion, while expressing support for the statement made by the Ambassador of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, I wish to state that we hope to refine and expand our position on the various subjects handled in the position paper as the discussions on them proceed.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): The next speaker is the representative of Poland. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Wlosowicz (Poland): Let me begin by wishing you, Mr. President, and all the other members of the Security Council a most prosperous and healthy new year and by congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of January. I should also like to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Bakuramutsa of Rwanda, for presiding over the Council's work in December 1994.

We join you, Mr. President, and the Security Council in expressing sincere condolences to the families of the victims of the deadly earthquake that struck the region of Kobe in Japan two days ago. May I ask the Permanent Representative of Japan to convey this message of sympathy to his Government and to all those who are mourning their loved ones.

Poland welcomes the "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace", submitted by the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Organization. Aimed at improving United Nations performance in the main area of the Organization's responsibility — namely, the protection of international peace and security — the document contains both an evaluation of United Nations achievements and a number of inspiring ideas regarding the future of the United Nations.

We believe that the Secretary-General rightly emphasizes that the United Nations offers the best and most promising avenues to address current and possible future threats to international peace and security. This was true in the not-too-distant past, and it is so now, when we are witnessing a significant rise in intra-State, often violent, conflicts, as opposed to the inter-State wars more frequent in the cold-war world. We share the Secretary-General's view that sustainable and harmonious social and economic development constitutes the best remedy for those conflicts. It is with this in mind that Poland will continue to support the work of the social and economic sectors of the Organization, as they are both an important element of the early-warning system and an indispensable instrument of post-conflict reconstruction. The Polish delegation shares the Secretary-General's view that the way we deal with today's qualitatively new threats to international security has to correspond better to the root causes and nature of these threats.

Further discussion is needed on the development of the concepts of preventive diplomacy, conflict management and post-conflict recovery. The regional organizations are in a position to contribute significantly to this discussion. Development of the cooperation between them and the United Nations would greatly facilitate our work. I am thinking in particular about the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which has garnered significant and unique experience while dealing with the peace and security problems in the area perhaps most affected by the post-cold-war changes.

It is also our view that peace-keeping operations will continue to be a main instrument in managing crisis situations for the foreseeable future. The Secretary-General is right when he calls for an urgent, in-depth and up-to date examination of United Nations performance in this respect. No doubt the overall picture which emerges from such an examination will be positive. But there is still room for further improvement. United Nations peace-keeping should be fully mandated and better planned, organized and financed.

There is potential for improvement in the United Nations peace-keeping operations through certain readjustments to coordination mechanisms within the

Organization itself, as well as between the Secretariat and the contributors concerned. We recognize the complexity of this issue. The best thing that we can and should do now is to address them fully and sincerely with a clear will to come to satisfactory conclusions. A part of that work has already been done. We thank the delegations of Canada, Norway and the Netherlands for their efforts to facilitate the discussion on the refinement of the peace-keeping mechanisms.

At this point I would like to mention the Polish participation in United Nations peace-keeping operations. About 2,000 Polish troops are now serving under the United Nations banner. The peace-keeping training center in the Polish city of Kielce became operational more than a year ago. Poland has committed itself to designating a logistic unit to be included in the United Nations stand-by forces in 1996. May I assure the Council that in the future Poland will also do its best to respond positively to United Nations requests.

Poland attaches particular importance to the issue of collective sanctions, which is extensively dealt with in the Secretary-General's position paper. Appropriately and carefully designed and applied sanctions are now, and will remain, an indispensable instrument at the disposal of the international community. Poland stands ready to take part in a detailed discussion on this subject.

Our approach to the sanctions has been best defined by the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, who, in a statement to the General Assembly, said that there should be arrangements alleviating the burdens incurred by countries which participate in economic measures against the offender State and that it was clear that Article 50 of the Charter did not constitute a sufficient remedy.

Finally, the adverse implications of the United Nations current financial situation for the improvement of the United Nations peace-keeping capabilities cannot be overlooked. There are not many countries in a position to claim a flawless performance in this regard. Having said that, I should like to point out that in many cases those countries' conscientiousness in discharging their financial obligations depends heavily on the punctuality of reimbursement to them for outlays they made earlier in regard to their country's participation in peace-keeping operations.

These are the initial remarks offered by the Polish delegation at this juncture of our deliberations.

I should like to thank you once again, Mr. President, for convening this important meeting and to declare our readiness to contribute further to the discussion.

The President *(interpretation from Spanish)*: I thank the representative of Poland for the kind words addressed to my delegation.

The next speaker is the representative of the Netherlands. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Biegman (Netherlands): Let me congratulate you, Sir, on the assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of January.

May I also express my delegation's sincere condolences to the Government of Japan on the occasion of the terrible disaster that struck the Kobe region yesterday.

I am happy to have the opportunity to address the Council on the important matter under discussion today, which has already been the subject of an intervention by the French delegation on behalf of the European Union. We subscribe entirely to the views put forward in that intervention, but would like to make a few additional remarks.

As a substantial contributor to United Nations peace-keeping and crisis-management, the Netherlands attaches great importance to the strengthening of the United Nations capacity in this domain and to the views and recommendations put forward in the Secretary-General's Agenda for Peace. This is a crucial element of the United Nations response to the new challenges confronting the international community after the end of the cold war.

The timely and thought-provoking position paper of the Secretary-General, which has been presented as a Supplement to his Agenda for Peace, describes the dramatic changes in both the volume and the nature of United Nations activities in the field of peace and security which have occurred since the Agenda was written. These changes call for reflection, and I would like to address a number of the issues raised in the Supplement.

In the report, the Secretary-General stresses the importance of preventive diplomacy. But, as he points out, the greatest obstacle to its successful application is

the reluctance of one or other of the parties in a conflict to accept an active role for the United Nations. The hope is expressed that in the long run the international climate of opinion will evolve in such a way that it will become established practice for countries not to refuse an offer of United Nations good offices. The Netherlands shares this view, but it would be useful, I think, to discuss in somewhat more detail what we can do to bring about such a climate. The coming celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations next October would provide a good opportunity to this end. I would suggest that the Heads of State and Government incorporate in their declarations on that occasion a solemn reaffirmation of their willingness to accept an offer of good offices by the United Nations in conflicts to which they may become a party. This could constitute a code of conduct for Member States in the field of preventive diplomacy.

We warmly welcome the conclusion of the Secretary-General that the idea of a rapid reaction force deserves serious attention and we fully share his analysis. As will be recalled, the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs in his intervention during the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly also argued in favour of such a force. In particular, he mentioned the possibility of creating an all-volunteer, professional United Nations brigade at the service of the Security Council, a brigade which could be rapidly deployed in a crisis situation. The personnel of such a brigade would have no links with the armed forces of Member States and would be directly contracted by the United Nations. This would seem to be the best way to guarantee that these units would actually be available in an emergency, as the use of units which would remain part of national forces would still be subject to often time-consuming national decision-making, including, in many cases, parliamentary approval. Moreover, the outcome of this decision-making would not necessarily be positive. The Netherlands has undertaken a preliminary internal study as to the feasibility and modalities of such a United Nations brigade, and intends to further pursue this option in consultations with Member States and the Secretariat in the very near future.

In his "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace" the Secretary-General makes a clear distinction between peace-keeping and peace-enforcing. If we understand the text correctly, the Secretary-General argues that we should return to the classical type of peace-keeping operations, based on the consent of all parties, impartiality and non-use of force. New elements, such as the protection of safe areas and of humanitarian operations during continuing warfare, as well as putting pressure on the parties, endanger the success of the peace-keeping formula, especially if the peace-keepers lack the capability for the effective use of force, so the argument goes. Of course, the Netherlands agrees that the capabilities of the peace-keeping forces should be sufficient to meet the requirements of the mandate. Mandate and means should be well-balanced. However, the answer is not, in our view, to limit ourselves to the kind of peace-keeping that was appropriate for a world which was very different from the one we are now living in. As the Supplement makes clear, the nature of the problem confronting the international community has changed as a result of the recent wave of intra-State conflicts and the phenomenon of the failed State. The responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace and security makes it incumbent upon the Organization to devise ways to address these new threats. In the case of massive violations of human rights and humanitarian emergencies it may become unavoidable to combine peace-keeping operations with elements of enforcement.

I agree that there is a real possibility of contradiction and confusion, and that the United Nations force may face situations of a very difficult and delicate nature. However, my country does not draw the conclusion from the experiences in, for instance, Bosnia and Herzegovina that we have given the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) the wrong mandate. On the contrary, UNPROFOR's capabilities should be strengthened and its vulnerability reduced, so that it can indeed perform its existing mandate.

In his Supplement, the Secretary-General also refers to the new interaction between the Council and the troop-contributing countries. The Netherlands has repeatedly emphasized the importance of enhanced transparency and better consultations with troop- contributing countries that are not members of the Council. The new procedures decided upon recently by the Council have already resulted in improved information and consultations on the operations mandated by the Council, and I hope further progress will be made in this respect. This is a legitimate expectation on the part of those countries which, while not on the Council, are nevertheless major contributors to United Nations peace-keeping operations and thus instrumental in the implementation of the Council's decisions. This enhanced involvement of the troop contributors in the political process is also important in order to maintain domestic public support. It can be realized without encroaching on the special responsibilities of the Council or the Secretary-General.

The Council must have flexibility in its choice of instruments while trying to maintain or restore international peace and security. The Charter specifically mentions sanctions as one of the instruments for this purpose. The Secretary-General rightly observes that sanctions often have unwanted side-effects.

The experience gained since 1990 tells us that a mechanism such as that proposed by the Secretary-General may give a sharper edge to what he calls a blunt instrument. The effectiveness and credibility of the sanctions instrument, applied in conformity with the Charter, would certainly be improved if some of the Secretary-General's recommendations were adopted.

But — especially if there should be a reduction in military enforcement activities on the part of the United Nations, as proposed by the Secretary-General — the Organization will have to make sure that it does not lose the only remaining means of action in cases of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression. The Netherlands, in cooperation with Australia, intends to address various questions related to the effective application of sanctions in a working paper to be presented on the occasion of the United Nations Congress on Public International Law, which will take place in New York in March 1995.

In reading the Supplement, I was particularly pleased with the emphasis that the Secretary-General puts on the concept of post-conflict peace-building. This should include the transition from humanitarian assistance to development cooperation — a vital instrument in the promotion of international peace and security. Achieving synergy between the different organizations concerned should be an important goal, and we wholeheartedly support the Secretary-General in his efforts aimed at greater coordination in the field.

Let me conclude by stating that we welcome the attention that the Supplement gives to regional organizations. The cooperation between these organizations and the United Nations seems to be evolving in the right direction. The Secretary-General is correct in stating that a universal model for their relationship with the United Nations cannot be established. The primacy of the United Nations, so far as enforcement is concerned, has been laid down in the Charter and must be respected. However, this does not preclude a division of labour between United Nations and regional organizations, which, in the opinion of my country, should be based on considerations of comparative advantage. Individual tasks should be performed by the organization best equipped to do them. In this way, duplication and institutional competition can be avoided, and the effectiveness of our common effort will be enhanced.

The President *(interpretation from Spanish)*: I thank the representative of the Netherlands for his gracious words addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Turkey. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Batu (Turkey): Let me take a moment to extend our heartfelt condolences over the terrible loss of life caused by the recent earthquake in Japan.

I wish to express our appreciation to the Secretary-General for providing us with his "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace", which is before the Security Council today for its consideration.

At the time of its release, the report, "An Agenda For Peace", was a compelling endeavour to remind the international community of the urgency of the need to strengthen the capabilities and arrangements of the United Nations with a view to enabling the Organization to bear, in a more effective and efficient manner, the ever-increasing burden of maintaining peace and security around the globe. The extensive and voluminous debate that the Agenda has generated thus far is testimony to the timeliness of the Secretary-General's initiative.

Since then there have been enormous changes in the international scene — some of them encouraging, but mostly disheartening. In relation to these changes, the burdens on the United Nations have increased dramatically. The Organization is going through a serious soul-searching about its role, its effectiveness and its credibility, almost on a daily basis.

In view of these most recent developments, and given that this year we celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, we believe that the Secretary-General's "Supplement to the Agenda for Peace" is a valuable and timely step forward to highlight the areas where difficulties regarding the initiatives and ideas that have been put forth in the Agenda have arisen.

We warmly support the point made by the Secretary-General in his position paper that it is better to prevent conflicts than to try to handle them after they

have broken out. Indeed, the idea of preventing disputes in a peaceful manner is embodied in the letter and the spirit of the Charter. In fact, this is not only a desirable and ideal method of controlling and resolving conflicts, but also the most cost-effective way of doing so. To this effect, we have noted with attention the proposals made by the Secretary-General in his position paper.

Furthermore, we believe that more attention should be focused on certain measures of preventive diplomacy, such as fact-finding missions, preventive deployment and early-warning capabilities.

We share the observations of the Secretary-General in the Supplement with regard to the qualitative and quantitative changes that have been taking place since the end of the cold war — in particular, on the tragic human toll of the increased hostilities that have surfaced. The sheer number of the refugees — given by the Secretary-General as 26 million, representing a two-fold increase since 1987 — calls for swift and determined action. We believe that as one immediate step the financial and material capabilities of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) should be enhanced.

In the area of disarmament, the Secretary-General introduces two new concepts in his position paper — namely, micro-disarmament and macro-disarmament. The proposition that micro-disarmament is relevant to post-conflict peace-building is particularly interesting and worth considering. We also agree with the Secretary-General's assessment that

> "The ... significance of micro-disarmament is demonstrated by the enormous proliferation of automatic assault weapons, anti-personnel mines and the like." *(S/1995/1, para. 61)*

We believe that the efforts to address the proliferation of this type of armament should be carefully balanced between the need to deal with its serious consequences and the legitimate rights of States to defend themselves. Accordingly, the relevant measures in this area should focus on ways to enable the various arms control mechanisms to detect and verify illegal end-users.

We fully endorse the Secretary-General's views pertaining to sanctions — particularly his reference to Article 50 of the Charter. As he rightly states in paragraph 73 of his supplementary report,

> "Sanctions are a measure taken collectively by the United Nations to maintain or restore international peace and security. The costs involved in their application, like other such costs ... should be borne equitably by all Member States and not exclusively by the few who have the misfortune to be neighbours or major economic partners of the target country." *(S/1995/1, para. 73)*

We wholeheartedly support the Secretary-General's proposals, contained in paragraph 75 of his position paper, regarding the establishment of a mechanism to carry out certain functions in relation to sanctions.

To the observations made by the Secretary-General I must add that the lack of efficient consultation mechanisms and secrecy in the decision-making of the Council are also causing great concern to the general membership. In this context, I should like to reiterate what I said to this body on 16 December last year, especially in reference to the imposition and review of the economic sanctions. Since all Member States must comply with sanctions imposed by the United Nations, we propose that the decision-making and the review process thereon must be totally transparent.

To be effective, sanctions regimes require the full cooperation of the Member States. The successful implementation of sanctions can be ensured only with great sacrifice by the countries most affected. It is difficult to understand why reviews of existing sanction regimes are held in closed, informal consultations. At this point I should like to repeat our concrete proposal. We request that the Council consider

> "reviewing existing sanction regimes in public meetings with open debate." *(S/PV.3483, p.18)*

In this vein, it is the considered opinion of my country that the sanction committees should also carry out their deliberations in public meetings or inform the non-member countries of their deliberations and decisions by circulating detailed reports periodically. We strongly believe that openness in the activities of the Council with respect to sanctions would make the system more just and fair.

We took note with particular attention of the Secretary General's remarks and suggestions in his supplementary report with respect to the peace-keeping activities of the United Nations, and urge members to carefully examine their implications.

We hold the view that the success of peace-keeping operations rests on a clear and practicable mandate given by the Security Council, the cooperation of the parties concerned, the readiness of Member States to contribute personnel and, last but not least, adequate financial and logistic support.

Furthermore, mandates must be tailored to the realities and imperatives of the situation. In conjunction with this, mandates of peace-keeping operations should be periodically reviewed, and, when necessary, mandates which no longer correspond to the prevailing situation should be modified, so that peace-keeping forces could operate with maximum efficiency. In this respect, their degree of effectiveness should also be reviewed and, if appropriate, they should be streamlined in keeping with the goal of minimizing the costs.

In view of the financial strains that we face with regard to the peace-keeping activities, I would like to refer once again to the proposals made by the Secretary General in "An Agenda for Peace." We continue to support his proposals contained therein to deal with this problem, such as taxing arms sales, retaining budgetary surpluses, increasing the Working Capital Fund, authorizing commercial borrowing and establishing a peace endowment fund.

Given the stark realities that we painfully witness around the globe, especially in the humanitarian aspects of the conflicts, the Secretary-General's conclusion in his supplementary report on the need to give serious thought to the idea of a rapid deployment force is thought-provoking and merits urgent consideration. Such a force could also play a deterrent role in certain cases, depending on its size, mandate, modalities of deployment, level of readiness and proximity to potential conflict areas.

It is our firm opinion that the regional organizations have much to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security within the framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter. The challenges we are facing today are far greater than the means and resources of the United Nations to respond to them by itself effectively and adequately. We believe that the activities of the United Nations and the regional organizations should be viewed as mutually reinforcing and complementary in nature. In this respect, we should also bear in mind that the United Nations continues to play the central role in the maintenance of peace and security around the world. To this effect, we add our voice to the Secretary-General's point that, given the unique characteristics of each situation and the varied mandates, as well as the structures of the regional organizations, an attempt to establish a universal model for their relationship with the United Nations would be counterproductive. In this context, we support the principles that are laid out by the Secretary-General in paragraph 88 of his report as the basis of this relationship.

This year we are celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of this Organization. It is a most opportune time to take stock of our past experiences and start reflecting on the future. I sincerely hope that the Secretary-General's supplementary report to "An Agenda For Peace" will be an appropriate starting point to this end.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): The next speaker is the representative of Canada. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Fowler (Canada): I would first wish to congratulate you, Sir, on your accession to the Security Council presidency for the month of January. The Council has already done a substantial amount of work under your capable leadership. I also wish to congratulate your predecessor, the Permanent Representative of Rwanda, for the diligence with which he discharged his duties during the month of December.

This being my first appearance before the Security Council in almost 20 years, I would like to assure the Council of my delegation's full cooperation in the pursuit of our common objectives.

Mr. President, with your indulgence, allow me to join my colleagues and, for my part, express the sympathy of Canadians for the horrible tragedy which has befallen the people of Kobe in Japan.

Canada warmly welcomes the Secretary-General's presentation of the supplement to his Agenda for Peace. He is doing so at an opportune moment in this, the fiftieth year in the life of our Organization; it is indeed time to take stock of the major questions facing the United Nations. These have been clearly spelled out by the Secretary-General in the Supplement and in his Agenda for Development. We all recognize that the questions raised in the Agenda for Peace and the Agenda for Development are inextricably connected.

I am pleased to have this opportunity to express before the Council a few preliminary views on the

Secretary-General's paper, a document which Canada is, of course, examining very closely.

We agree in large part with the Secretary-General's accurate and eloquent analysis of the quantitative and qualitative changes in the activities of the Organization in the field of international peace and security. It is true that in just a short period of time our collective burden has become much heavier.

We also endorse the main features of his findings and recommendations concerning the instruments we must acquire in order to deal more effectively with the numerous ethnic, racial, religious and other conflicts which face our world and which threaten to multiply in the coming years.

Spoke in French

Of course, it is important to improve the range of instruments at our disposal to enable the United Nations to fulfil its role. But it is of prime importance that we, the Member States, decide collectively on the role we are prepared to play in the face of the bloody conflicts breaking out all over the world, and on what our Organization's role should be. These are, without question, hard decisions.

What kind of a commitment are we, the Member States, prepared to make to prevent the repetition of tragedies such as Rwanda? We have been unable, collectively, to provide an adequate response to this genocide. Under what circumstances are we, the Member States, prepared to lay the lives of our soldiers on the line to try to prevent massacres of innocent people?

Obviously there is no easy or immediate answer to these questions. Past experience has also shown that no two situations are alike. In some cases, for example, it may be preferable, despite our sense of urgency, to refrain from intervening immediately in a conflict by way of a peace-keeping operation. It may be more effective to try by other means to help the parties concerned find long-term solutions to their problems. In other instances a rapid, significant intervention may be the best approach.

In any case, we can reaffirm our determination not to remain insensitive to the misery caused by armed conflict, and reiterate our commitment to try, to the best of our ability, to find collective solutions more effective than those used recently.

In the face of the difficulties encountered in various recent operations, some will feel that the Security Council should no longer intervene in complex intra-State conflicts. For its part, Canada encourages the Security Council to continue to be concerned in solving both intra-State and inter-State conflicts. As pointed out by the Secretary-General, intra-State conflicts are today the most frequent and the most violent.

Others may feel that the United Nations should take refuge in traditional peace-keeping operations. We cannot share this kind of approach, which would limit the international community's intervention to increasingly less frequent situations. In fact, I would even add that engaging in the "classical" type of operation is no guarantee of success at the political level.

We have made some remarkable efforts in the field of peace-keeping over the past few years and spent considerable resources on numerous new types of operations. We have lost a number of soldiers. We have tried to respond to new world-wide challenges. But the difficulties we have encountered, particularly in Somalia, Bosnia, Croatia and Rwanda, have demonstrated that good intentions alone cannot obtain the desired results. We must respond to each new situation in an appropriate way and give the Organization the means it requires to fulfil its objectives.

I do not claim that I shall analyse the Secretary General's report in detail today. We shall do so at some later time and in the context of the General Assembly. However, I should like to highlight now certain parts of the Supplement which we feel are particularly important.

The activities of preventive diplomacy and peacemaking are crucial; there is no longer any need to demonstrate that they are necessary. As the Secretary-General indicates, there is no lack of information on potential conflicts, and it is rather the reluctance of one or other of the parties to accept United Nations preventive help that limits our capacity for action. In order better to use the information at our disposal, we feel that the Economic and Social Council should assist the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretary-General better to anticipate problems and develop strategies to address the economic and social causes of conflicts. As others have done, we have supplied the Secretary-General with a list of eminent personalities who might represent him in preventive diplomacy activities.

As for peace-keeping operations, we must again stress the need for clear, achievable mandates from the Security Council, and the need to find practical ways to institutionalize the Security Council's consultations with troop-contributing nations. We must also ensure that the roles of the Security Council, the Secretary-General and regional organizations involved in the implementation of peace-keeping operations are clearly defined and respected. It is worth recalling that, in the final analysis, the Security Council will always be accountable for the results of such operations. The same can be said of the Secretary-General's accountability for the execution of missions.

We have, moreover, come to realize that, as the Secretary-General points out, it is always dangerous to transform an ongoing peace-keeping operation which depends on the consent of the parties into an operation requiring the use of force. And we, the Member States, must supply the Secretary-General with the necessary troops, adequately equipped and trained to carry out their assigned mandate. We must also give these operations a sound basis and therefore meet on time our financial obligations in this respect.

Concerning the Secretary-General's idea for a rapid response force, Canada, as is known, has launched an extensive study on practical short-, medium- and long-term options to improve the rapid reaction capability of the United Nations in times of crisis. The results of this study will be available at the next session of the Assembly. To this end, we have sought the assistance of numerous international experts and are counting on the active cooperation of the Secretariat.

We share the Secretary-General's views on disarmament and the importance of the Conference of parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which we hope will be renewed for an indefinite period. The same applies to the urgent need for the Convention on chemical weapons to enter into force. The control of conventional weapons also remains a priority area of intervention, and we are convinced that better use should be made of the Register of Conventional Arms, for example where anti-personnel mines are concerned.

We must admit that to date our experience with sanctions has produced mixed results. They are an imperfect but essential instrument and are among the various mechanisms available to influence the behaviour of Governments that defy the international community. The considerable efforts made by a number of States to lift even partially the sanctions imposed on them show how effective they are. Even if we could see the advantages of a prior assessment of the impact of sanctions, we do not feel that we should establish mechanisms that might unduly delay their imposition.

We share the Secretary-General's comments on the need to coordinate effectively international action in the area of peace and security. We endorse his concept of the role that regional organizations should play and the parameters that should guide relations between the United Nations and the latter. We also believe, like the Secretary-General, in the usefulness of establishing groups of "friends of the Secretary-General" to assist him in meeting his objectives. Such small, well-balanced groups of interested States have proved their usefulness by having their members become more deeply involved in the resolution of conflicts.

Let us hope that this fiftieth anniversary year will be not only, as it should be, a year a celebration but also a year of reflection for our Organization. In the coming months the questions raised by the Secretary-General will be the subject of discussions not only among States, in which Canada will participate actively, but among the general public as well. Let us all encourage a broad, open debate that will help us set the course for future years.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Canada for the kind words he addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Japan. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Maruyama (Japan): On behalf of my Government, I should like to express my deepest appreciation for the expressions of sympathy and condolence offered by you, Mr. President, the Council members and other Member States to the people and Government of Japan in connection with the recent earthquake. I shall certainly convey those messages to my Government.

At the outset, let me congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of January. I am sure that under your able guidance the Council will conduct its work most effectively. Our thanks go also to Ambassador

Bakuramutsa of Rwanda for the skilful manner in which he guided the work of the Council last December.

The "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General" offers new suggestions for enhancing United Nations peace-keeping and peacemaking functions in the light of recent changes in the international situation and the successes and failures of recent peace-keeping efforts. It highlights certain areas where unforeseen difficulties have arisen since June 1992, when the Secretary-General's "An Agenda for Peace" was issued. Japan appreciates the generally more realistic approach it takes to the issue of peace and security, building on past lessons and experiences. That this paper was presented to us as we prepare for the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations makes it quite timely, and we look forward to participating in the active discussions that it will surely stimulate.

Permit me to offer Japan's comments on major points contained in the "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace".

The Secretary-General indicates that, in addition to a dramatic quantitative increase in United Nations activities relating to the maintenance of peace and security, there have been qualitative changes that are of even greater significance. As the paper points out, so many of today's conflicts occur within the boundaries of a State rather than between States. The collapse of State institutions is a common feature of such conflicts. The use of United Nations forces to protect humanitarian operations is another growing trend. Japan agrees with the Secretary-General in his analysis and the importance he attaches to this trend. Indeed, such qualitative changes must be taken into account in the effort to devise more appropriate means of enhancing international peace and security.

Among United Nations activities, those relating to preventive diplomacy and peacemaking deserve to be given greater priority. I note that an effort has been made to find persons with the requisite diplomatic skills and experience to serve as mediators, special representatives or special envoys of the Secretary-General. That effort should be reinforced, for example, through the preparation of a list of the persons so identified. In cases where such persons lack sufficient experience and understanding with respect to the United Nations, it is important that training be provided for them in order to ensure that they discharge their tasks as effectively as possible.

We share with the Secretary-General the recognition of the need to establish and dispatch small field missions to engage in preventive diplomacy and peacemaking efforts in a timely manner and for a sufficient period of time. In an effort to conserve budgetary resources, cooperation with regional organizations and the use of their skilled personnel should be pursued and encouraged.

Japan is of the view that in cases where coercive action is necessary, the mandate must clearly define the action as exceptional and specify its duration, since a coercive peace-keeping operation is likely to result in the United Nations becoming a party to the conflict and thus deviate from the principle of impartiality. We note with appreciation that the Secretary-General takes a cautious approach to peace enforcement.

As recent experience has demonstrated, adherence to the traditional principles of peace-keeping — particularly the consent of the conflicting parties, impartiality, the non-use of force except in self-defence, and the commitment by the parties to a cease-fire and peace agreement — is essential to the success of any peace-keeping operation. Japan is pleased to note the similar analysis offered by the Secretary-General. At the same time, comprehensive peace-keeping operations such as the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) are relevant to today's world and will remain a valid and effective approach. Furthermore, in order for a peacekeeping operation to be truly successful it is essential that it be integrated into an overall political process from the beginning.

Whenever the Council decides to establish a new peace-keeping operation, it is imperative that its mandate be defined in detail and its time-frame clearly stipulated in a so-called sunset clause. It is unacceptable and financially irresponsible to prolong a peace-keeping operation while its specific goals and timetable remain vague.

Once a decision has been made to establish a peace-keeping operation, it is essential that it be deployed in a timely manner. Towards this end, possible personnel- and equipment-contributors could be identified even before the Council took a final decision. It is also crucial that the personnel deployed be provided with the necessary training. In particular, in the light of the increasing role of the civilian component in recent peace-keeping efforts, unified training programmes and manuals for use by civilian personnel, such as civilian police, as well as by military personnel are urgently required.

With respect to the Secretary-General's idea of a "rapid reaction force" Japan joins others in stressing the importance of developing a level of preparedness for the timely deployment of peace-keeping operations, and commends the Secretary-General's initiative. On the other hand, further clarification of the following points is required: If it is expected that the force may be dispatched to any region of conflict solely by a decision of the Council, will there be any Member State willing to provide troops for such a force? Does the anticipated effectiveness of this force override considerations of the cost involved?

Clarification will also be needed as to how to avoid the facile and unrestrained dispatch and deployment of peace-keeping operations as a result of the materialization of this idea. Concerning the concept of "a reserve stock of standard peace-keeping equipment", it may be necessary to give further thought as to the ability of each national contingent to make full use of unfamiliar equipment, and as to the maintenance of such equipment.

As described in the Secretary-General's paper, as the peace-keeping stage of a United Nations effort comes to an end it is important to arrange for the smooth transfer of responsibility from the Council to the General Assembly or to a small support group chaired by the Secretary-General to promote peace-building. This will require greater coordination between the two bodies. But it is also useful to start discussing post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction even before a conflict is settled, as this could serve as an incentive for the parties to expedite an early conclusion of the conflict. In Cambodia, for instance, Japan took the initiative of calling for the convening of a reconstruction conference before there was a cessation of hostilities. This was a part of our efforts toward post-conflict peacebuilding there, and contributed to the eventual settlement of the conflict.

The Secretary-General does not discuss in detail the issue of, in his words, "macro disarmament". My delegation would like to stress, however, that 1995 is important as the year in which the Conference on the review and extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will be held. Let me simply reiterate here that Japan supports the unlimited extension of the NPT in order to enhance the stability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Similarly, it is also important to promote nuclear disarmament, and Japan hopes that further efforts in this regard will be made by the nuclear-weapon States.

At the same time, the importance of an early conclusion of the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty cannot be overemphasized. With respect to what the Secretary-General calls "micro-disarmament," as Foreign Minister Kono stressed in his statement at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly the easy transfer of conventional arms and their excessive accumulation are a destabilizing factor in various regions of the world. It is therefore an issue that demands the serious attention of the international community. Moreover, my delegation wishes to associate itself with the Secretary-General in emphasizing the importance of regulating anti-personnel mines and of strengthening the Register of Conventional Arms, as well as of promoting regional disarmament.

In his paper, the Secretary-General addresses the complicated issue of sanctions, and suggests that a mechanism be established to improve their effectiveness and reduce unintended collateral damage. This is certainly a controversial and sensitive issue. While noting the points made in the paper, we must not forget that sanctions are one of the few effective instruments at our disposal that can be used to convey the will and determination of the international community without resorting to the ultimate instrument, the use of force. It is also important to keep in mind that the purpose of sanctions is to modify the policy and behaviour of a party that is threatening international peace and security, and that the use of sanctions is clearly defined by the Charter of the United Nations.

Having said this, I acknowledge that it may be increasingly necessary to take into account the question of the impact sanctions can have on the economies of neighbouring countries in extending bilateral and multilateral cooperation to those countries. Japan, for its part, is ready to consider the impact of sanctions as it formulates its aid policy. It is desirable that appropriate humanitarian assistance activities are guaranteed even in the target country. We would suggest that there may be room for improvement in the actual practice of the sanctions committees and humanitarian agencies in more accurately assessing humanitarian needs and removing various factors impeding the activities of the humanitarian agencies in the target country.

Japan shares the view of the Secretary-General that improved coordination with the United Nations system as a whole is necessary.

In closing, my delegation wishes to stress that in order to enhance the peace-keeping and peacemaking functions of the United Nations in line with some of the suggestions made by the Secretary-General, it is essential that each Member State pay its assessed contributions in full and on time. At the same time, we would urge the Secretariat to strive to conduct its work more efficiently. While we understand that new initiatives require a certain amount of financial backing, we would encourage both the Council and the Secretariat, with the cooperation of Member States, to be brave enough to cut financial allocations where appropriate and necessary. We should not even shy away from the difficult decision of bringing to an end any United Nations activity that has largely achieved its original objective.

The United Nations is faced with ever-increasing challenges and expectations; its capacity and resources, however, remain limited. This requires that we embark upon a serious discussion as to how to establish priorities among the many important issues which the United Nations is called upon to address.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Japan for the kind words he addressed to me.

There are still 15 names on the list of speakers. In view of the lateness of the hour and with the concurrence of the members of the Council, I will suspend this meeting now.

The Council will continue consideration of this item tomorrow, Thursday, 19 January, at 10 a.m.

The meeting was suspended at 7.15 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.3492 (Resumption 2)

Security Council

Fiftieth Year

Provisional

3492nd Meeting

Thursday, 19 January 1995, 10 a.m.
New York

President:	Mr. Cárdenas	(Argentina)
Members:	Botswana	Mr. Legwaila
	China	Mr. Wang Xuexian
	Czech Republic	Mr. Kovanda
	France	Mr. Mérimée
	Germany	Mr. Henze
	Honduras	Mr. Martínez Blanco
	Indonesia	Mr. Wisnumurti
	Italy	Mr. Fulci
	Nigeria	Mr. Gambari
	Oman	Mr. Al-Khussaiby
	Russian Federation	Mr. Lavrov
	Rwanda	Mr. Ubalijoro
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir David Hannay
	United States of America	Mrs. Albright

Agenda

An Agenda for Peace

Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations (S/1995/1)

95-85060 (E)

This record contains the original text of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned, *within one week of the date of publication*, to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Section, room C-178.

The meeting resumed at 10.30 a.m. on Thursday, 19 January 1995.

The President *(interpretation from Spanish):* I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Misić (Bosnia and Herzegovina) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council Chamber.

The President *(interpretation from Spanish):* The next speaker is the representative of Brazil. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Valle (Brazil): First of all, I should like to express the satisfaction of my delegation in congratulating you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of January. As the Permanent Representative of the sister nation of Argentina, you have been conducting the Council's work with admirable competence and paying special attention to transparency — a feature which has been meeting with widespread appreciation among non-members and deserves public recognition.

I also wish to express to Ambassador Manzi Bakuramutsa of Rwanda words of great respect for the wisdom and professional integrity with which he most ably discharged his duties last month.

I take this opportunity to greet the five new non-permanent members who have joined in the Council in its deliberations for what will undoubtedly be a busy and challenging term.

We welcome the opportunity offered to the United Nations membership at large to react to the "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace", which the Secretary-General has placed before the Security Council and the General Assembly on the occasion of the Organization's fiftieth anniversary. This exchange of ideas and observations, although of a preliminary nature, will provide delegations and the Secretariat with a useful input for an in-depth reflection on the Organization's capacity to maintain peace and security at a moment of new, historic opportunities for the overall role of the United Nations.

I must preface my comments on more specific aspects of the document by recalling that Brazil remains convinced that peace and security cannot be dissociated from social and economic well-being. Having felt the need to become actively involved in the promotion of a renewed international effort in favour of development, we strongly believe that a new Agenda for Development is essential for the success of any Agenda for Peace. We should therefore like to stress the importance of advancing in the creation of a true partnership between the less developed and the more developed, at an appropriate pace, as a crucial step in fostering an equitable and peaceful international system at the threshold of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations.

The Secretary-General's Supplement contains a number of ideas and proposals which will require careful study and examination. The fact that it is addressed to the General Assembly at its fiftieth session — in addition to having been presented to the Security Council — will thus call for a prolonged debate, allowing delegations to dwell on the interesting thoughts and suggestions included in the report and to focus on action that may realistically be taken thereon.

The analysis of the changes in the international environment presented by the Secretary-General in the Supplement before us bears the authority of experience acquired through first-hand contact with a number of difficult situations, some of which remain unresolved and continue to defy contemporary diplomatic resourcefulness. While acknowledging the complexities of dealing with inter-State conflicts or internal ones that have exposed the United Nations to criticism, the Secretary-General retains a cautious approach to the problems encountered and refrains from redefining the accepted tenets under which efforts at peacemaking and peace-keeping must continue to be carried out.

In this context, we agree with the relevance attributed by the Secretary-General to Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter and with his assertion that

> "consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence" *(S/1995/1, para. 33)*

are essential to the success of United Nations endeavours.

We also welcome the clear recognition of the need to keep troop-contributing Governments fully informed on the evolution of peace-keeping operations. There have been some significant recent improvements in increasing transparency, and there appears to be an emerging consensus on the desirability of further progress in this direction.

It is doubtful, however, whether agreement could easily be reached on the proposal for the creation of a rapid reaction force or similar arrangements for dealing with emergencies. Although Brazil has been taking a number of steps in order to facilitate the availability of troops to the United Nations, through streamlined legislative approval procedures for deployment and the organization of special military training courses, we would not be in favour of hastening into the creation of a reaction force before a thorough consideration of financial and other related implications.

Likewise, any modification of the essentially economic, social and humanitarian role of United Nations resident coordinators to include a wider political mandate in the context of post-conflict peace-building would require previous careful examination.

As a general comment, my delegation would contend that in looking at ways to improve or speed up the response of the Organization to situations that threaten international peace and security, we must not lose sight of the inherent difficulty in prescribing general solutions to problems that are specific by their very nature. Whether focusing on preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping or national reconciliation and economic reconstruction within a post-conflict scenario, case by case sensitivity and expertise will continue to be necessary, with due regard given to the concerns of the affected civilians, if we are adequately to meet the challenges of the post-cold-war era. The experience of the past years has indeed taught us that there are no ready-made formulas for promoting peace, nor can any individual player in the concert of nations claim a monopoly over wisdom.

At this stage, my delegation wishes to reiterate the importance of the United Nations counting on the means to implement all Charter-mandated activities in a stable and predictable manner. In particular, in the case of peace-keeping operations, perhaps the most valuable tool at the disposal of the Organization to deal with situations that threaten international peace and security, the institutionalization of the ad hoc scale for the apportionment of peace-keeping expenditures, inaugurated by General Assembly resolution 3101 (XXVIII) of 1973 and repeatedly endorsed since then, is a goal to be sought.

The special scale embodies a number of fundamental political and economic considerations. The continuing adherence to it for more than 30 years provided stability to the financial foundations of this Organization. First and foremost, the principle of the special responsibility of the permanent members of the Security Council, as recognized by General Assembly resolution 1874 (S-IV), is the acknowledgement that peace-keeping expenses, which nowadays constitute the bulk of the Organization's costs, are a collective but differentiated responsibility of Member States. The special scale is a reminder that when the Security Council exercises the exceptional powers conferred upon it by the Charter, it should act in a financially responsible way.

The other principles of the special scale have also been consistently upheld by Member States in all General Assembly resolutions devoted to the financing of peace-keeping expenditures. Developed countries are in a position to make more substantial contributions than developing ones to the financing of expenditures, since the maintenance of international peace and security is a solidary task that should be performed through mustering resources from States according to their capacity to pay and in accordance with the necessities of the maintenance of international peace and security.

I shall concentrate my additional comments essentially on the sections of the Secretary-General's document devoted to sanctions and to disarmament.

The Chapter on disarmament seems to focus on a questionable perspective, in so far as it places on the same level both the process of limiting the spread of small arms among individuals and factions within a society and the task of pursuing, establishing and verifying disarmament among States. The process termed "micro-disarmament" relating to small arms should preferably not be addressed as a sub-section of disarmament, and would seem to fit more adequately into the context of measures designed to reverse the breakdown of law and order after a conflict.

Furthermore, this section of the document fails to portray the role that can be played by disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation in the present security

context. We recall that there has been widespread agreement in recent years on the increased importance of preventing the spread of, and gradually eliminating, all weapons of mass destruction — nuclear, chemical and biological. It is worth noting, on the other hand, that efforts regarding transparency and confidence building, in the field of conventional weapons and military budgets, have been meeting with some success.

May I note with satisfaction that the chapter on sanctions tackles in a candid and creative manner an issue that has been raising increasing concern among Member States. Indeed, the problems and contradictions mentioned by the Secretary-General reflect the disquiet of a growing number of delegations with regard to what is often perceived as a precipitate resort to sanctions or their implementation beyond what would seem to be a fair or adequate span of time. I would also recall that Brazil has continuously expressed the view that the Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions must be abided by by those to whom they are directed as well as by the Council itself.

The proposal for the creation of a mechanism to monitor the application of sanctions, as described in paragraph 75, has merit, although its establishment and functioning would have to be widely debated, and the precise role of the Secretariat would need to be discussed among delegations.

In concluding, the Brazilian delegation expresses thanks to the Secretary-General for providing us with interesting material on which to focus our attention, and declares its readiness to participate in further deliberations on the topics raised in the document before us. As a last word, I would like to lend our support to suggestions that a list be drawn up in response to the difficulty encountered by the Secretariat in finding senior persons with diplomatic skills who are willing to serve as Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, and our willingness to provide some names to be included in that list.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Brazil for his kind words addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of New Zealand. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Keating (New Zealand): It is a great pleasure for me to sit here at this table under your presidency, Sir. I know full well that the Council is in extremely good hands, and we wish you all the very best for the remainder of your term.

I would also like to request the delegation of Rwanda to convey to our friend and colleague, the Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Rwanda, our congratulations and thanks for what he did; his hard work during the month of December was much appreciated.

Like the Ambassador of Brazil, I would like to extend my congratulations to the new members of the Council. We are very pleased to see them all taking over their very important responsibilities. They have our support, and in some ways also our sympathy.

I do not intend this morning to set out the full range of New Zealand's views on our collective efforts to maintain international peace and security. My Foreign Minister did that in the General Assembly general debate last September, and what he said at that time seems to me to be still relevant. Instead, I want to make some preliminary comments on the Secretary-General's "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace". I hope that you, Sir, and the members of the Secretariat will forgive me for the fact that I have not come here with a prepared statement.

I think that some of the important reforms that we have made in the processes of the Council in the past year or so have been predicated on the fact that there ought to be a better dialogue between the members of the Council and the Members of the United Nations that are not members of the Council. It seems to me that, if we are to have a candid dialogue, we need to be able to come here to the Council and have an exchange of views. We certainly should not come with a closed mind and an inability to respond to the points that have been made in the course of discussion.

In referring to the Secretary-General's "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace", I would like to begin with his conclusion because I think it is very important and I endorse every word of it. He says that hard decisions are needed. Now, they are not needed because we have failed; I believe that real progress has been made. Hard decisions are needed because we have begun to succeed. The United Nations has begun to work in the area of international peace and security in the way it was designed to do.

It seems to me that, for most of the past 50 years, the United Nations has been crawling. In the past few years, we have begun to learn to walk and even, perhaps, to run a little bit. Naturally, there have been a few stumbles. That is life. But let us not pay heed to those who have spoken in this debate to advocate that the United Nations should go back to crawling because that is what it knows best. We stand firmly with the Secretary-General when he says:

> "There is no reason for frustration or pessimism" (*S/1995/1, para. 105*).

We should go forward with confidence and courage.

Let me turn to the part of the Secretary-General's Supplement on preventive diplomacy and peacemaking. This is a fundamental task set out in the Charter of the United Nations. I find it somewhat curious that in this very important and substantial section of the Supplement the Charter is not mentioned at all. The Secretary-General notes in paragraph 25 that the objective is to find ways of enabling the United Nations to perform better the roles envisaged for it. I think that there is an anomaly in the fact that when we look at the Charter and at what it says about preventive diplomacy and peacemaking we find that there is absolutely no mention at all of a role for the Secretary-General in those areas. Instead, we find a very substantial Chapter — Chapter VI — which gives primary responsibility to the Security Council in matters which, in our terminology of today, can only be described as preventive diplomacy and peacemaking.

I would be the first to endorse the very significant contributions that successive Secretaries-General have made to preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, and I would be the first to insist that those should continue. But I do think that it is curious that the Security Council's role in preventive diplomacy and peacemaking is somehow submerged. It does not appear in the document and it does not appear in the literature. I think that the Security Council has a very important role to play in preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, and I would note in this context that one of the principal conclusions the Secretary-General has reached is that one of the things that are frustrating his efforts in preventive diplomacy and peacemaking is the lack of a norm by which States should accept the good offices of the United Nations.

Let me say in response to this that I agree that there should be a norm, but when you look at the Charter you see that there is already such a norm, set out in Article 37. Article 37 is in fact more than a norm — it is a legal obligation on all States Members of the United Nations. If it proves impossible to resolve a dispute or conflict in a face-to-face manner, there is an obligation to bring that matter to the Security Council. So the norm for the involvement of the United Nations is already there in our Charter. I believe that what this demonstrates is that we need to look for some new kind of partnership between the Council and the Secretariat in which they both see themselves as being engaged in a cooperative effort to implement the principles that are already set out in the Charter.

As the members of the Council are well aware, there has been for quite some time a degree of concern and apprehension amongst the non-members of the Council, which gets expressed from time to time in the General Assembly, that the Security Council should put more effort into action under Chapter VI rather than Chapter VII. Speaking personally, I believe that the Security Council has actually been doing that and doing a lot of it very successfully. But because it is not recognized in the way I have described, it is perhaps missed.

How would such a partnership between the Secretariat and the Security Council work? It seems to me that the model perhaps could be the work that was undertaken last year in the mission which the Security Council sent to Burundi. I do not think that there is any doubt at all that the Security Council played a very important role in preventive diplomacy and peacemaking when the mission went to Burundi at a very critical time.

I think also that my own personal experience on a mission to Somalia reinforces this conclusion. Preventive diplomacy and peacemaking were not part of the original mandate of the mission that went to Somalia, but certainly there was an unexpected outcome from that mission. Before we left, we were informed in a briefing by the Secretariat that it was to be expected during our time there that the parties would both unilaterally announce the formation of competing governments. I think there is no doubt that the presence of the mission in Somalia had a very important impact in persuading the parties to hold back from what would have been a disastrous outcome, both for the United Nations and for any prospects of reconciliation. Now, four or five months later, that restraint still prevails.

I think that it is also instructive to note that this partnership can work not only here in New York, but also on the ground. It was certainly the experience of

those of us who went to Somalia that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and his political civilian advisers greatly valued the presence in the field of another organ of the United Nations to work with them at a critical time.

I think we can, and must, replicate these two examples in other areas, and I have one practical suggestion that members of the Council might like to reflect on. Over time, a practice could perhaps develop whereby, when the Council takes up an issue under its preventive diplomacy and peacemaking mode, it might look to appointing, either formally or informally, one Member State that clearly has no interest in the issue in question to act as what other organs of the United Nations might call a rapporteur or a coordinator — or what might be called a godfather. That Member State would take responsibility for a particular problem the Council is dealing with, and it might also work with the Department of Political Affairs to ensure that the Council's handling of its role in preventive diplomacy and peacemaking is appropriate and timely. If a mission is called for, then a mission can take place.

I am conscious of the fact that many Members of the United Nations would feel very strongly that, if the Council were to become more involved in preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, its members should always remember their roots — that they are Members of a broader Organization. I believe that it is possible for the Council to play this role and to involve the States of a region that would have a special interest in its handling of an issue.

Again, I should like to give an example from the work of the mission to Somalia. I believe that a very important event during that mission was the convening, in Nairobi, of a meeting between the Council mission and the representatives of the countries of the region. We were able to brief them on what the Council was doing and to receive their views on how we should handle the situation upon our return to New York. So I think it is possible for the Council to play a much more active role in peacemaking and preventive diplomacy.

I should like to turn now to the question of peace-keeping. I was very struck by what the Secretary-General said in paragraph 36, that peace-keeping and peace enforcement

> "should be seen as alternative techniques and not as adjacent points on a continuum, permitting easy transition from one to the other."

I thought long and hard about that sentence, and I concluded that, while I agree that this is the ideal, it does not correspond to what happens in the real world.

We should always be striving to make the real world conform to our ideals, but I want to give an example of why I think the real world is different. Let us look at what confronted General Dallaire in Rwanda. General Dallaire had a very critical problem; he had to respond to a situation of desperate human need. Did he protect the civilians in the stadium or did he not? In the real world, there is always, I think, transition from peace-keeping to peace enforcement, where occasionally force will need to be used without consent.

Take the case of Bosnia. Again, I feel the Secretary-General's analysis is a little faulty. I think this is a case where the Security Council did listen to what the international community was saying. Some would say it did not go far enough, but the Security Council did respond, and it did give a partially forceful mandate.

I believe that human history suggests that decisions to go to war — to use force — are rarely taken in a clinical way, and the recent history of the United Nations suggests that we will not be immune from that tendency.

Finally, I should like to make a comment about command and control. The Secretary-General says that the Security Council has tended to engage in micro-management. I think that that is a straw man; I think the Security Council does not even engage in management, let alone micro-management, of issues in the field. The Security Council does require a detailed understanding of the operational conditions in the field, and this is not only a question of information.

On the question of information, we know that the fog of war argument does not always hold up, because there are large amounts of information available in the Secretariat: witness the digest that we used to receive, but not longer receive. But there is a broader question, a question of political accountability between the Secretariat, which is the administrative organ of the United Nations, and the policy organ of the United Nations, which is the Security Council and on occasion the General Assembly.

Efficiency is important, but all democratic structures must make a trade-off between bureaucratic efficiency and political efficiency. If we make bureaucratic efficiency an absolute, this results in "bureaucratic

capture". I believe that in all modern democracies being politically efficient means a quite detailed level of intrusion into the decision-making that is being done by those charged with implementing policy, a detailed intrusion by those responsible for the political implications of the action being taken. That is certainly the case in my country, and I know it is the case in many of the other countries represented here in this Chamber. I do not think that the United Nations should be any different.

A final word about sanctions: sanctions have proved themselves to be an important tool in the armoury of the United Nations, and I think the report slightly underrates the significance of this. I can see that there is a very strong argument for Members of the United Nations impacted by sanctions to support the concept of a mechanism to investigate the economic implications. I believe that there is merit in considering this issue, but it should not be looked at in isolation. We must bear in mind that there are other issues relating to sanctions that should be studied at the same time. Enforcement is one of them. Sanctions committees are constantly made aware of the fact that action in the field is being affected by events that are outside United Nations control.

I think if we were to have a study of a mechanism, it should also study the question of enforcement and who pays for enforcement, because, in the view of my authorities, a "user-pays" element in the administration of sanctions regimes is long overdue, and I believe that the Security Council could well encourage the study of such a "user-pays" system.

I do not want to leave the impression that with these comments, which have been somewhat critical of the report, we are any less supportive of the excellent work that has been done by the Secretary-General in following up "An Agenda for Peace". As those who have worked with us in the past know, there has been no stronger supporter in the Security Council of the Secretary-General, his staff, the Department of Peace-keeping Operations and the Department of Political Affairs, and I intend that New Zealand will continue to maintain that level of support for the United Nations in its role outside the Security Council.

I thank you, Mr. President, for the excellent opportunity you have provided us to express some views on the "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace", and we wish you well.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of New Zealand for the kind words he addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Slovenia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Türk (Slovenia): It gives me great pleasure to see you, Sir, presiding over the present discussion. We deeply appreciate your efforts to improve the working methods of the Security Council, and we consider it most fitting that the present discussion takes place under your presidency. We are convinced that under your presidency the work of the Security Council will be successful.

We are grateful to the Secretary-General for the "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace", and we commend him for the valuable ideas expressed therein. We particularly welcome the point made towards the end of the document that the changing circumstances require, *inter alia*, perceptive, adaptive and creative responses. The Supplement prepared by the Secretary-General will certainly facilitate the search for such responses, and we wish to offer some of our thoughts pertaining to the same search.

An important part of the "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace" is devoted to the Secretary-General's reflections on the specific features of political and military conflicts after the end of the cold war. Indeed, the new international political environment is often characterized by conflicts which are in some respects different from those of the past. The number of political actors involved in conflicts has increased and become more diverse. The current wars by proxy are sometimes fought on behalf of smaller States and for diverse political agendas. In several conflicts the inter-State aspect is less apparent or deliberately obscured. All this calls for additional efforts in the analysis of the causes of conflicts.

It is sometimes suggested that ethnic or religious factors are crucial in many conflicts, which are therefore described as ethnic or religious. We would like to caution against the hasty use of these terms to qualify conflicts. A look to the past would help reveal the presence of ethnic or religious elements in many conflicts of the past and other, non-ethnic and non-religious elements in present military conflicts, including those which are described as ethnic. As a matter of fact, it is possible to speak of the ethnic coefficient in most military conflicts

in human history. What is really necessary is a careful identification of actors in each conflict and of their actual agendas. Only if this is possible and done can one hope that the response by the United Nations and by other international mechanisms will correspond to the actual needs.

A related problem stems from the fact that, as a rule, the qualification of a conflict as ethnic does not explain its causes or nature. Such qualification is too often a result of political convenience, intellectual laziness or, worst of all, willingness to accept a situation as insoluble. Such approaches ought to be avoided.

Our final remark on the issue of the nature of present-day conflicts is this: a number of recent conflicts have been fought under the slogan of preservation of the territorial integrity of States. Here, again, we wish to emphasize the need for careful analysis of the real nature of the conflict and of the actual agendas involved. The use of powerful and generally supported values and principles for the purpose of justifying very prosaic goals, such as the pursuit of power and control over others, are as old as military conflicts themselves. Moreover, in some recent military conflicts such prosaic goals have motivated the use of force against the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination and have made political negotiation on the most appropriate and peaceful form of self-determination more difficult and sometimes impossible. It is indeed paradoxical that in our era the use of military force under the slogan of territorial integrity has more often than not led to the social and political disintegration of societies and in some cases to the disintegration of States.

The purpose of these admittedly somewhat lengthy opening remarks was to contribute to the ongoing discussion on the challenges put before the United Nations and the international community at present. Moreover, we believe that careful clarification of military conflicts is necessary in any effort intended to devise the United Nations response to a given situation. That response, of course, need not always be a military one. Very often political means, such as good offices, advice or economic cooperation, can be more useful, in particular in the period before the full outbreak of a military conflict.

In the situation of conflict itself, it is necessary to agree on the nature of the conflict prior to defining the nature of the United Nations military operation. Here we suggest that careful thought be given to the exact nature of the United Nations operation. We agree with the Secretary-General when he emphasizes in the "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace" that

> "Peace-keeping and the use of force (other than in self-defence) should be seen as alternative techniques and not as adjacent points on a continuum, permitting easy transition from one to the other." (*S/1995/1, para. 36*)

We would like to add in this connection that it is necessary to re-evaluate the so-called complex peace-keeping operations and consider the possibility of limiting peace-keeping operations to what they actually should be: operations intended to support and stabilize a cease-fire or a truce already agreed to by the parties in conflict. In our opinion, adding other elements should be avoided, both as a matter of principle and as a matter of expediency.

This approach does not exclude the possibility that the United Nations can authorize or resort to the use of force in forms other than peace-keeping, in accordance with the Charter. But in such cases the specific type of use of force should be characterized as what it actually is.

Perhaps an improved practice would also require clearer terminology; the term "peace-keeping" should be reserved for genuine peace-keeping operations, while other military operations should be termed in appropriate words. While this might be politically difficult in some situations, the advantage of preservation of intellectual and moral accuracy would be to the benefit of all Members of the United Nations.

We studied carefully the comments by the Secretary-General on sanctions, and we generally agree with his analysis. In particular, we would like to support the idea, expressed in paragraph 75 (a), that there should be a mechanism to assess, before sanctions are imposed, their potential impact on the target country and on third countries.

Any sophisticated system of decision-making requires impact assessment prior to the final taking of a decision. Recent experience with sanctions has shown that their effects are sometimes slightly different from what was generally expected, and that sometimes a disproportionate burden is placed upon neighbouring States or on major economic partners of the targeted State. We would therefore urge that the question of mechanisms for the assessment of effects of sanctions and

the methodology of preparation of statements of impact assessment be given a high priority.

Before concluding, I wish to make a few remarks on the Secretary-General's analysis of preventive diplomacy and peacemaking. It is a matter of common sense that prevention is better than cure. It is also clear that successful preventive diplomacy is considerably less costly than peace-keeping and other types of military operations that become necessary in situations where preventive diplomacy failed or was not attempted. We therefore support the recommendations in paragraphs 31 and 32 concerning the practical measures necessary for the successful implementation of the mandate of the Secretary-General in the domain of preventive diplomacy.

But more needs to be done, and — hypothetically, at least — can be done. The Secretary-General recognizes, in paragraphs 27 and 28, the problems of political will and the reluctance of certain States to accept United Nations assistance. We agree with the Secretary-General that the solution can only be long term, and that it depends on the necessary climate of opinion, or ethos, within the international community which would encourage Member States to accept an offer of United Nations good offices.

The real question here, in our opinion, is whether such a climate or such an ethos might be expected without an effort on the part of various United Nations organs and, in particular, the General Assembly. In matters of preventive diplomacy the Secretary-General is not alone and should not be alone. In our view the entire United Nations system should be seen as a whole, and different tasks in the domain of preventive diplomacy pertain to all United Nations organs within their respective powers defined in the Charter.

The Permanent Representative of New Zealand has just spoken at some length on the powers and possibilities for the Security Council in this domain. I largely share his analysis. What we would like to recall in this context is that the General Assembly, in its resolution 47/120 B, entitled "An Agenda for Peace" expressed its resolve to make full and effective use of powers set out in Articles 10 and 14 of the Charter, in conformity with other relevant provisions of the Charter. The General Assembly then went on to decide, in paragraph 2 of part I:

> "to consider the use of existing or new machinery, including subsidiary organs under Article 22 of the Charter, to facilitate consideration of any situation coming within the scope of Article 14 of the Charter, with a view to recommending measures for the peaceful adjustment of such a situation".

The resolution was adopted by consensus by the General Assembly on 20 September 1993. An appropriate machinery established by the General Assembly could help the Secretary-General address any situation which it, as Article 14 says,

> "regardless of origin ... deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations."

This may help reduce the problems of political will to tackle a situation at an early stage.

The long-term processes to which the Secretary-General refers in paragraph 28 of the Supplement could thus be accelerated. In this context, I should like to make a specific proposal. Perhaps the Secretary-General could suggest consultations with the General Assembly, initially through its President, with a view to establishing the machinery called for in General Assembly resolution 47/120 B. It seems necessary to take advantage of the General Assembly and its potential and competences in this context.

We have commented upon several aspects of the "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace". We are hopeful that the Supplement and the discussions it has generated will contribute to the improvement of the work of the United Nations and to the adjustment of its mechanisms to current and evolving needs.

The President *(interpretation from Spanish)*: I thank the representative of Slovenia for his kind words addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Sri Lanka. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Rodrigo (Sri Lanka): At the outset, allow me to thank you, Mr. President, and the other members of the Security Council for the opportunity to present Sri Lanka's views on the Supplement to the Secretary-General's "An Agenda for Peace".

Sri Lanka would also like to extend its deepest condolences to the people and Government of Japan on the tragic loss of life and devastation caused by the earthquake in the region of Kobe.

During your stewardship of the Council, Mr. President, we have experienced welcome advances in the process towards greater openness in the Council's work. My delegation greatly appreciates your approach.

We are also grateful to the Permanent Representative of Rwanda for the efficient conduct of the Council's work during December.

The Secretary-General in his introduction to the Supplement recalls the political climate surrounding the first Security Council meeting held at Heads of State level in January 1992. He describes it in paragraph 1 as

"a time of hope and change".

The 1990s represent, as Charles Dickens described an earlier period of change, not only "the spring of hope" but also "the winter of despair". The cold war may certainly be over, but that late and not much-lamented phenomenon was not the sole cause for the constraints placed upon the United Nations, or, as the representative of New Zealand would have it, for making the United Nations crawl. There are other maladies, particularly economic ones, which lie outside cold war complications.

Since "An Agenda for Peace" was first issued in June 1992, three annual reports of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization have reviewed its basic premise. As a welcome corrective to what was primarily a political emphasis in the original Agenda for Peace, we have also seen the Secretary-General's "An Agenda for Development", exploring the nexus between political concerns and underlying economic factors.

The Agenda for Development seeks to identify the multiple dimensions of development. Peace, the economy, the environment, society and democracy were all seen as essential dimensions of development. While peace was thus seen as providing the most secure context for lasting development, there has also been recognition of the reality that political conflicts have, at root, economic and social causes. "An Agenda for Development" thus extended the horizons of "An Agenda for Peace". It has served, as the Secretary-General's Supplement puts it, to advance international consensus on the crucial importance of economic and social development as the most secure basis for lasting peace. We now hope for a practical manifestation of this consensus through the effecting of a balance between peace-keeping activities and pressing socio-economic imperatives.

Two years ago "An Agenda for Peace" offered a new vision to guide post-cold-war approaches to preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and peace-building. The Organization has come to be increasingly involved in a wide range of often controversial United Nations experimental activities relating to peace and security. Since June 1992 many of these activities have been guided by approaches outlined in the Agenda for Peace. In some situations the approaches adopted have been less successful than in others. The experiences gained, whether negative or positive, have been the subject of constant assessment by the Council and by the General Assembly, as well as by individual Member States.

The Secretary-General has not been insensitive to all this, as the Supplement — a frank and thought-provoking paper — clearly shows. It is the latest, but hopefully not the last, document in what we see as an incremental exercise to improve and hone the capacity of the United Nations to more effectively and efficiently respond to threats to international peace and security. We would welcome the continuation of this process, for two reasons.

First, the global tectonic rumbles which began in the late 1980s have not yet settled. Further changes will take place, not necessarily for the better. We are by no means yet on a yellow brick road leading to the end of history. Secondly, the responses of the United Nations to these developments are likely to continue counting not only successes but failures. The Organization must therefore develop essentially consensual courses of action — not to mention garnering essential resources — to respond to new eventualities.

As the representative of Indonesia, speaking on behalf of the non-aligned countries, suggested, the current debate on the Supplement could thus be advanced further with the participation of all Members through some suitable mechanism. The comments made by the representative of Slovenia are relevant in this connection.

The representative of Indonesia, in his statement, which we support, dealt also with many other issues of concern to my delegation. I therefore need to make only some brief supplementary comments. My delegation has in other forums stressed the importance of what we have called the "before" of peace-keeping.

It is essential that the United Nations have a clear and accurate understanding of the complexities of any situation in which it contemplates involvement or intervention. Every encouragement should be given to national domestic efforts being pursued to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes before the United Nations intervenes. The United Nations should scrupulously respect the principles of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States and should not intrude into areas which lie within their domestic jurisdiction.

The Department of Political Affairs, which has been organized in the Secretariat to follow international developments, should maintain close touch with Member States so as to be alive to complexities involved in each unique situation and to ensure the accuracy and fairness of political assessments that are being made. Reluctance to seek recourse to the United Nations — which the Secretary-General notes and regrets — will be reduced only to the extent to which States develop confidence and faith in the Organization.

When eventually decided in respect of a conflict situation, the peace-keeping operation should be conducive to its eventual settlement, and not confuse or confound it. When the United Nations intervenes, the objectives it seeks to fulfil must be clearly understood and embodied in coherent peace-keeping mandates which enjoy the support of the general membership of the United Nations. Resources needed to pursue and attain these objectives within realistic time frames must be anticipated, and their availability ensured, so as to permit a credible and sustainable level of effective engagement. Efficient, cost-effective management and rational utilization of these resources are vital in order to retain States' confidence in the United Nations. The consent of States, impartiality and the non-use of force, except in self-defence, are cardinal principles of peace-keeping.

Finally, my delegation would like to comment on section E of chapter III of the Supplement, which relates to sanctions. We endorse the view that the purpose of sanctions is to modify and influence the behaviour of those who threaten international peace and security, and not to punish or otherwise exact retribution. All Member States are bound to comply with decisions relating to sanctions, and the imposition of sanctions therefore involves all Member States.

The impact of sanctions, given the extent of global interdependence, affects more States today than ever before — some economically vulnerable States even more adversely than others. A balanced analysis is therefore necessary before the imposition of sanctions, not only to assess whether the threat to international peace and security would indeed be removed by sanctions, but also to avert the suffering of the innocent in the target State, as well as in other States.

By the same token, a strong case exists for much closer and more regular scrutiny of the situation in respect of States currently under sanctions, particularly where vulnerable civilian populations are being adversely affected. The Secretariat deserves to be strengthened with additional staff and resources required to more effectively and expeditiously fulfil its functions in respect of Article 50 of the Charter. We would therefore welcome close study of the timely suggestions made by the Secretary-General in paragraph 75 of his position paper.

We are grateful that the Agenda for Peace has remained open for improvement and that the Secretary-General has been responsive to the many suggestions that have been made in the two years since his original document was issued. We urge the process forward, not only in the Security Council but also in the General Assembly and in other forums, so that the decisions eventually reached, however hard, will be effectively carried out with the support and acceptance of the general membership of the Organization, on whose behalf the Council acts.

The President *(interpretation from Spanish)*: The next speaker is the representative of Australia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Butler (Australia): It gives me great pleasure to be at this table to offer you, Mr. President, congratulations on assuming the high office that you now hold.

This meeting of the Security Council is a remarkable one. It takes place at the beginning of the year in which the United Nations will mark its fiftieth year of life. It is focused on a paper by the Secretary-General which, with impressive clarity, analyses major issues revealed by, and needing to be addressed in, the period of transition — transition from the old to the new — through which we are passing.

Australia is grateful to the Secretary-General and his staff for providing the Supplement to "An Agenda for Peace". We also welcome the opportunity that the

Security Council has provided for the paper to be discussed in an open debate.

This debate is significant because the subjects which are addressed by the Secretary-General concern all States Members of the Organization and are ones on which we must all work together if the "hard decisions" — to use the Secretary-General's words — which he rightly says need to be taken are to be taken. This debate also reflects once again the new directions the Council has embarked upon in taking account, in its working methods, of the interests of non-Member States.

The Supplement identifies clearly the challenges and opportunities that the United Nations faces, following the end of the cold war and in an increasingly complex global environment. It outlines the significant action which has been taken in many areas since the Security Council Summit in 1992, and the subsequent publication of "An Agenda for Peace", to strengthen the role and functioning of the United Nations in order to enable it to respond effectively to those challenges and opportunities.

These are important features of the Supplement, but in our view its chief value lies in its identification of the issues on which attention needs to be focused in the future, and the steps needed to be taken to strengthen our common capacity to deal with threats to peace and security.

That capacity must be developed both intrinsically and at a fundamental level, a conceptual level. For these purposes we need action in three main fields: in economic and social development; in continuing development of all regimes of disarmament; and in major progress on reshaping, on reintegrating, the United Nations itself.

With respect to economic and social development, we are required, because of the pledge in the Charter — I am talking about Article 56 — but also for human and ethical reasons to seize the opportunity of the post-cold-war period to dramatically change our collective effort in support of the world's people. But there is another reason, relevant to today's debate.

As the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator Gareth Evans, said at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, in his general debate statement,

> "The distinction between peace and security on the one hand and development on the other has too often been a matter for sterile and unhelpful debate, with attempts to trade off one for the other as key goals for the United Nations. Any viable modern concept of international peace, let alone peace within States, must recognize that the two are indissolubly bound up with each other: there can be no sustainable peace without development, and no development without peace." *(Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, Plenary Meetings, 15th meeting, p. 8)*

For all of these reasons, Australia welcomed the Secretary-General's "Agenda for Development", following on, as it does, from "An Agenda for Peace". Among other very important considerations, it fully recognizes the relationship between peace and development, and it acknowledges that equitable development eradicates many of the socio-political conditions in which threats to peace breed. And it is only through such an integrated approach that we will be able to strengthen our common capacity to deal with the threats to peace and security to which the Secretary-General's paper refers.

The Secretary-General's paper also gives a very welcome attention to disarmament, on all levels.

As we will review the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) just three months from now, it is important to recognize what is at stake, 25 years after the entry into force of that unique agreement. The Non-Proliferation Treaty addresses a question which was not able to be addressed when the Charter was written, but one placed squarely on the agenda of history only months after San Francisco. That question is and was: will we live in a world permanently characterized by nuclear weapons? The answer given in that Treaty, by nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States alike, was "No".

We must extend indefinitely the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is unthinkable that we should in any way qualify that clear answer given in 1968. And we must use the review and extension Conference to further strengthen the application, the effectiveness and the implementation of the Treaty.

In his paper the Secretary-General also mentioned "micro-disarmament", to use his phrase. We strongly support him in this. The new world we are building must be freed from the destruction and waste caused by small conventional weapons. This Organization alone can forge international agreement on such measures, including measures on the clandestine arms trade, a trade which is

so often associated with the major threats to peace and security of people caused by the narcotics trade and by international criminality.

In the consideration of the current situation, two and a half years after the publication of "An Agenda for Peace", when the United Nations is still passing through a period of transition, it is appropriate that the Secretary-General should mention comprehensively the range of instruments which the United Nations has developed for controlling and resolving conflicts between and within States, instruments such as preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, peace-keeping, peace-building, disarmament, sanctions and peace enforcement.

All of these instruments have been employed in pursuit of the objective of a stronger international security environment. All have a role and a contribution to make. But the particular instrument that I wish to highlight in my statement today is that of preventive diplomacy. We highlight it because of its extreme relevance to the roots of conflicts we are witnessing in contemporary circumstances and because it is the paradigm of a reintegrated United Nations.

One of the most crucial elements in any functioning system of cooperative security is an effective capacity for preventive diplomacy. We note — and express our appreciation to him for them — the efforts the Secretary-General has made to strengthen the United Nations capacity in this field. But Australia is convinced that more can and should be done to prevent disputes escalating into armed conflict by giving increased attention to preventive diplomacy. By doing so, we will be making an invaluable commitment and contribution to creating a more peaceful and stable world.

As a major means to the peaceful settlement of disputes, preventive diplomacy is both consistent with the spirit and in accordance with the letter of the Charter of the United Nations.

An essential and accepted principle of preventive diplomacy is respect for the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and the political independence of States. By nature, preventive diplomacy techniques, as set out in Article 33 of the Charter, are non-intrusive and non-coercive, as they require the consent of the disputing parties. This is recognized by the Secretary-General in his position paper, where he refers to the fact that

> "Clearly the United Nations cannot impose its preventive and peacemaking services on Member States who do not want them." *(S/1991/1, para. 28)*

One of the strengths of preventive diplomacy is that it is all about non-military measures. It is quite distinct from preventive deployment using peace-keeping forces. In fact, the record shows that there has been limited use of preventive deployment, whereas the use of dispute settlement machinery has a long history, as illustrated by the United Nations handbook on the peaceful settlement of disputes.

It is also important to remember that strengthening the United Nations role in preventive diplomacy would not entail any diversion of attention or resources from the critical task of promoting development. The figures speak for themselves: a very small proportion of United Nations resources has so far been used for preventive diplomacy and peacemaking.

We also strongly believe that developing a greater ability within the United Nations system to solve disputes peacefully and avoid the costs of armed conflict is necessary as a matter of balance between the vital role of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security — but overloaded with crises and often called upon to act at the eleventh hour — and the General Assembly, which, with the benefit of all Member States' views and with the opportunity to reflect on questions of principle and general approach, can and should contribute its views on the security role of the United Nations and what can be done to act sooner to prevent the escalation of disputes into conflict. It is also a matter of balance between the costs — financial and in terms of a tax on the credibility of the United Nations — of reliance on peace-keeping and the costs of other military options when there is enormous scope to develop negotiation, good offices and other techniques for the peaceful settlement of disputes. There is also the potential to strengthen the Secretary-General's own role in preventive diplomacy, as he mentions in his paper.

Preventive diplomacy is, in short, a field rich with promise and opportunity. We must give greater attention to strengthening this key element in our common search for a more effective peace and security system.

In summary, we Australians believe that we need a reintegrated United Nations, a United Nations which addresses and is competent in the relevant range of contemporary concerns in development and disarmament

and with respect to threats to the security of people as well as of States. The "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace" and indeed today's debate are strong steps along that path.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Australia for his kind words addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Colombia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. García (Colombia) (*interpretation from Spanish*): On behalf of my Government, I wish to express our sorrow and convey our condolences to the Government and the people of Japan on the tragedy that has befallen their country as a result of the earthquake there this week.

First of all, I must emphasize our support for the statement made yesterday by the Ambassador of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned States. My delegation also wishes to thank the Secretary-General for submitting his "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations".

From an initial reading of this document we can see that, in its preparation, account was taken of some of the concerns expressed by various delegations, including that of my country, during the discussions that followed the submission of "An Agenda for Peace" in June 1992. This is particularly true of the references for many aspects of peace-keeping operations and the relationship between development and peace, and the consideration of items of the greatest importance, such as disarmament, and matters relating to the objectives, implementation and consequences of sanctions imposed under Article 41 of the Charter.

As has been said, greater emphasis is now being placed on economic and social affairs as the foundations of peace. Indeed, the existence of an international consensus on the paramount importance of economic and social development as the soundest basis for lasting peace is now recognized. On this subject, we are deeply convinced that the Organization must accord priority attention to economic and social development. We agree that the fiftieth anniversary offers an opportunity for the international community to begin its preparatory work on what has been called An Agenda for Development.

Chapter II of the paper, on quantitative and qualitative changes in this period of transition for the international system, contains a diagnosis that deserves serious consideration, particularly with regard to the increase and complexity of internal conflicts. In this connection, the framework for the Organization's actions must be based on the provisions of the Charter, especially paragraph 7 of Article 2. That is why my delegation agrees with the assertion made in the document that the United Nations, for eminently valid reasons, is reluctant to shoulder responsibility for maintaining law and public order and to impose new political structures or State institutions.

As has been indicated, one of the subjects about which the Secretary-General's paper acknowledges the many concerns that were raised when "An Agenda for Peace" was issued is precisely peace-keeping operations. In this regard, it rightly envisages the following as basic principles: the consent of parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in the case of self-defence. It also recognizes the need for making information more readily available and communicating and coordinating with, those countries that have contributed troops to such operations. Attention should also be drawn here to the reference in the paper to the success achieved in those operations that had been established on the basis of a negotiated agreement and designed to ensure implementation.

Although it is premature to refer in depth to the analysis of the changes that have occurred in peace-keeping operations, it is none the less appropriate to stress the advisability of a broader discussion of and greater clarity about the nature of multifunctional operations. Furthermore, the formulation of the proposal for the establishment of a rapid reaction force — about which my delegation has some reservations — should be studied in depth and with the greatest caution.

Despite the very relevant reference to the Charter and in particular to paragraph 7 of Article 2, the ideas expressed in the paper's Chapter III A, on preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, and in Chapter III C, on post-conflict peace-building, require further discussion and analysis.

Although rather limited, the reference to nuclear disarmament in Chapter III, on instruments for peace and security, is very timely. The changes that have occurred in the international system make it even more obvious that nuclear arsenals must be eliminated. We are optimistically preparing to participate in the discussions at the Conference of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and we stress the

importance of strict compliance with the objectives defined in article VI of that Treaty.

The Secretary-General's paper pays particular attention to "micro-disarmament" within the context of existing conflicts. Without doubt, the proliferation of automatic assault weapons, anti-personnel mines and other, similar weapons is an anomaly which encourages the outbreak and deterioration of conflicts of all kinds, while obstructing the processes of peace and reconstruction.

With regard to the proliferation of anti-personnel mines, we agree that the international community has been paying greater attention to this problem. Nevertheless, the measures that have been adopted are clearly insufficient. Even an effective moratorium on the production and export of these mines would still leave us with the 110 million that have already been laid.

The set of proposals made by the Secretary-General on the question of sanctions merit more thorough study. We emphasize the importance that we attach to defining "clear objectives", to taking into account in advance of the lifting of sanctions the possible effects this would have on third States and the more vulnerable groups of the population, and to assessing the criteria for and the results of such a step.

In the light of the experience acquired over recent years, we should give serious consideration to the Secretary-General's suggestion that instruments be established that would enable the United Nations fully to develop and implement the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter.

Finally, my delegation emphasizes the appropriateness, timeliness and importance of the initiative that has made it possible for us to engage in this consideration of the paper submitted by the Secretary-General. We also wish to stress your skilful leadership of this discussion, Mr. President. We are sure that there will be broader and deeper discussions of the paper in the General Assembly and in this Council, in accordance with the Charter's mandate in such matters. To this end, we agree that a working group of the General Assembly should be established to study the Secretary-General's document.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Colombia for the kind words he addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Hungary. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Nathon (Hungary): I should like to join those speakers who have congratulated you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for January. I wish you much success during the rest of the month.

First of all, I would like to express my appreciation to the Secretary-General for the important document that is before the Council today. In the position paper, he has provided us with a thoughtful and comprehensive analysis on how to improve the capacity of the United Nations to maintain peace and security. We believe that the proposals he has put forward in the present document can serve as a useful additional basis for evaluating and further developing some conceptual and practical elements of "An Agenda for Peace".

No one can deny that during the last two and a half years the activities of the United Nations relating to the maintenance of peace and security have undergone significant changes. Nevertheless, most of the ideas set out in 'An Agenda for Peace' have remained relevant. At the same time, we should admit that the rapid increase in peace-keeping operations and the diversification of their mandates have resulted in an inadequate use of related principles, methods and resources as well. We must, therefore, agree with the Secretary-General that it is time to highlight certain areas of the activities of the United Nations in order to draw lessons from the experience gained.

Certain developments in the nature of conflicts have further increased the importance of rapid actions. This calls for the strengthening of preventive diplomacy, including developing adequate early warning capacities, dispatching field missions, and utilizing the good offices of Governments, international or regional organizations or eminent personalities in order to get to the source of an imminent conflict and safeguard the security, well-being and human rights of the affected civilian population. Hungary, for its part, supports the Secretary-General's proposal that a climate be created within which it would be a basic rule for Member States to accept the involvement and the assistance of the United Nations in such conflicts.

During the last few years the character of the peace-keeping operations has changed dramatically. The

operations have become more complex and also more dangerous. It has become increasingly difficult to find sufficient troops and other personnel. The Secretary-General presents to us a set of proposals on how, in his opinion, the United Nations could get out of this "pitfall" situation. In this respect we look forward to receiving further details about his idea of a rapid reaction force.

The importance of the post-conflict peace-building activity of the United Nations has grown considerably in recent years. Objectives like demilitarization, control of small arms, development of the police force and the judiciary, establishment of the rule of law, building up of democratic institutions, monitoring of human rights, and assistance for social and economic development have all become indispensable elements of this activity, in which peace-building efforts should go beyond traditional functions. Post-conflict peace-building has thus turned into a multifunctional activity in which the responsibilities of the United Nations have increased, particularly in the humanitarian and human rights fields. We welcome the progress that has been made in this regard and encourage the Secretary-General to further strengthen all aspects of this crucial activity.

Cooperation between the United Nations and the regional arrangements under Chapter VIII of the Charter is on the rise. We whole-heartedly welcome this relatively new phenomenon. The various fields of collaboration between the United Nations and regional organizations are duly reflected in the document in the reference made to concrete examples of consultation, diplomatic support, operational support, co-deployment and joint operations. I would like to mention here an additional example: the participation of regional arrangements — the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Western European Union (WEU) — in enforcing sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). We think it would be appropriate for the United Nations and the regional organizations to strengthen cooperation in the fields of preventive diplomacy and regional arms control and disarmament arrangements.

In our capacity as Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE we deem it extremely important that the already promising and fruitful cooperation between the two organizations develop further. Recent changes in the institutional structure of the OSCE — for example, the establishment of the post of Chairman-in-Office and the Troika — have made it possible for the OSCE to act more efficiently in its relations with other organizations. A good reflection of this development is found in the almost daily contacts between the United Nations and the OSCE. Working-level cooperation between the two secretariats should be further encouraged. For our part, we will do everything in our power to give impetus to this collaboration.

In his paper the Secretary-General pays special attention to the question of sanctions. Undoubtedly, sanctions are a very blunt instrument. However, in the last couple of years, the Security Council has increasingly resorted to the imposition of sanctions in order to either modify the behaviour of a party that constitutes a threat to international peace and security, or enforce the mandatory resolutions of the Council. Since sanctions do not involve the use of force, they are the last 'peaceful' means among the instruments for peace and security at the disposal of the international community to enforce its will.

The imposition of sanctions inevitably affects the economic interests of neighbouring countries of the targeted State. An important element for consideration could be the involvement of such countries in the negotiating process of the Security Council before the actual imposition of sanctions. However, under the relevant provisions of the Charter, mandatory sanctions imposed by the Security Council represent internationally binding obligations for all States, which are duty bound to implement them. Article 25 of the Charter remains a cornerstone of the United Nations. Therefore, those who, for one reason or another, call into question their obligations relating to the implementation of sanctions, undermine the very existence of the world Organization.

The President *(interpretation from Spanish)*: I thank the representative of Hungary for the kind words he addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Ireland. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Hayes (Ireland): It is a great pleasure for my delegation to see you, Sir, presiding over the Security Council. Our confident expectations that your performance of the duties of this high office will be marked by wisdom and effectiveness have already been fully justified, and we wish you continued success for the rest of your month in office. We particularly appreciate your efforts to continue the improvements in the transparency of the work of the Security Council. We would also like to thank the representative of Rwanda for

the effective conduct of the Security Council's business last month.

Permit me also to express to Japan our heartfelt sympathy over the disastrous earthquake which has struck that country and which has caused so many casualties and brought so much suffering on its people. It is our wish that the efforts of the Government to alleviate the plight of those suffering will meet with significant and early success.

I welcome this opportunity to give a response to the Secretary-General's important and, in view of the United Nations fiftieth anniversary this year, timely report, which has been published as a supplement to "An Agenda for Peace". At the outset, I wish to thank him for having taken the initiative in giving us his analysis of the many changes that have occurred since June 1992 and for the valuable recommendations which he makes. The Secretary-General's analysis and proposals are all the more valuable since they are clearly based on the experience acquired during the past few years, and in particular the lessons to be derived from operations such as those in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. As measures designed to strengthen the role of the United Nations in the area of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping, the Secretary-General's proposals merit careful study and, in general, evoke the support of my Government.

The comments I wish to make should be seen in the context of the statement made by the Ambassador of France on behalf of the European Union, which we, of course, fully endorse. In view of the importance of the issues at the heart of this debate and the public interest and concern they arouse, my Government wishes to make some supplementary observations.

Our first comment, a general one, is that the ground covered in this report, as indeed in "An Agenda for Peace", impinges on the peace role of the United Nations system as a whole, including, in particular, not only the Security Council but also the General Assembly and the Secretary-General himself.

The manner in which United Nations operations in the field have qualitatively changed in recent years and, in particular, have had to take on a multifaceted approach in order to deal with the many complex problems arising from preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping and peace-building mandates, appropriately forms one of the major themes of the Secretary-General's report. My Government has welcomed the development of this multifaceted approach to the conduct of the United Nations responsibilities in this general area. We would like to see this approach further developed in the future through, in particular, ensuring that a human rights dimension is clearly provided for in humanitarian and peace-keeping operations and is included in further mandates, as appropriate.

The Secretary-General in his report quite rightly highlights the increasing number of conflicts around the world today that are within States rather than between States. These conflicts are often of the most barbaric and cruel kind, with large numbers of innocent civilians as their principal victims. The role that can be played by the United Nations to end these conflicts is both complex and delicate, and cannot easily be performed without the help of regional organizations. We fully support the importance the Secretary-General attributes to the role that regional organizations can play in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. In this regard, we fully subscribe to the principles which he has proposed should underlie the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations in this area.

The way in which preventive diplomacy can be used to pre-empt conflicts and defuse them at an early stage is well known and has been successful on many occasions. However, as the Secretary-General has himself pointed out, too often the offer of assistance from the United Nations is rejected or comes too late. There is also the problem of ensuring that all information on or evidence of growing instability or a potential crisis is expeditiously brought to the attention of the competent organs, and that appropriate action is quickly taken. For example, ample information on the deterioration of the situation in Rwanda was available within the United Nations system in advance of the crisis, but did not lead to timely preventive action. We need to examine such problems carefully and as a matter of urgency in order to improve the manner in which the preventive diplomacy efforts of the United Nations are undertaken.

In this regard also, I should like to recall a proposal put forward by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ireland, Mr. Dick Spring, in his address to the forty-ninth regular session of the General Assembly. In that address, he called for the establishment of a mediation body to which the Security Council or the General Assembly could refer difficult issues. Such a body would, of course, act in close consultation with the Secretary-General and would be made up of personnel skilled in mediation. In our view, such a body could quickly acquire an expertise and authority that would enhance the peacemaking capacity of the United Nations.

My Government has noted with great interest the Secretary-General's comments regarding the difficulties involved in the establishment and financing of small field missions for preventive diplomacy and peacemaking. We believe firmly that the financing of such important missions needs to be put on as assured a basis as possible and therefore would urge that favourable consideration be given by the appropriate bodies of the General Assembly to the specific proposals which the Secretary-General has made in this regard.

In this respect, we submit that a positive and creative approach to a more proactive role for the United Nations in preventing and defusing conflicts is called for. Success in such a role not only would prevent much human suffering, but would have the additional advantages of strengthening the United Nations capacity for maintaining peace and of reducing the need for costly peace-keeping missions. Again, a case in point is Rwanda, where early preventive diplomacy could have avoided much bloodshed and also averted a belated and more costly international operation.

The principal — indeed, one might say quintessential — instrument employed by the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security throughout the first half century of its history has been peace-keeping. My Government fully subscribes to the view articulated by the Secretary-General in his report that recent experience has confirmed that respect for certain basic principles of peace-keeping, such as impartiality, consent of the parties and non-use of force except in self-defence, are absolutely essential if peace-keeping mandates are to be implemented effectively. We equally endorse his view that classic peace-keeping must be clearly seen as distinct from peace enforcement at all times, and the latter should never be seen as logically deriving from the former.

The importance in United Nations peace-keeping of ensuring strict adherence to the principle of unity of command is a concept which my Government has always recognized and supported, and we therefore endorse the Secretary-General's comments on this important matter. We have also noted his comments generally on the subject of command and control and, in particular, his concerns regarding micro-management of peace-keeping operations by the Security Council. We understand his concerns on this point. My Government has consistently held the view that effective communication of information between troop-contributing countries, the Security Council and the Secretary-General is absolutely essential in order to ensure adequate public confidence in, and understanding of, the United Nations and its role in the areas of peacemaking and peace-keeping. We have therefore warmly welcomed the recent efforts made to improve consultation procedures in this regard, and we feel sure that these and any further efforts to develop them can also contribute to improvement of the overall command and control structures.

As regards the issue of availability of troops and equipment, my Government has taken note with interest of the Secretary-General's proposal regarding establishment of a rapid reaction force, and it believes that, as outlined in the statement of the European Union, this proposal merits further examination in all its aspects and in conjunction with the ongoing efforts to develop the system of stand-by arrangements.

In his report the Secretary-General has quite rightly pointed out that the measures available for use in pursuit of post-conflict peace-building can equally be applied in support of preventive-diplomacy activities. He has drawn attention, however, to the difficulties which may exist in triggering international recognition for the application of such measures in a situation of potential conflict where there is as yet no United Nations peacemaking or peace-keeping mandate. In this regard, we support his comments on the effective early-warning role which agencies and programmes of the United Nations system can play in alerting the Secretary-General to potential disputes. I also wish to reiterate my Government's belief that the Economic and Social Council can, and should be encouraged to, play an important role in ensuring that information on economic and social conditions likely to result in a threat to international peace and security is quickly brought to the attention of the Organization and, in particular, the Security Council. In a wider context, we fully share the views put forward by other speakers in this debate on the importance and relevance of the "Agenda for Development" in addressing the economic and social circumstances which so often trigger and, indeed, fuel conflicts.

My Government has noted with satisfaction the pertinent comments of the Secretary-General on the question of what he has termed "micro-disarmament". The proliferation of small arms and light weapons, in its own way, needs to be as much a cause of concern for the international community as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. There can be no doubt about the need to stem and control the flow of small arms. It was for this reason that my Foreign Minister once again

proposed on behalf of my Government in September last that the United Nations should elaborate a code of conduct for conventional arms transfers. This proposal for a code, which would set out common principles to be observed in this area, was subsequently developed as a European Union initiative during the recent session of the General Assembly. It is still our belief that such a code of conduct remains necessary and would help to bring about the progress in conventional-arms control which the Secretary-General has called for in his report.

The Secretary-General's report recalls that the Charter authorizes the Security Council to impose sanctions for the purpose not of punishing a State but of securing modification of State behaviour which is threatening international peace and security. Drawing on the experience of cases where sanctions have been imposed, the Secretary-General accurately describes them as a blunt instrument. He adverts to aspects of their application which should be considered before their imposition, such as clear establishment both of the aims they are intended to achieve and of objective criteria for their termination. He also identifies several undesirable side effects that may result from their application, including severe impact on third States and exacerbation of humanitarian problems.

He suggests two headings under which action to alleviate such effects might be taken: first, facilitating the work of humanitarian agencies in situations where sanctions are imposed and, secondly, responding to the expectations raised by Article 50 of the Charter in regard to third States which are particularly adversely affected economically by sanctions.

These are extremely important considerations, not least in the context of the status of and support for Security Council decisions to impose sanctions. We believe that the Secretary-General's proposal, in paragraphs 75 and 76, to set up a Secretariat mechanism and give it investigatory tasks regarding the effect of sanctions is useful, and that its potential should be carefully examined by Member States.

It is, or should be, well understood by now that the whole capacity of the United Nations to engage in peacemaking and peace-keeping activities is hostage to the willingness of Member States to observe their obligations to pay their assessed contributions in full and on time. My Government fully endorses the pertinent comments of the Secretary-General on this matter, in particular his comments in paragraph 97 of his report. We look forward to solid progress being achieved in 1995 to improve the overall financial situation of the Organization so as to enable all United Nations activities, including those in the area of peacemaking and peace-keeping, to be conducted on a more secure financial basis.

In conclusion, my Government shares the view of the Secretary-General that, in taking stock of all that the United Nations has achieved in the area of peacemaking and peace-keeping during the first half-century of its existence, there is no reason for undue pessimism. As he aptly points out, much has been achieved, taking into account the fact that it is only in the past few years that the United Nations has really been in a position to act in the manner which was originally intended. Problems still remain to be resolved but they can be overcome provided the United Nations and its Member States demonstrate a willingness both to learn from recent experiences and to build on the Organization's successes. Progress will also require new attitudes and new thinking, and in this regard we echo the Secretary-General's views on the timeliness of a demonstration on the part of all Member States of a deeper commitment to the goals of international cooperation and true multilateralism.

The President *(interpretation from Spanish):* I thank the representative of Ireland for the kind words he addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Romania. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Gorita (Romania) *(interpretation from French)*: Allow me first of all, Sir, to express to you our congratulations on your accession to the presidency of the Security Council for January. Under your competent direction the Council has already carried out substantial work. I should also like to congratulate your predecessor, the Permanent Representative of Rwanda, on his performance as President of the Council for December.

This discussion of the Secretary-General's report "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace" has given rise to a whole series of activities, exchanges of view and possible recommendations, decisions and measures in connection with the long-term prospects for the United Nations in the light of the fiftieth anniversary of the world Organization.

The quantitative and qualitative developments in the world with regard to stability and security which are referred to in chapter II of the report evoke analyses and possible conclusions, both conceptual and practical.

Preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, peace-keeping, peace-building and peace enforcement — designated by the Secretary-General as instruments of peace and security — have become standard terminology for collective efforts to achieve international peace and security. Developing those instruments is only logical given the state of affairs.

The wide participation in this discussion and the preceding statements have demonstrated the importance attached to the subject and the readiness of Member States to contribute to the dialogue in this context. We fully share the view presented here by Ambassador Mérimée on behalf of the European Union.

I propose now to set forth some of our views on, in particular, such salient topics such as peace-keeping operations and sanctions.

Instruments such as preventive diplomacy and peacemaking have a dominant political component. It seems to us very important that this political component maintain its central place, even in those instances where efforts at prevention have not succeeded and resort to other peace-keeping instruments has become necessary. Experience has shown the importance of the political component during the mandate of a peace-keeping operation. From this point of view, material resources and personnel must be well calibrated. Conceptually, this implies the beneficial coexistence of the peace-keeping efforts, the functioning of the operations begun to that end, and the pursuit of sustained political action for the settlement of disputes and conflicts and the full restoration of peace.

We have studied with special attention the detailed analysis in the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace of United Nations peace-keeping operations. We find arguments there for the need for the international community to adopt a new attitude towards this increasingly complex dynamic field.

Romania has fully supported in the last five years the realistic and innovative ideas put before the Security Council and the General Assembly and its subsidiary bodies. The document presented by the Secretary-General is a laudable effort to make conceptual clarifications and to find the means to bridge the gap which continues to exist between the concrete operational capacity of the United Nations and the ambitious goals pursued. In my delegation's view, the increase in United Nations responsibility requires not only a clear determination by Member States to use already existing means but also the exploration of new means. To be sure, all the possible options have to be in keeping with the spirit of the Charter and must respect the criteria and the principles of time-tested United Nations operations.

The opinions expressed regarding command and control, dialogue between permanent members of the Security Council, the Secretariat and the troop-contributing countries, and a coherent approach to the tasks entrusted to United Nations missions offer additional elements for future developments.

Romania is prepared to make its contribution to the conceptual debate and is also prepared to participate effectively in the field.

The increasingly frequent resort to sanctions regimes as an instrument of security raises problems related to their impact and their unintended effects. In the report which is the subject of our debate, emphasis is placed on the legitimacy and the importance of sharing the costs of sanctions, so that they are not borne solely by a limited number of States that have the misfortune of being neighbours or principal economic partners of the State subjected to sanctions.

We must find the necessary ways and modalities to bring about, in the case of sanctions, the kind of solidarity that exists in the sharing of other costs resulting from United Nations peace-keeping and peacemaking operations. Ensuring that the political impact of sanctions is maximized while minimizing the collateral unintended damage seems to us a particularly relevant idea in this context.

We consider that the suggestions put forward by the Secretary-General in paragraphs 75 and 76 of his report deserve the full attention of the Security Council and of the United Nations in general.

The Supplement to "An Agenda for Peace" rightly emphasizes the relevance — the increasingly decisive relevance — of coordination and effective interaction between the United Nations and regional organizations to ensure international stability and security. For Romania, as for other countries in the central and eastern European region, the hopes for real stability and security are essentially linked to integration into the political, security and economic structures of the European-Atlantic community — the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union and the Western European Union.

The establishment of a strategy calling for a supple and coherent approach in relationships of partnership between NATO, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the United Nations, where each has its own responsibilities, powers and ways of operating, is of vital importance to the entire matter of Euro-Atlantic security, with beneficial effects for the entire collective security system based on the United Nations Charter.

I should like, before concluding, to make two more comments.

It is necessary to emphasize the importance of placing arms control and disarmament in the context of international stability and security. We pay tribute especially to the attention that the Secretary-General has given in his report to micro-disarmament. Full respect for arms embargo regimes is particularly relevant in this context.

In our opinion, one remarkable merit of the Supplement to "An Agenda for Peace" is the frank and realistic presentation of a special section on problems that arise with regard to enforcement action against those responsible for threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression.

The President (interpretation from Spanish): The next speaker is the representative of Latvia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Baumanis (Latvia): I should like, first, on behalf of my Government, to offer heartfelt condolences to Japan and its people and Government, and especially to the people of Kobe — the sister city to my capital city of Riga — for the human suffering and material losses caused by the earthquake three days ago.

Allow me, Sir, to congratulate you warmly on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of January. Your wide experience and diplomatic talent make me confident that the work of the Council will show excellent progress under your leadership. My deep appreciation also goes to your predecessor, Ambassador Bakuramutsa of Rwanda, for his capable leadership of the Council last month.

I am deeply grateful to the Secretary-General for his Supplement to "An Agenda for Peace". This report contains a very useful summary of lessons taught by the successes and failures of this Organization in promoting the maintenance of peace and security during the first years of the post-cold-war age. It brings to our attention some problems that need hard decisions by the Member States. Last, but not least, it is written in a plain and forthright style that aids comprehension and emphasizes the gravity of the subject.

The following is a response to selected proposals of the Secretary-General and to some subjects he has addressed in his report.

Latvia welcomes the Secretary-General's proposal, in paragraph 44 of document S/1995/1, for a rapid reaction force that can be deployed when there is an emergency need for peace-keeping troops. Latvia and its Baltic neighbours — Estonia and Lithuania — have demonstrated the importance they attach to peace-keeping through the establishment of a joint peace-keeping force called the BALTBAT — the Baltic Battalion. This battalion is currently being trained and equipped. Latvia is grateful to all those countries that have offered and will offer, to assist us with training and the supply of equipment. Subject to legislation of the three Baltic States and agreement at the United Nations, the BALTBAT could become a part of the rapid reaction force.

The Secretary-General, in paragraphs 63 to 65 of his report, has brought to the attention of Member States the large role that light weapons, especially small arms, play in the deaths and injuries that result from current conflicts. Latvia agrees with the Secretary-General that it is time to begin looking for effective solutions to the problems posed by small arms. Latvia favours a comprehensive and long-range solution to this problem. Without going into technical details of the solution, I can say that it appears to have three major steps.

The first step is to gather information on the nature and extent of the problem and then analyse the information, including a comparison of the present effects of small arms and weapons of mass destruction. The information thus gathered and analysed would be disseminated to Member States and to the public at large.

In the second step the quantities of small arms available in conflicts would be minimized by various means, such as United Nations control, buy-outs and/or confiscation, followed by destruction, and actions to diminish the volume of intra-regional and inter-regional transfers of small arms.

In the last, and ultimately most important, step, actions would be taken to diminish the volume of the production of small arms. A weapon not produced is a weapon that can never kill or cause injury.

In regard to sanctions — discussed by the Secretary-General in paragraphs 66 to 76 of his report — Latvia wishes to make the following points.

Sanctions, especially embargoes on goods other than weapons, are a blunt and infrequently effective instrument which can hurt not only aggressor Governments but innocent people and victims and third countries as well. This means that they are an instrument to be applied but rarely and with a clear understanding of its potential impacts. Sanctions need to respect the right to self-defence guaranteed by Article 51 of the Charter, and they must include effective means to respond to the claims of third countries under Article 50.

In regard to enforcement action — discussed by the Secretary-General in paragraphs 77 to 80 of his report — Latvia wishes to emphasize its belief that such action needs to be clearly separated from peace-keeping actions, in respect of both the authorities responsible for managing the actions and the forces engaged in them. The fundamental reason for the separation is that successful peace-keeping and successful enforcement are opposites, in three important respects: the former, unlike the latter, must have the consent of all parties to the conflict; it must be impartial; and it must not use force, except in self-defence.

In regard to these points, it is only fair to point out that Latvia is a party to a bilateral agreement that provides a role for the Security Council in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter.

With respect to financial resources for the maintenance of peace and security, the Secretary-General states in paragraph 97 of his report:

> "The failure of Member States to pay their assessed contributions for activities they themselves have voted into being makes it impossible to carry out those activities to the standard expected." *(S/1995/1, para. 97)*

Latvia wishes to make two observations in regard to that statement. First, the table on page 4 of the Secretary-General's report shows a dramatic increase in United Nations activities related to peace and security during the last eight years, including a budget for peace-keeping operations that has increased approximately sixteen-fold over this period. Secondly, the important elements of the methodology of assessing peace-keeping contributions, in particular the scheme of limits and the division of Member States into four groups for assessment purposes, were decided prior to this dramatic increase and may not be suitable to the present situation.

An inevitable consequence of the aforementioned points is the fact that over half of the outstanding contributions to the peace-keeping budget at the end of December 1994 was owed by 32 Member States. These are the Member States that suffer from excessive assessment rates due to distortions from the application of the scheme of limits, and in addition have generally poor economies.

We note that Member States did not explicitly vote a specific large increase in the total peace-keeping budget, nor did they explicitly vote excessive peace-keeping contributions for the 32 Member States. Most if not all Member States did not anticipate, and could not have anticipated, the present situation, because it is an indirect consequence of many decisions both by the 15 members of the Security Council and by the General Assembly, taken without explicit consideration of cumulative long-term effects. The time has come to carry out a comprehensive study of the decision-making process for peace-keeping operations with a view to improving, *inter alia*, control over the total peace-keeping budget and over the apportionment of peace-keeping contributions to Member States.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Latvia for his kind words addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Bulgaria. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Pashovski (Bulgaria): Allow me at the outset to congratulate Ambassador Cárdenas of Argentina on his assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month and to wish him success in his activities. I would like also to express our appreciation to last month's President, Ambassador Bakuramutsa of Rwanda.

Let me take this opportunity to express our high esteem for the delegations of all the members of the Council whose term expired at the end of last year. I would like also to congratulate the new members, which

have already started performing their important responsibilities with commitment and dedication.

This debate is being held at an important time in the life of the United Nations. We are on the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the Organization. In this regard, the report of the Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, presented as a supplement to "An Agenda for Peace", is a timely and very useful document. We welcome the ideas and proposals put forward in it. They will, without doubt, serve as a necessary impetus to the consideration of the problems the Organization is facing today.

For the past several years, we have no longer been living in a world marked by the characteristics of the cold war. The new realities have brought with them the need for new approaches by the international community and the United Nations as its universal representative body. The report entitled "An Agenda for Peace" was a truly innovative and constructive document. It played the role of a catalyst for reform of the Organization, adapting it more adequately to its new mission and arming it with a whole array of instruments for conflict prevention, crisis management and peace-building.

As we gain more and more experience in coping with the existing threats to peace and security, it is becoming increasingly evident that the trend towards expanding the involvement of the United Nations in preventive diplomacy and crisis management should be encouraged. Bulgaria has traditionally acknowledged and supported the better use of the instruments for prevention of conflicts and crises, and we welcome the substantive progress made in that sphere. Therefore, we share the prevailing opinion that conflict prevention and peace-keeping should be given priority over peace enforcement after conflicts have already broken out. At the same time, we are concerned at the problems that the Organization is facing in this area, some of which have been outlined by the Secretary-General in his paper. Further efforts should be exerted by the whole membership to overcome these impediments to the capacity of the United Nations to prevent and forestall conflict.

A major component of the Organization's efforts in conflict resolution is the growing involvement of the United Nations in peace-keeping throughout the world. Peace-keeping operations nowadays are more complex, dangerous and expensive than they were in the past. Special attention should be given to such pressing issues as enhancing the Organization's institutional framework in the area of peace-keeping, improving the planning process, searching for ways and means to solve the financial problems related to peace-keeping operations, and ensuring greater safety and security for peace-keepers — which is an imperative need.

Significant progress has been made in these spheres. We support the development of the system of so-called stand-by arrangements. Bulgaria has already committed national resources for use in United Nations peace-keeping operations. My Government is in the process of defining further possibilities for wider participation in United Nations peace-keeping operations, including through contributing military, police and civilian personnel.

We share the growing concern over the existing problems in the financial aspects of peace-keeping. Therefore, we join those who call for redoubling the efforts to find answers to these questions. In this respect, more attention should be given to the necessity to ensure the financial basis of new peace-keeping operations before they are established.

We find it very encouraging that there is an increasing awareness of the paramount importance of the issue of training in peace-keeping. It is clear that training is essentially the responsibility of national Governments. Nevertheless, we believe that there is a great potential, and indeed a need, for cooperation and assistance among Member States in this field. The United Nations Secretariat — the Department of Peace-keeping Operations in particular — also has a role to play. As for Bulgaria, we would welcome assistance from it for the establishment and operation of a national peace-keeping training centre for military, police and civilian specialists.

The Secretary-General has rightly pointed out the significance of adhering to a set of basic principles in the peace-keeping activities of the United Nations. Traditional rules and guidelines in this respect should continue to be upheld and reinforced. At the same time, new experiences prompt the need for innovative approaches, which should also be studied.

My country has repeatedly championed the improvement of consultation and coordination mechanisms for a more active involvement of Member States in the process of decision-making on peace-keeping operations, especially at its earlier stages. In this respect, we welcome the significant progress reflected in the Security Council statement of 4 November 1994. We would be glad to see this process continue with a view to introducing further necessary measures.

While on the topic of the comprehensive array of preventive and enforcement measures to solve conflicts, let me recall that Bulgaria attaches extreme importance to the issues related to devising an overall mechanism for the implementation of Article 50 of the United Nations Charter. We uphold the position that such a mechanism should guarantee equitable sharing of the economic burden by the whole international community.

The Republic of Bulgaria observes the decisions of the Security Council in good faith and to this effect has undertaken internal measures for strict implementation of the Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions. As a result of the application of the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Iraq and Libya, my country is suffering serious economic difficulties and enormous financial losses. To cite a specific example in this regard, suffice it to point out that Bulgaria's losses as a consequence of the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) alone amounted to $6.139 billion as of 30 September 1994. Our special situation in this respect has contributed to the heightened concern and sensitivity of the Bulgarian people to the so-called collateral or side effects of sanctions as an instrument of crisis management.

It is therefore with justified interest and appreciation that we have considered the Secretary-General's ideas outlined in his report. Indeed, the need for consultations with States that are not members of the Council but are directly concerned is most strongly felt when economic sanctions and other similar preventive and enforcement measures are considered. We note the steps taken in this direction during the past year as well as the proposals of the Secretary-General for further action. We cannot help but recognize, though, that there is still a lot to be desired with regard to addressing the existing problems in an adequate manner.

We, too, uphold the position that an institutionalized mechanism should be set up to provide a realistic possibility of offsetting the unfavourable effects of sanctions on third States and compensating them for their losses. This mechanism should involve the advance assessment of potential negative effects on their economies and the definition of ways and means for dealing with such unfavourable effects. Along with the United Nations Secretariat, the international financial institutions and other components of the United Nations system should assume greater responsibility.

Judging from our previous experience in this regard, it would be realistic to expect that the process of elaborating and putting into effect such a mechanism would take some time. Therefore, taking into account the fact that the problems of affected countries persist and are worsening, we deem it appropriate that the Security Council should in the meantime focus more actively on exploring ways of assisting them on a case-by-case basis. My country expects that the Security Council will address the need to render concrete assistance to Bulgaria in this regard.

The Republic of Bulgaria believes that the States which are potentially most affected should by all means be consulted regarding the implementation of economic measures taken in pursuance of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. It is our view that greater transparency in the work of the Security Council in its decision-making on sanctions-related issues will have great importance for increasing the effectiveness of the measures taken. At the same time, we deem it necessary to bring about a real improvement in the efficiency of the work of the sanctions committees. We hope that our proposals of 22 June and 15 December 1994 will meet with favourable consideration. The budgetary and personnel difficulties experienced by the United Nations Secretariat with regard to the services provided to these committees should also be speedily resolved. This is of concern not only to us but to other Member States as well.

The cooperation of the United Nations with regional organizations is an essential element of the evolving new international system of security and stability. Some very promising avenues for joint activities have already been revealed. My delegation is of the opinion that the meeting of regional organizations convened by the Secretary-General in New York on 1 August 1994 provided an ample opportunity better to understand and address the problems and challenges facing the international community today. As a European country, Bulgaria attaches particular significance to the coordination of efforts between the United Nations and the European and trans-Atlantic arrangements and security structures, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Western European Union.

In conclusion, I would like to underscore once again our appreciation of the dedication of the Secretary-General to the overall reform and adaptation of the Organization to the new challenges of our time. In this

connection, allow me to reaffirm our commitment to this process as well.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his kind words addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Muntasser (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (*interpretation from Arabic*): At the outset, my delegation extends to you, Sir, its warm congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month. We are convinced that you will accomplish this task with the greatest competence. My delegation also wishes to express its gratitude to Ambassador Manzi Bakuramutsa, the Permanent Representative of Rwanda, for his leadership of the Council last month.

I take this opportunity, on behalf of my country, to congratulate the new members of the Security Council: Botswana, Germany, Honduras, Indonesia and Italy.

The representative of Indonesia spoke yesterday on behalf of the member countries of the Non-Aligned Movement. My delegation fully endorses his statement and wishes to add the following comments.

During the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly my delegation welcomed "An Agenda for Peace", drawn up by the Secretary-General. Today, in discussing the "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace" (S/1995/1), my delegation wishes to thank the Secretary-General for his preparation of this important document, which we welcome as a further contribution to strengthening United Nations efforts to overcome negative factors and devise new approaches towards creating a world in which security and stability prevail, on foundations established by all States, foundations of equality and mutual respect.

Desirous of working for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Secretary-General has put forward some new ideas and proposals for strengthening the role of the United Nations in this respect. He has raised some very important issues. My delegation would like to express its view on some of these issues.

It must be recognized that there has been an increase in the number of peace-keeping operations undertaken by the United Nations. This is a result of an international imbalance, and it is that imbalance that should be stressed rather than the efforts to solve armed conflicts as such. We must deal with the underlying causes of this imbalance, whether political, economic or social.

It must be noted that the United Nations has scored some limited successes with its peace-keeping operations. But we must ensure more successes for these operations through the international support that is so essential and through the formulation of a clear mandate for each operation.

The Secretary-General has stated his views on the ways to meet actual and potential challenges. He has emphasized that the United Nations is in the best position to take a global, long-term approach in order to achieve lasting settlements of conflicts. My delegation supports his position on this, and we believe that the practical application of his approach requires that the United Nations discharge its functions under the Charter more appropriately. Moreover, certain great Powers must be prevented from exploiting the failures that have occurred in this sphere to resort to such unilateral methods as direct military intervention, as happened in Somalia, Haiti and Rwanda, which casts doubt on the real motives of such actions.

The Secretary-General has raised a number of points in the sphere of disarmament. My delegation shares his concern at the tremendous arms traffic and also at the existence of various types of mines. We support his appeal to all Member States to accord the highest priority to this question.

With regard to the other matters dealt with by the Secretary-General in this connection, we believe that the international community must focus its efforts more on nuclear weapons since they constitute the greatest danger to international peace and security. The most important requirement is the elimination of these weapons and indeed all weapons of mass destruction. Their manufacture, acquisition and use must be prohibited. We must also face the fact that one country is trying to acquire the largest possible number of nuclear weapons. My country has drawn attention to this fact in an official document, distributed by the United Nations under the symbol S/1994/1386.

My delegation also associates itself with the Secretary-General's desire to see the 1995 Conference of States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons crowned with success. My delegation emphasizes that the objective of the Conference must be the extension of that Treaty. This objective is linked to some other questions that must be dealt with — in the first place, the questions of providing credible security safeguards for non-nuclear countries and guaranteeing global adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty. My country attaches the greatest importance to this matter because the region in which we are situated suffers from a disequilibrium in the security sphere because Israel possesses nuclear weapons and refuses to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty and to subject its nuclear installations to International Atomic Energy Agency's control and safeguards.

The Supplement to An Agenda for Peace deals very frankly and objectively with a large number of issues. The fact is that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has repeatedly drawn attention to a number of those issues. My delegation does not intend to repeat what we have already said on this subject, but we wish to comment on two questions that are important to us.

First, we believe that the Secretary-General is entirely correct when he refers to the difficulties caused by the vagueness of the purposes of certain Security Council resolutions. We are raising this matter because my country has had practical experience with it. We have taken practical steps; we have accepted a number of initiatives; we have displayed a great deal of flexibility. We reacted positively to the clear demands contained in Security Council resolution 731 (1992). Some non-governmental organizations and a number of countries, including some members of the Security Council, have recognized that a sufficient number of measures have been taken to justify the lifting of sanctions. But certain countries members of the Security Council have refused to recognize this and, invoking their own interpretation of the resolution, persist in refusing to lift or even alleviate some of the sanctions imposed under resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993).

This policy has gone so far that my country is convinced that the purpose of the sanctions is simply to inflict the greatest possible damage on the Libyan people. We have pointed out in many forums, including this Council, the magnitude of the wrong that has been done to us. We have set forth the facts in official documents, the latest having been distributed under the symbol S/1994/921. I need only cite here, as an example of the damage caused by the sanctions, the crash of a Libyan civil aircraft in 1992, when 157 persons were killed — a crash resulting from the ban on providing Libya with spare parts for its aircraft. Moreover, 1,622 people have been killed in road accidents, and 350 people — most of them children, women and handicapped persons — have died because they could not be sent abroad for treatment.

Great economic damage has also been caused by these sanctions. The figure has been estimated to be more than $4.5 billion. This shows the real purpose of the sanctions imposed on Libya. It should be noted that the position of one country has made it impossible to send sick persons abroad for treatment.

My delegation shares the Secretary-General's view that sanctions are incompatible with the achievement of development objectives.

If the letter and the spirit of the Charter are observed, the situation will necessarily worsen if sanctions take the form of vengeance-seeking and punishment, particularly when it is absolutely clear that the purpose of the sanctions is to serve certain political interests, to the detriment of the Libyan people, who have committed no act endangering international peace and security.

The proposals for peaceful solutions have been turned down by the countries that insisted that these sanctions be imposed. Why were they in such a hurry to invoke Chapter VII of the Charter — and in a way incompatible with international norms and rules? My country has asked that account be taken of international norms and rules, and we have called upon the organs of the United Nations, including the Security Council, to try to convince the other parties to adhere to the principles of justice and serve the interests of all parties.

In conclusion, this discussion has made it possible for us to state our views in general terms. In due course, we will spell out our position on the other proposals contained in the "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace". We support the suggestion made by the Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement that the General Assembly set up an open-ended working group to study this Supplement in more detail and to submit its comments and its recommendations.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): The next speaker is the representative of Sierra Leone. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Bangura (Sierra Leone): Mr. President, my delegation is happy to see you, a worthy son of fraternal Argentina, directing the Security Council's deliberations during this first month of 1995. We are confident that the Council's work will benefit immensely from your proven diplomatic skill and ability.

May I also extend, through you, our appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Bakuramutsa, Permanent Representative of Rwanda, for the efficient manner in which he conducted the Council's business last month. In a similar vein, my delegation takes this opportunity to welcome the new members of the Security Council while expressing our confidence in the contribution they will make to the work of the Council, to the benefit of this Organization's membership.

It is my sad duty to convey, through you, Mr. President, the deepest condolences of the Government and people of the Republic of Sierra Leone to the Government and people of Japan on the untold destruction and human suffering brought upon them by the catastrophic earthquake that struck their country last Tuesday. We express our wishes for their speedy healing and recovery.

My delegation appreciates this opportunity to share its thoughts with members of the Security Council on the position paper submitted by the Secretary-General as a supplement to "An Agenda for Peace". Suffice it to say that we are in agreement with the views so eloquently expressed by the Permanent Representative of Indonesia, speaking on behalf of the members of the Non-Aligned Movement.

This paper, as would be expected, raises a range of interesting issues, some of which, given their complexity, will require from Member States a careful and detailed study from which a consensus approach could be forged. This being the case, my remarks today will be of a preliminary nature and confined to three areas explored by the Secretary-General: sanctions, preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, and post-conflict peace-building.

Few of us would question the efficacy of sanctions imposed by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter as a means of dealing with situations that pose a threat to international peace and security. Similarly, there is no disagreement that the provisions of Article 41 impose an obligation on Member States to comply with such a sanctions regime. However, the unintended consequences of sanctions, as demonstrated by recent experience, call for an in-depth examination of their application. We believe that the overall objective of any sanctions regime should not be one that would be compromised by the emergence of long-term factors that were not planned for. Of importance is the need to guard against creating in the target State conditions that lead to a hostile attitude being fomented and exploited in the general population against the international community.

This can easily set in when vulnerable groups are exposed to unrelenting hardship for which no remedy has been put in place. The Secretary-General's observation on this issue is quite pertinent: that a systemic approach should be considered in place of the current ad hoc arrangement. My delegation understands from this that what the Security Council would be called upon to take into account would be much more thorough planning, into which would go such elements as the objectives of the particular sanctions regime; a way of determining when these had been achieved; making provisions for humanitarian assistance to cushion the impact on vulnerable groups within the target State; and bringing the sanctions to an end when the original conditions requiring their imposition had been met.

A corollary, and no less important, is the need for the Security Council to now give serious thought to putting in place a mechanism to alleviate the adverse economic consequences of sanctions on third States. My delegation has consistently maintained that the provisions of Article 50 carry with them an expectation that goes beyond mere consultation with the Council — namely, that of a remedy. It stands to reason that measures designed to restore international peace and security, which, by their nature, are a collective responsibility of the United Nations, should be formulated within a dynamic framework whereby the commitment of individual Member States would not be undercut by the jeopardizing, in the long run, of their own economic well-being.

We note with satisfaction, therefore, the Secretary-General's suggestion for the establishment of a mechanism that would take a comprehensive view of the impact on the target State, the potential effects on third States, and how best the objective of the sanctions could be achieved to the maximum advantage of the international community. We are hopeful that, given the overwhelming opinion in favour of such a mechanism, the Security Council will give timely consideration to the modalities for its establishment.

On the issue of preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, we recognize the difficulties inherent in encouraging greater involvement by the Secretary-General through the use of good offices in conflict situations, thus creating a climate of good will in which possible solutions can be found. We could not agree more that a new ethos needs to be developed within the international community that would lead to a gradual shedding of the reluctance that Member States now have to acquiesce to the offer of preventive and peacemaking services by the United Nations, be it in inter-State or internal conflict situations.

My delegation believes that making such an ethos a reality requires of each of us the realization that we stand to expend fewer resources, both human and material, in accepting United Nations efforts than in securing costly military victories. Indeed, this truism underlies my delegation's proposal already before the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization. But, beyond this, caught as my country is in the throes of an internal situation which, as the international community knows, has its origins in the Liberian civil war, we, as a nation, have taken the step of requesting the assistance of the Organization, through the good offices of the Secretary-General, to bring peace to our country.

Our love of peace and our concern for the security and prosperity of our nation are greater than the false perceptions which an inviolable State sovereignty may dictate. It is in this context also that my Government is actively considering the various options open to it, not the least of which is the presence of a small field mission of the type referred to in paragraph 31 of the Secretary-General's position paper. We will continue to work closely with the Secretary-General on this matter so that in due course we can draw upon the accumulated experience and expertise of the Organization to bring peace to our country.

Let me now turn to the issue of post-conflict peace-building, which is of particular concern to us also, in the light of our own present situation. Undoubtedly, the restoration of peace can be greatly enhanced by the rebuilding of structures and institutions devastated by conflict. Building trust among the different factions, pursuing aggressive disarmament timetables, reintegrating former combatants into the civilian sector and crafting long-term political and socio-economic programmes are all activities that will guarantee durable peace at both the national and regional levels.

Bringing this about should therefore be seen as a common venture and a responsibility to be shared by the State or States concerned and the United Nations, in the interest of safeguarding international peace and security. This should be seen as an investment that the concerned parties and the international community must make to forestall a relapse and encourage prospects for long-term peace and stability. Even in this, prudence and opportunity-cost can dictate no other choice.

What I have attempted to show is that the problems that the Organization and its Members have had to confront since the end of the cold war are not isolated elements in our world picture. They are interconnected in ways some of us may be unwilling to admit. They are as much a legacy of a past era as they are an opportunity to forge new linkages for the future.

Thus, as we move forward in the coming months to consider these issues that the Secretary-General has raised, we should not forget that the pillars for peace and security which we must construct in this period of transition must rest equally on political and economic foundations. I can only conclude by echoing the Secretary-General's statement that the face of conflict in our time requires of us a deeper commitment to cooperation and genuine multilateralism than we have achieved before. It is therefore auspicious that we have recently embarked on fashioning "An Agenda for Development", which, it goes without saying, could establish a new ethos of multilateralism leading to global peace and security. We are convinced that, together, the Agenda for Peace and the Agenda for Development provide us with the keys to reaching that goal.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Sierra Leone for the kind words he addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Norway. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Biørn Lian (Norway): Allow me first to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of January. I am convinced that the skill you display in the performance of your duties will enable the Council to deal with the important matters before it in a businesslike and expeditious manner.

Norway joins others in welcoming the Secretary-General's position paper at the opening of the United Nations fiftieth anniversary year. The Supplement to "An Agenda for Peace" is an important and valuable contribution to the ongoing process of strengthening the United Nations activities in the field of peace and security. The Secretary-General has concisely drawn our attention to the most urgent issues facing the United Nations, drawing on the experience gained since his report "An Agenda for Peace" was issued in June 1992.

I would like, as others have done, to comment in a preliminary manner on some of the issues that are of particular importance to my authorities.

We believe preventive diplomacy and peacemaking are challenging tasks in which the United Nations is well placed to play an important role through a variety of instruments, such as mediation, conflict resolution and the Secretary-General's good offices. We should all do our utmost to allow future United Nations activities for peace and security increasingly to be focused on efforts that can solve problems before they are allowed to deepen into crisis or conflict. At a time when a multitude of demands are being put on the Organization and resources are scarce, focused preventive action will be the most efficient way in which the United Nations can seek to meet tomorrow's challenges to collective security.

Effective preventive action requires early action. Our experience is that international assistance can preserve peace, save lives and protect human rights and democracy if it reaches vulnerable communities in time. We have too often been passive observers of unique opportunities being lost, because we, as individual nations or as United Nations Members, did not mobilize resources in time. Too often our response mechanisms have proved to be inadequate for the early needs of embattled democracies, peace initiatives or disaster-prone and vulnerable communities.

Norway has tried to meet these challenges by establishing the Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System and the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights. At the request of United Nations agencies, newborn democracies and parties to armed conflicts, more than 500 relief workers, human rights advisers and peace mediators and observers were dispatched last year to more than 30 countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, Europe and the Middle East.

These stand-by arrangements have made it possible for us to play an active role as facilitator in relation to four separate peace processes: in the Middle East, in Guatemala, in the former Yugoslavia and, most recently, in Sri Lanka. In all of these peace efforts, our role is either supportive of, complementary to or preparatory for, the United Nations.

As pointed out by the Secretary-General, solutions need to be found to the practical problems of finding persons with the necessary qualifications and seniority to act as special representative or special envoy of the Secretary-General, and of providing the resources needed for establishing small field missions for preventive diplomacy and peacemaking.

In this connection, I would like to point to the instrument of preventive deployment. The deployment of forces with a clear preventive mandate was for the first time initiated in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with a joint Nordic force. So far this operation must be described as successful and it therefore, we feel, stands out as an example to be followed in other potential conflict areas.

The first main obstacle to a strategy of preventive deployment is the lack of resources. Secondly, and perhaps most important, the formal authorities in conflict-prone countries often resist United Nations or other international involvement. The Secretary-General, therefore, underscores that we must create a climate of opinion in which the norm would be for Member States to accept an offer of United Nations good offices or for themselves to invite such an offer from the United Nations.

Similar attitudes should be promoted amongst Member States with regard to preventive deployment.

The concept of peace-keeping operations should be further developed to meet the new challenges. Norway has been and still is a staunch supporter of United Nations peace-keeping operations. We have contributed to a large number of them and have been active in the development of their concepts — the creation of training manuals and the establishment of stand-by forces. In particular, the strengthening of United Nations command and control capabilities has been a concern of ours for a long time. Suffice it to mention the Nordic initiative at the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly and the informal working group on command and control that was set up under the chairmanship of Norway, also as a follow-up to the informal Ottawa meeting on peace-keeping operations. The Secretary-General has now

issued a separate report regarding this issue which we will have the opportunity to discuss in further detail in the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations later this spring. Let me just emphasize the importance we attach to clear lines of command and a common understanding of operational control. We see the principle of unity of command as a prerequisite for a successful peace-keeping operation.

Norway fully shares the Secretary-General's concern that a peace-keeping operation should not be asked to use force when its existing composition, armament, logistics support and deployment deny it the capacity to do so. The viability of the operation and the danger to the personnel must be the main priorities.

We furthermore support the Secretary-General's call that before the Security Council takes a decision on a new or expanded peace-keeping operation the United Nations should be assured that the necessary personnel and equipment will be forthcoming.

In this connection, Norway welcomes the improvement we have witnessed in the procedures for consultations between troop-contributing countries, members of the Security Council and the Secretary-General. We firmly believe that an enhanced dialogue with the Security Council and increased transparency in these matters will be of crucial importance for maintaining broad political support for United Nations peace-keeping operations in the Member States. The consultations with troop-contributing countries should be structured, focused on areas of particular concern and take place on a regular basis as well as when extensions and/or modifications of existing mandates are being considered. The Security Council should, whenever possible, consult with potential troop-contributing countries also before a decision is taken by the Security Council to launch a new peace-keeping operation.

The new tasks of the United Nations peace-keeping operations are manifold. What is now needed is consideration of new proposals in relation to the new tasks of peace-keeping operations. The Secretary-General's forward-looking ideas regarding a rapid reaction force, a reserve stock of standard peace-keeping equipment, and partnerships between Governments that need equipment and those Governments ready to provide it all merit further study and deliberation. These proposals are intended to respond to present and future requirements that can already now be foreseen, and therefore deserve our full attention.

We share many of the Secretary-General's comments in the area of post-conflict peace building. The transition from a peace-keeping operation to longer-term humanitarian and development efforts needs careful management, and the question of coordination and responsibility needs to be closely considered in each individual case.

With regard to the issue of anti-personnel mines, my delegation believes that we are off to a good start, thanks to initiatives by the European Union and the United States, both of which were firmly supported by my Government. We will continue to be actively engaged in these issues and in follow-up activities.

Sanctions will continue to be an important instrument in United Nations efforts to foster peace and security. The Security Council should, in connection with the imposition and use of sanctions, assess the consequences of sanctions on third countries and explore ways of assisting third countries that are adversely affected by sanctions. In fact, similar proposals were presented by the Nordic countries in their document "Shaping the peace: the United Nations in the 1990s", which was circulated in October 1991. It is important that the instrument of sanctions not be weakened in any way.

The Secretary-General voices his concern regarding the consequences of using force, other than for self-defence, in a peace-keeping context. While we agree with those who point out that the use of coercive measures cannot be ruled out, we feel that the issue of the use of force or peace enforcement should be approached with caution. Recent experience shows that it is difficult to foresee the full consequences of peace enforcement operations. Few crises lend themselves readily to this type of approach, and many countries tend to be reluctant to put their soldiers under United Nations command for operations that are perceived as risky or uncertain. The limited resources of the United Nations impede peace-enforcement actions. In the cases where the Security Council mandates such actions, they may have to be delegated to Member States or other arrangements which have the necessary capacity to implement them.

The issue of coordination is crucial, be it within the Secretariat, between the various United Nations agencies and bodies or between Headquarters and the field, and also in Governments' positions in various bodies. The objective must be to solve the tasks at the right level and by the relevant organs in close cooperation. We believe that more work is required in order to improve the

practical coordination of all aspects of a comprehensive peace-keeping operation, including humanitarian efforts, particularly in the field. Here again, the role of the special representative of the Secretary-General, the role of the force commander and the chain of command need to be absolutely clear.

In conclusion, I should like to point to the critical financial situation of the United Nations with respect to peace-keeping. The resources of the United Nations are stretched to the limit, as are those of many troop-contributing countries. The United Nations is faced with a serious financial situation, which is adversely affecting peace-keeping operations. These problems need urgently to be solved on a permanent basis.

As the Secretary-General himself has said, the ability of the United Nations to perform the tasks for which it was created is in peril, and this is no longer simply a financial question but an urgent political question. Norway fully agrees with this analysis and fully supports the introduction of the financial incentives, sanctions and reforms that the Secretary-General has suggested, as a political measure to meet the threats we perceive to the Organization. In our view, reforms are necessary to maintain and renew multilateralism.

The President *(interpretation from Spanish):* The next speaker is the representative of Egypt. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Elaraby (Egypt): Allow me, at the outset, to express our condolences and to convey a message of sympathy and support to the delegation of Japan and to the Japanese people following the tragic earthquake.

Once more, Mr. President, I should like to express the appreciation of the delegation of Egypt for your very able leadership of the Council. The timing of our discussion today under your presidency is no coincidence. Not long ago we met in this Chamber to express our support for a joint proposal, initiated by Argentina and New Zealand, on strengthening the arrangements for consultations between troop-contributing countries, members of the Security Council and the Secretary-General. We are confident that the Security Council, under your wise leadership, will give the important subject under discussion today the consideration it deserves.

We listened to the Ambassador of Indonesia speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. We fully support the views expressed in his statement, and I should like to add some comments that the Egyptian Government wants to put on record.

I should like to start by welcoming the timely introduction of the Supplement to "An Agenda for Peace". The Secretary-General was indeed able to capture the attention of the entire international community by highlighting problem areas where the United Nations is encountering difficulties in fulfilling the mandate entrusted to it and where Member States are called upon to make "hard decisions".

More than two years after the submission of "An Agenda for Peace", one has to recognize the fundamental changes in the international environment and their bearing on the performance and efficacy of the United Nations. The Secretary-General has reminded us — and rightly so — that we are still in a time of transition after the end of the cold war.

There are, however, justifiable doubts that

> "the new spirit of commonality that had emerged, of which the 1992 Summit was ... a clear manifestation" *(S/1995/1, para. 2)*

is still prevailing. When measured against the determination and unity of the international community demonstrated during the last war in the Gulf, the lack of international resolve to deter and repel aggression in places like Bosnia can only reinforce these doubts.

The issue of prevention has emerged in recent years as one of the essential tools of international diplomacy in confronting potential or existing conflict situations. Added importance and value are given to preventive action if we bear in mind the limited resources of the international community working through the United Nations and its various organs or through regional arrangements or agencies, whether intergovernmental or non-governmental.

My delegation therefore agrees with the Secretary-General's assertion that only sustained efforts to resolve underlying socio-economic, cultural and humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation. It is evidently better to prevent conflicts through early warning, quiet diplomacy and the active engagement of the United Nations than to have to undertake major politico-military efforts to resolve them after they have broken out. The Secretary-General has made several suggestions to enhance United Nations

capability in the field of prevention. We should embark on an in-depth examination of the feasibility of implementing his proposals.

The role of regional organizations and arrangements, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter, could be crucial to the success of preventive diplomacy measures. The United Nations is called upon to help regional efforts to develop preventive mechanisms for regional conflicts. In this context, the Government of Egypt has decided to establish in Cairo a training centre for conflict resolution and peace-keeping in Africa. We are confident that this newly established centre will receive substantial assistance from the United Nations and countries with long experience in peace-keeping training.

The nature of peace-keeping has evolved rapidly and expanded beyond the traditional peace-keeping and military observation missions.

The Secretary-General reaffirms in his report that the last few years have confirmed that respect for certain basic principles of peace-keeping is essential to its success. His analysis of recent successes and failures shows that in all the successes the principles to which he referred were respected, and that in most of the less successful operations one or other of them was not.

Some existing peace-keeping operations were given additional mandates that required the use of force and therefore could not be combined with existing mandates requiring the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force. Unfortunately, these operations were mandated with such expanded missions when their existing composition, armament, logistic support and deployment denied them the necessary capacity.

The logic of peace-keeping flows from political and military premises that are quite distinct from those of enforcement. When the Council authorizes an operation under Chapter VII of the Charter it should be clear in everyone's mind that we are departing from traditional peace-keeping, which is based on the consent of the parties.

The report has accurately cited the difficulties facing enforcement by the United Nations or by a group of Member States entrusted by the Security Council to implement such actions. When adopting enforcement measures the Council should strictly follow the Charter's provisions under Chapter VII. Expanding the definition of what may constitute a threat to international peace and security, and consequently justify enforcement measures, could have a negative impact on the Organization's stature and on its credibility. The same is true when the political will to enforce peace is missing while an abusive aggression is being witnessed by the whole world.

The Secretary-General's report contains very ambitious plans to make troops and equipment available to mandated peace-keeping operations. What the Secretary-General calls a rapid reaction force may be a far-reaching proposal inspired by the idea of a United Nations army. In our view, any such arrangements should, however, be set up according to the Charter's provisions and following wide consultations.

While we support the principle of the unity of command and the necessity for a peace-keeping operation to function as an integrated whole, it is equally important to consult with the troop-contributing countries. Such consultations should be undertaken in accordance with the spirit of the provisions of Article 44 of the Charter by institutionalizing the consultations with troop-contributing countries as an integral part of the decision-making process on any peace-keeping operation. The debate that preceded the adoption of the Security Council presidential statement on strengthening the arrangements for consultations is a good indication of how strongly Member States feel about this issue.

At the Security Council summit meeting in 1992, the Council underscored the interest in and concern for disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, with special reference to weapons of mass destruction, the most devastating of which are the nuclear weapons. The Secretary-General, however, was not able to report any tangible achievements in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, an issue which has enjoyed unanimous international support and the highest priority since the adoption of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in 1978.

Regrettably, some States continue to decline to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which is due for review and extension this year. Egypt has repeatedly advocated the universality of the NPT — the only way to guarantee its viability and its credibility in the future. We therefore call on all parties, especially the five permanent members of the Security Council, to spare no effort to attain this goal, thereby strengthening international as well as regional

security and facilitating the possibilities of extending the NPT.

The Secretary-General has referred in his report to the possible ramifications of sanctions. He has rightly emphasized the need to examine this important issue, which directly affects other countries neighbouring the targeted country — if one can call a country a targeted country — and, in particular, the vulnerable sectors of the population of these countries. He has suggested that a mechanism be established for assessing, monitoring and measuring the effects of sanctions, that ways be explored of assisting Member States that are suffering collateral damage, and that the sanctions be lifted as soon as they have achieved their intended purposes. We welcome the Secretary-General's suggestions in this regard.

Egypt has long called for the full implementation of Article 50 of the Charter. We strongly believe that the responsibility of the Security Council does not stop at imposing sanctions. The Council should have prior consultations with countries that may be affected by the sanctions and must be able to review and assess the desired political impact of the sanctions and to minimize their collateral damage. We believe that the General Assembly should address this issue and consider adopting appropriate measures to alleviate the negative effects that have afflicted many countries.

In conclusion, we share the Secretary-General's call for fresh thinking, for striving together and creating new ways to overcome crises. The world that emerged after the end the cold war may still be in transition. The new age, however, holds great promise for both peace and development and we should exert every effort to fulfil that promise.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Egypt for his kind words addressed to me.

The final speaker is the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Misic (Bosnia and Herzegovina): Let me begin by expressing, on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, our most sincere condolences to the Government of Japan and to the families of the victims of the earthquake that struck Kobe. We are confident, though, that with resolve and perseverance the people of Japan will overcome the tragedy that has befallen them.

It is indeed reassuring to see Ambassador Cárdenas at the helm of this ship, and we are confident that he will guide it with skill and diligence.

Allow me at the outset to express our appreciation to the Secretary-General for his ongoing efforts and study concerning the ways to strengthen international peace and security, as expressed in his "Agenda for Peace" and its supplement. The original "Agenda for Peace" was one of several appropriate channels through which this Organization began to address the post-cold-war challenges. It offered some enlightening analyses and many ideas that can benefit the pursuits of the United Nations. The "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace" is no less valuable a document in its acknowledgment that the international community continues to be in transition, and that at this moment there can be no absolute theories or methods. The situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of the first challenges encountered by the international community and this Organization, and it remains a challenge. Barely three months after the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina had started, the Secretary-General delivered "An Agenda for Peace", emphasizing the objective of achieving

> "a United Nations capable of maintaining international peace and security, of securing justice and human rights and of promoting, in the words of the Charter, 'social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom'." *(S/24111, para. 3)*

Since then, the United Nations has been through both success and failure, and has been given numerous lessons which, as the Secretary-General rightly states in paragraph 6 of the Supplement, we must learn if we are to attain the objectives of the Charter. It is in this context of first hand experience that we will make our statement today.

First and foremost, we would like to fully associate ourselves with paragraph 16 of the Supplement. We are indeed of the view that the personnel of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), particularly those outside the top command circles, have performed with great courage, commitment and bravery under incredibly harsh and frustrating circumstances.

As for chapter II of the Supplement, "Quantitative and Qualitative Changes," we concur with the finding that most post-cold-war conflicts are of an intra-State nature,

> "though some of them, especially in the former Yugoslavia, have some inter-State dimensions also". *(S/1995/1, para. 11)*

The Bosnian experience has provided one of the most clear-cut examples of the Supplement's finding that "civilians are the main victims and often the main targets" *(ibid., para. 12)* of such conflicts. The Supplement also rightly points out — and our situation offers an example — that humanitarian endeavours are hampered.

> "because the relief of a particular population is contrary to the war aims of one or other of the parties". *(ibid., para. 18)*

That is why today the Karadzic Serbs continue to block Sarajevo's blue route, and why they do not allow wood shipments to the city. As was confirmed Tuesday by United Nations spokesman Chris Janowski, "They just want to keep people cold and miserable". The temperature in Sarajevo yesterday was minus 20 degrees Celsius; today it is even lower.

The creation of the Department of Political Affairs and its ability to "follow political developments worldwide" *(ibid., para. 26)* are most welcome and, if it does this with diligence, it can greatly reduce the number of conflicts and the burden of the Department of Peace-Keeping. Regional organizations like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and others, can contribute to the success of the Department by regularly providing it with information, while the Organization as a whole must improve its credibility so that individual Member States will be more forthcoming in providing as well as asking for necessary assistance.

We would concur with the assessment of the Supplement that the resolution of conflicts

> "requires patient diplomacy and the establishment of a political process that permits, over a period of time, the building of confidence and negotiated solutions to long-standing differences". (*S/1995/1, para. 36*)

But it would be careless to accept such an assessment on absolute terms. Our case has demonstrated that political processes can be used as a cover for prolonging aggression.

As for the time required, it must not be indefinite, and those involved in negotiations must, if necessary, be ready to swallow their pride, admit failure and pursue action that may be dramatically different to the failed process. Furthermore, those who are mediating must have an understanding of the background; they must understand exactly who the parties to a conflict are and their motives for fighting. Are their motives consistent with the Charter? What policies have they pursued? To what extent are they legitimate or illegitimate? These and other questions must be answered before one can decide whether or not impartiality should be applied.

The finding in chapter III, section A, "Preventive diplomacy and peacemaking", that impartiality is essential to peace-keeping operations, is at least deserving of scrutiny and in no way deserves to be treated as an absolute. The United Nations must be careful as to what it judges to be a peace-keeping operation and the assumptions under which it will decide to work. It is widely agreed that all conflicts have their peculiar characteristics, which the United Nations has often found itself to be ignorant of, thus pursuing an approach that has little impact on the conflict — or even a negative impact.

As for the application of impartiality in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it has very often served to undermine Security Council mandates, especially with respect to the protection of safe areas and the delivery of humanitarian aid. In a situation such as that in Bosnia, where mandates have been pronounced in reaction to "ethnic cleansing" and siege, impartiality is incompatible with the fulfilment of the safe area and aid delivery mandates, especially when, as pronounced by the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Abuses in the Former Yugoslavia, "ethnic cleansing" and siege are practised as policy by the Serbian forces.

This has led to a gross inconsistency in the pursuance of agreed policies and measures necessary for the implementation of Council mandates. In total disregard of the situation on the ground, a zealousness in diminishing the range and spirit of mandates has come to characterize the policy of some involved in UNPROFOR's chain of command.

Impartiality cannot lead to progress if it means accepting the blocking of humanitarian convoys and of

the delivery of fuel and other aid, in order to benefit the aims of conquest and siege, being resigned to entire units of UNPROFOR being taken hostage and informing those who have shelled hospitals in safe areas when and where the "cosmetic" or "proportionate" airstrike against an offending tank will take place. It is absolutely unacceptable that Security Council mandates are perverted to benefit those whose only international persona is that of international pariah and who reject peace in favour of a war inspired by an appetite for the territory and resources of a sovereign Member State as well as by xenophobic hatred.

The Secretary-General's assessment that none of the instruments available to maintain international peace and security can be used unless adequate resources are made available is one which I believe every Member State can agree with. But there is also the question of how finances made available are being spent. It is widely acknowledged, for example, that UNPROFOR in Zagreb has an excess of Land Rovers, regularly seen on the streets of the city. This money could have gone to a better end, such as defensive equipment for Bangladeshi peace-keepers in Bihac. As with any administrative organ, spending errors do take place and need to be corrected.

There have been too many instances in Bosnia alone, not to mention other peace-keeping or peacemaking missions, that necessitate an in-depth study as to how to ensure that individuals entrusted with mandates by this Organization do not deviate from them or from the principles of the Charter, standard ethical behaviour and common sense. For examples of such poor behaviour, we could go back as far as mid-summer 1992, yet we need only go back to this past Monday, when it was reported and confirmed that the Commander of UNPROFOR in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was ready to hand over flight plans of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to the Karadzic Serbs. This action would directly threaten NATO pilots, reduce the NATO alliance to a bargaining chip and further set back what security mechanisms there are for the populations of the safe areas and the peace-keepers. The folly of this action is even more glaring when one considers the following excerpt from "An Agenda for Peace":

> "The fault [for unresolved conflicts] lies first in the lack of political will ... to seek a solution ... and second, in the lack of leverage at the disposal of a third party". (*S/24111, para. 34*)

Despite the fact that in Bosnia only the Karadzic Serbs, in their rejection of the Contact Group peace plan, can be associated with the first fault, it was considered to neutralize further what little leverage — namely, NATO — was at the disposal of the UNPROFOR Commander in Bosnia.

Bosnia has seen numerous cases of abuse by what is most probably only a small group of individuals. These cases include:

> Neglect for fact in an effort to equate legal Governments and criminal gangs, as evidenced by a 76-page report entitled "Who's Who of Former Yugoslavia", put out in June 1994 by the Department of United Nations Military Information in Zagreb, which was later admitted by United Nations officials to be factually marred.
>
> Suppression of fact in order to exonerate and protect those who have violated a safe area, as was the case in Gorazde, and to exonerate and protect those who have violated both safe area and international border, the so-called Knin Serbs.
>
> Disregard for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of a Member State and a Security Council mandate, as was done by the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in their approval of illicit fuel shipments to the so-called Croatian Serbs, in violation of resolution 820 (1993).
>
> Failure to report and act on crimes against humanity, as was the case in mid-summer 1992, when UNPROFOR reports confirming the existence of concentration camps, where tens of thousands of men, women and children had been starved, tortured, raped and murdered, had been kept confidential.

All of these actions in and of themselves warrant a serious inquiry into the individuals responsible for them. As they are only examples of a greater pattern, it is high time to create and develop mechanisms for accountability. This issue of accountability is as critical to the functioning of the United Nations as the issue of finances, because without accountability there is no credibility, without which the United Nations cannot function.

My last point is that important bases for the development of policy and the formulation of important decisions and their successful implementation include a proper understanding of events, calling things by their proper names and ensuring the speedy provision of timely and exact information. This has been rightly emphasized by many speakers, particularly eloquently by the Ambassador of Ireland and, yesterday, by the representative of the United Kingdom.

Regrettably, however, we have far too often witnessed the manipulation of information in various ways, including the suppression of accurate information, while unverified — or very difficult to verify — information is supplied.

In this fashion, dealing with such individuals, who are certainly easily recognizable, it will be impossible rationally to resolve international crises or to enhance the credibility of the United Nations. It will also be difficult to pursue the new world order, which should promote peace and prosperity for all countries.

It is certainly a success that this planet Earth has remained in its orbit, despite all that has been done to it in this century, and we recognize that this Organization deserves a great deal of credit for this success. But we must be courageous, face the truth and acknowledge that this world could be in a healthier and more fortunate phase had greater responsibility been exercised, had principles been abided by, and had there been greater respect for the existing norms and principles upon which this Organization is based, which should be defended rather than arbitrarily interpreted by various bodies or individuals.

It is our sincere hope and belief that this debate and the many contributions made to it by Member States will revitalize the Organization's approach to strengthening international peace and security in the future.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): There are no further speakers inscribed on my list.

The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on the agenda.

The meeting rose at 2.20 p.m.